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THE SOCIAL CONTEXT VARIABLE IN HOSTILE
ENVIRONMENT LITIGATION
MichaelJ. Frank*
In all harassment cases, judging the objective severity of the har-
assment "requires careful consideration of the social context in which
particular behavior occurs .... Common sense, and an appropriate
sensitivity to social context, will enable courts and juries to distinguish
between simple teasing... and conduct which a reasonable person in
the plaintiffs position would find severely hostile or abusive."'
Although Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc. is generally
known for its holding that same-sex harassment is actionable under
Title VII, the decision is more frequently cited for its instruction to
consider social context when analyzing hostile work environment
claims.2 Courts attempting to give effect to this instruction, however,
have encountered difficulty in determining exactly what the Court
meant by "social context." Oncale's social context exhortation is sus-
ceptible to different interpretations and can be construed to support a
wide range ofjudicial practices. These include analyzing hostile envi-
ronment claims according to a "reasonable woman" standard,3 plac-
ing special emphasis on any romantic relationship or friendship
between the victim and putative harasser,4 considering all acts of har-
assment as an aggregate whole,5 and considering whether the harass-
ment occurred in a public or private context,6 to name but a few.
* The author is an attorney specializing in labor and employment law. He
wishes to thank Professor Samuel Estreicher, Director of the Center for Labor and
Employment Law at New York University Law School, for his helpful comments and
suggestions.
1 Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 81-82 (1998) (empha-
sis added).
2 See, e.g., EEOC v. R&R Ventures, 244 F.3d 334, 340 (4th Cir. 2001);Jackson v.
Quanex, 191 F.3d 647, 661 (6th Cir. 1999).
3 See infra Part II.B.
4 See infra Part II.C.
5 See infra Part II.D.
6 See infra Part II.A.
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Oncale's mandate can also be interpreted as requiring courts to
pay close attention to the workplace culture-sometimes called the
blue- or white-collar culture-especially as this relates to the un-
welcomeness and severity of the harassment, and its cause. 7 In this
age where coarse language is commonplace, an assessment of pur-
ported harassment in light of this culture could be important. Ac-
cording to this view, Oncale endorsed the practice whereby courts
examine the record to determine whether vulgar language and un-
pleasant conduct is a normal part of the workplace, and whether the
plaintiff participated in similar conduct.8 When these key attributes
are found, the courts deem them highly probative in determining
whether the purported harassment was severely offensive, unwelcome,
or motivated by the plaintiff's sex.9
Under this understanding of "social context" the prevalence of
blue-collar behavior usually precludes the plaintiff's hostile environ-
ment claim, as courts interpret pervasive vulgarity as (1) indicating
that the conduct was a regular part of the environment and, thus, not
always directed at the plaintiff and not unwelcome, (2) suggesting that
neither the plaintiff nor a reasonable person would find the conduct
severe, or (3) indicating that the conduct was not based on the plain-
tiffs sex.10 This is particularly true where the plaintiff similarly used
7 Because the Sixth and Tenth Circuits have already used the adjective "blue-
collar" to describe these workplaces, it is convenient to continue using this nomencla-
ture. The author means no disrespect to blue-collar workers and recognizes that
many of these workers conduct themselves in a gentlemanly or lady-like manner that
would rival white-collar workers in refinement. One need only listen to the Nixon
audio tapes to realize that white-collar workers are often not models of etiquette.
Similarly, a recent description of a New York law office shows thatjuvenile behavior is
not confined to blue-collar contexts. See Fitzgerald v. Ford Marrin Esposito Witmeyer
& Gleser, L.L.P., 153 F. Supp. 2d 219, 222 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) ("[C]onversation became
'quite vulgar' in the evening . . ").
8 See Dominic Bencivenga, Same-Sex Harassment: Ruling Puts Work Environment
Under Scrutiny, N.Y. L.J., Mar. 12, 1998, at 5 ("The broad, conduct-based analysis could
establish class distinctions for Title VII plaintiffs, as it could be interpreted to allow
different standards for different work environments.").
9 See, e.g., Johnson v. Hondo, Inc., 125 F.3d 408, 412 (7th Cir. 1997) (holding
that crude statements were ordinarily an expression of animosity in the workplace
and thus not based on the plaintiff's sex); Gross v. Burggraf Constr. Co., 53 F.3d 1531,
1547 (10th Cir. 1995) (holding that supervisor's offensive comments, taken in the
social context of a construction company, were not based on the plaintiffs sex); Reed
v. Shepard, 939 F.2d 484, 491 (7th Cir. 1991) (holding that crude comments and
conduct were a regular part of the prison work environment and were not offensive to
the plaintiff, particularly in light of the fact that she was an active participant in simi-
lar conduct).
10 This Article often speaks in terms of sexual harassment because this is the most
common type of harassment litigation. See Lipsett v. Univ. of P.R., 864 F.2d 881, 898
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foul language or engaged in behavior comparable to that of her pur-
ported harasser.1' Under this approach, the continual use of crude
language, so long as it was not directed at the plaintiff, frequently will
not constitute actionable harassment; only continued touching or par-
ticularly virulent invectives would result in liability for the employer.
12
More often than not, cases in which the courts have taken a close
look at the cultural context have been easy ones that probably would
have come out the same way regardless of the blue-collar environ-
n.19 (1st Cir. 1988). But the discussion is also applicable to harassment on other
prohibited bases-like religion or race-and harassment which offend other statutes
like the ADA or the ADEA. See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 787 n.1
(1998) ("Although racial and sexual harassment will often take different forms, and
standards may not be entirely interchangeable, we think there is good sense in seek-
ing generally to harmonize the standards of what amounts to actionable harass-
ment."); Silk v. City of Chicago, 194 F.3d 788, 804 (7th Cir. 1999) (applying the Title
VII standard for hostile environment sex harassment to a harassment claim under the
ADA); Brennan v. Metro. Opera Ass'n, 192 F.3d 310, 318 (2d Cir. 1999) ("The analy-
sis of the hostile working environment theory of discrimination is the same under the
ADEA as it is under Title VII."); Standifer v. Gen. Teamsters Union No. 460, No.
GIV.A.97-2037-GTV, 1998 WL 229553, at *6 (D. Kan. Apr. 13, 1998) (race harassment
under 42 U.S.C. § 1981).
11 See, e.g., Johnson, 125 F.3d at 412 n.4 (holding that hostile work environment
did not exist when plaintiff responded in kind); Reed, 939 F.2d at 491 (holding that
no hostile work environment existed given plaintiff's predilection toward "sexually
suggestive jokes and activities"); Vaughn v. Pool Offshore Co., 683 F.2d 922, 924-25
(5th Cir. 1982) (holding that hostile work environment did not exist given that racial
epithets were "bandied back and forth without apparent hostility or racial animus");
Reynolds v. Atlantic City Cony. Ctr. Auth., No. CIV.A.88-4232, 1990 WL 267417, at *18
(D.NJ. May 26, 1990), aff'd, 925 F.2d 419 (3d Cir. 1991) (holding that hostile work
environment did not exist when plaintiff used obscenities).
12 Of course, one act of battery or sexual assault is sufficiently severe to constitute
harassment, regardless of the social context in which it occurs. See, e.g., Smith v. Shea-
han, 189 F.3d 529, 534 (7th Cir. 1999) (observing that one incident resulting in sur-
gery to the plaintiff's wrist could constitute harassment); Todd v. Ortho Biotech, Inc.,
138 F.3d 733, 736 (8th Cir. 1998) (finding that a single attempted rape was suffi-
ciently severe to be actionable); Tomka v. Seiler Corp., 66 F.3d 1295, 1305 (2d Cir.
1995) ("[E]ven a single incident of sexual assault sufficiently alters the conditions of
the victim's employment and clearly creates an abusive work environment for pur-
poses of Title VII liability."); Seldomridge v. Uni-Marts, Inc., No. CIV. A.99-469, 2001
WL 771011, at *6 (D. Del. July 10, 2001) ("In exceptional cases.., an isolated inci-
dent may be actionable under Title VII if it is extremely serious.. . ."); Jones v. U.S.
Gypsum, 126 F. Supp. 2d 1172, 1179 (N.D. Iowa 2000) (noting that a serious offensive
touching may be sufficiently severe to constitute harassment); Grozdanich v. Leisure
Hills Health Ctr., Inc., 25 F. Supp. 2d 953, 969-70 (D. Minn. 1998) (finding that an
isolated incident of sexual assault could create a hostile environment). Because bat-
tery is also a tort at common law, and is so clearly at the harassment end of the "offen-
siveness spectrum," it has little relevance to a discussion of attempts to create
standards to assist courts in deciding close cases.
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ment. Because of this, it is difficult to ascertain the full effect that
workplace culture has on the analysis. It could prove significant to the
evolving hostile environment jurisprudence, particularly because
many sexual harassment plaintiffs serve in traditional blue-collar
jobs. 13 The foremost justification for this sensitivity to workplace cul-
ture may be its capacity to ensure that sexual harassment law does not
become a workplace civility code. 14 Other advantages of the approach
might include greater predictability, uniformity, and consistency in
harassment cases. 15 This, in turn, could result in quicker settlement
of meritorious cases, less litigation, lower transaction costs, and possi-
bly greater and speedier protection of white-collar employees and vic-
tims of egregious harassment. 16 With a keen understanding of Title
VII, and perhaps influenced by these perceived advantages, the Fifth,
Seventh, Eighth, Tenth, and District of Columbia Circuits, along with
several district courts and state courts, have generally adopted the
practice of considering the social context of the workplace when ad-
dressing questions of motivation, objective and subjective severity, and
unwelcomeness.17
13 This is true at least as to plaintiffs whose lawsuits resulted in reported decisions.
See AnnJuliano & StewartJ. Schwab, The Sweep of Sexual Harassment Cases, 86 CORNELL
L. REV. 548, 561 (2001) ("Where occupation status of the plaintiff could be identi-
fied, . . . 38% of the plaintiffs we could classify were blue-collar (40% of the
workforce).").
14 Oncale v. SunDowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 81 (1998) (stating that
the causation requirement "prevents Title VII from expanding into a general civility
code").
15 See infra Part IV.
16 But see Ricketts v. Pa. R.R. Co., 153 F.2d 757, 761-62 n.6 (2d Cir. 1946) (Frank,
J., concurring).
Perhaps the most fatuous of all notions solemnly voiced by learned men who
ought to know better is that when legal rules are "clear and complete" litiga-
tion is unlikely to occur. Such writers surely carnot be unaware that
thousands of decisions yearly turn on disputes concerning the facts, i.e., as to
whether clear-cut legal rules were in fact violated. It is the uncertainty about
the "facts" that creates most of the unpredictability of decisions.
Id. (citations omitted)
17 See, e.g., Barbourv. Browner, 181 F.3d 1342, 1349 (D.C. Cir. 1999); Shepherd v.
Slater Steels Corp., 168 F.3d 998, 1010-11 (7th Cir. 1999); Johnson v. Hondo, Inc.,
125 F.3d 408, 412 (7th Cir. 1997); Montandon v. Farmland Indus., Inc., 116 F.3d 355,
358 (8th Cir. 1997); Gross v. Burggraf Constr. Co., 53 F.3d 1531, 1537 (10th Cir.
1995); Reed v. Shepard, 939 F.2d 484, 491 (7th Cir. 1991); Vaughn v. Pool Offshore
Co., 683 F.2d 922, 924-25 (5th Cir. 1982); Russo v. Henderson, No. CIV.A.00-CV-
4619, 2001 WL 541119, at *2 (E.D. Pa. May 22, 2001); Pirolli v. World Flavors, Inc.,
No. CIV.A.98-3596, 1999 WL 1065214, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 23, 1999); Temple v. Auto
Banc, 76 F. Supp. 2d 1124, 1130 (D. Kan. 1999); Mirakhorli v. DFW Mgmt. Co., No.
CIV.A.394-CV-1464D, 1999 WL 354226, at *2 (N.D. Tex. May 24, 1999); Standifer v.
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On the other hand, courts including the First, Fourth, and Sixth
Circuits have rejected any special treatment of workplace culture.' 8
They contend that any special consideration of workplace unpleasan-
tries lowers the hostile environment standard for blue-collar work-
places, helps to exclude women from traditionally-male occupations,
and gives employers a perverse incentive to create a harsher work en-
vironment in an effort to get the benefits of a reduced standard.' 9 It
is also arguable that this approach is contrary to the purposes of Title
VII, which was intentionally drafted "in the broadest possible terms"
so that it might reach harassment in all of its forms. 20 Furthermore,
any advantages that a consideration of workplace culture may entail in
terms of predictability could be outweighed by the difficulty of as-
signing the proper standard to specific workplaces and in defining the
contours of the new standard.21 In short, courts that decline to con-
sider workplace culture have plenty of arguments to support their
position.
Gen. Teamsters Union No. 460, No. CIV.A.97-2037-GTV, 1998 WL 229553 (D. Kan.
Apr. 13, 1998); Weston v. Pa. Dep't of Corr., No. CIV.A.98-CV-3899, 1998 WL 695352,
at *2 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 29, 1998); Smith v. Sheahan, No. 95-C-7203, 1997 WL 797663, at
*7 (N.D. III. Dec. 24, 1997), rev'd, 189 F.3d 529 (7th Cir. 1999); Fortner v. Kansas, 934
F. Supp. 1252, 1269 (D. Kan. 1996); Bernard v. Doskocil Cos., 861 F. Supp. 1017, 1021
(D. Kan. 1994); Reynolds v. Atlantic City Cony. Ctr. Auth., No. Civ.A.88-4232, 1990
WL 267417, at *18 (D.NJ. May 26, 1990), affd, 925 F.2d 419 (3d Cir. 1991); Rabidue
v. Osceola Ref. Co., 584 F. Supp. 419, 433 (E.D. Mich. 1984), afj'd, 805 F.2d 611 (6th
Cir. 1986); Webster v. Coastal Transp., Inc., No. 42693-1-I, 1999 WL 360625, at *5
(Wash. Ct. App. June 1, 1999).
18 See, e.g., O'Rourke v. City of Providence, 235 F.3d 713, 735 (1st Cir. 2001)
("[T]here is no merit to the City's argument at the first trial that it was entitled to a
jury instruction that the firefighters' conduct should be evaluated in the context of a
blue collar environment.... ."); Conner v. Schrader-Bridgeport Int'l, Inc., 227 F.3d
179, 194 (4th Cir. 2000) ("We are unable to discern an 'inhospitable environment'
exception to Title VII's mandate that employers may not discriminate .... .");Jackson
v. Quanex Corp., 191 F.3d 647, 662 (6th Cir. 1999) ("[T]he district court was wrong
to condone continuing racial slurs and graffiti on the grounds that they occurred in a
blue collar environment."); Williams v. Gen. Motors Corp., 187 F.3d 553, 564 (6th Cir.
1999) ("[W] e reject the view that the standard for sexual harassment varies depending
on the work environment.").
19 See Jackson, 191 F.3d at 662 (deeming reduced standard reasoning illogical);
Williams, 187 F.3d at 564 (arguing that this reasoning means that "the more hostile
the environment, and the more prevalent the sexism, the more difficult it is for a Title
VII plaintiff to prove that sex-based conduct is sufficiently severe or pervasive to con-
stitute a hostile work environment").
20 Hall v. Gus Constr. Co., 842 F.2d 1010, 1014 (8th Cir. 1988); Adkins v. Kelly-
Springfield Tire Co., No. 97-C-50381, 2001 WL 219636, at *7 n.7 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 6,
2001).
21 See infra Part V.
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This Article considers the justification, advantages, and disadvan-
tages of considering workplace culture. To properly understand the
need to examine workplace culture in harassment cases, it is first nec-
essary to have some familiarity with the purpose of harassment law
and its application in the courts. The Article, therefore, initially pro-
vides some relevant background on the hostile environment cause of
action and the present standard for harassment, including the Su-
preme Court's suggestion that courts assess harassment claims accord-
ing to the "social context" in which they arise. In Part II, this Article
then addresses various interpretations of "social context" and criticizes
some of them as unwarranted under Title VII. Part III narrows the
focus and considers those cases that interpret Oncale as an order to
look at workplace culture, and those pre- Oncale cases that are consis-
tent with this view. It addresses the asserted justifications for examin-
ing workplace culture.
Part IV considers the advantages to be gained from this practice.
In particular, it considers the ways in which this new approach might
be beneficial to courts, litigants, and the general public. Among the
benefits are greater certainty, predictability, and uniformity of deci-
sions, and the concomitant advantages that greater certainty would
entail. Part V presents the case against the practice of examining cul-
tural context. Included in this indictment are charges that this prac-
tice has created a new standard for harassment in the blue-collar
context, has provided perverse incentives for employers to ignore
caustic work environments, and that any diminished standard is diffi-
cult to administer. The Article concludes that these criticisms exag-
gerate the perceived problems associated with the practice of
examining social context and that this practice is necessary to a sound
evaluation of the "totality of the circumstances." An examination of
workplace culture does not necessarily lead to the creation of a new
standard for harassment cases, but merely assures that courts are sensi-
tive to the cultural dynamics of the workplace.
I. HOSTILE ENVIRONMENT HARASSMENT UNDER TrTLE VII
A. The Development of Hostile Environment Law
By its own terms, Title VII prohibits discrimination against em-
ployees on the basis of their race, color, religion, sex, or national ori-
gin, with respect to hiring, firing, or other terms and conditions of
employment.22 Although the text of the statute does not define or
even use terms like "hostile environment" or "harassment," federal ap-
22 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1994).
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pellate courts have held since at least 1971 that an employer can alter
the terms and conditions of employment by making an employee's
work environment unbearable.23 It was in 1971 that the hostile envi-
ronment cause of action was first recognized by one judge of the Fifth
Circuit in Rogers v. EEOC, a case of ethnicity or national origin harass-
ment.24 There, Judge Goldberg, although unable to convince either
of his colleagues to join his opinion, observed that Title VII necessa-
rily extended its protection to certain attributes of the work environ-
ment, otherwise employers could evade Title VII's prohibition of
using ethnicity as a factor in making personnel decisions simply by
making the work environment so unbearable as to coerce the depar-
ture of protected employees. 25 Judge Goldberg believed that
employees' psychological as well as economic fringes are statutorily
entitled to protection from employer abuse, and that the phrase
"terms conditions, or privileges of employment" in Section 703 is an
expansive concept which sweeps within its protective ambit the prac-
tice creating a working environment heavily charged with ethnic or
racial discrimination.
26
23 See Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1971) (Goldberg, J., with one judge
concurring in the result); see also DeAngelis v. El Paso Mun. Police Officers Ass'n, 51
F.3d 591, 593 (5th Cir. 1995) (observing that the purpose of a hostile environment
claim "is to level the playing field for women who work by preventing others from
impairing their ability to compete on an equal basis with men"). Actually, in most
instances it is not the employer that creates a hostile workplace; it is usually other
employees. Nevertheless, Title VII has been interpreted as applying only to
employers.
24 Rogers, 454 F.2d at 234. This case arrived at the Fifth Circuit in a rather strange
posture. After Josephine Chavez complained to the EEOC that several white co-em-
ployees had "abused" her and that her optometrist employer segregated patients, the
EEOC conducted an investigation in which it requested from the employer informa-
tion relating to the patients. The employer filed a petition to set aside or modify the
demand for production of documents, which the district court granted in part be-
cause it found that Chavez had not suffered an unlawful employment practice. The
issue on appeal was thus whether the employer's treatment of Chavez by segregating
patients sufficiently suggested a violation of Title VII as to warrant discovery by the
EEOC. Id. at 236-37.
25 See id. at 239. The court stated: "As patently discriminatory practices become
outlawed, those employers bent on pursuing a general policy declared illegal by Con-
gressional mandate will undoubtedly devise more sophisticated methods to perpetu-
ate discrimination among employees. The petitioner's alleged patient discrimination
may very well be just such a sophisticated method. . . ." Id.
26 Id. at 238. Judge Roney dissented. He argued that there
is no indication in the Act or the legislative history that Congress in passing
Title VII was concerned about whether an employer's business presents con-
ditions for employment that are environmentally unattractive to all, whether
the manner of his operation suits everyone, or whether a particular individ-
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He recognized that harassment is a form of disparate treatment, be-
cause it entails a difference in the terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment based on the employee's sex, race, religion, or national
origin.27 Accordingly, the law only prohibits harassment that seriously
affects an employee based on these protected characteristics.
In 1981, in Bundy v. Jackson, the District of Columbia Circuit
adopted this reasoning and applied it to a case of sexual harassment.28
Bundy involved quid pro quo and hostile environment harassment,
including frequent propositions for sex from several supervisors and
fellow employees. 29 When Sandra Bundy complained to one supervi-
sor, he responded that "any man in his right mind would want to rape
you."30 The court of appeals reasoned that a claim for hostile environ-
ment sexual harassment must be cognizable under Title VII, otherwise
the plaintiff's supervisors could extort sex from her by making her life
miserable.31 Because such a case might be thought of as a type of
quid pro quo case-where the victim is implicitly asked to trade sex
for a tolerable work environment-and everyone concedes that quid
pro quo cases are covered by Title VII, it stands to reason that these
hostile environment cases are similarly actionable.32 Importantly,
ual might be uncomfortable or have feelings of unhappiness in his
employment.
Id. at 246.
27 See Pollard v. E.I. Dupont de Nemours Co., 213 F.3d 933, 943 (6th Cir. 2000)
("[T] he Supreme Court has long recognized that proof of hostile environment sexual
harassment is proof of disparate treatment."), revd on other grounds, 121 S. Ct. 1946
(2001); Theresa M. Beiner &John M. A. DiPippa, Hostile Environments and the Religious
Employee, 19 U. ARK. LirrT ROCK LJ. 577, 583-84 (1997).
28 Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934, 944-45 (D.C. Cir. 1981). Plaintiff Sandra
Bundy was a Vocational Rehabilitation Specialist with the District of Columbia Depart-
ment of Corrections. Id. at 939.
29 Id. at 940.
30 Id.
31 Id. at 945 ("Thus, unless we extend the Barnes holding, an employer could
sexually harass a female employee with impunity by carefully stopping short of firing
the employee or taking any other tangible actions against her in response to her
resistance .... ).
32 Indeed, the Supreme Court has noted that it is sometimes difficult to distin-
guish between a quid pro quo and hostile environment case and that in some cases
these distinctions might be meaningless. See Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524
U.S. 742, 751 (1998) ("The terms quid pro quo and hostile work environment are help-
ful, perhaps, in making a rough demarcation between cases in which threats are car-
ried out and those where they are not or are absent altogether, but beyond this are of
limited utility."); see also Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 908 n.18 (11th Cir.
1982) ("On a practical level, of course, there are many cases that could be character-
ized interchangeably as condition of work or quid pro quo cases."); Eugene Scalia, The
Strange Career of Quid Pro Quo Sexual Harassment, 21 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'y 307,
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both the Bundy and Rogers courts recognized that harassment is only
actionable when it is caused by the plaintiffs sex or race, or some
other protected attribute, and, thus, general unpleasantries uncon-
nected to race or sex are not actionable.
B. The Supreme Court Addresses Hostile Environment Harassment
A hostile environment case finally made its way to the Supreme
Court in 1986 in Meritor Savings Bank, F.S.B. v. Vinson,33 the decision
in which the Court gave its imprimatur to the reasoning of Rogers and
Bundy.A4 Plaintiff Michelle Vinson claimed that her supervisor "fon-
dled her in front of other employees, followed her into the women's
restroom... exposed himself to her, and even forcibly raped her on
several occasions."3 5 In holding that hostile environment claims are
covered by Title VII, the Court noted that Congress used broad lan-
guage like "terms, conditions, or privileges of employment" to "'strike
at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men and women' in
employment."3 6 But the Court also made clear that hostile environ-
ment harassment is actionable only when it occurs because of the
plaintiffs race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.3 7 Additionally,
the Court defined some of the boundaries of a hostile environment
case, explicitly stating that the conduct at issue must be unwelcome, 3
and "must be sufficiently severe or pervasive" as to alter the terms and
conditions of employment and "create an abusive working environ-
316-17 n.38 (1998) (discussing the overlap of quid pro quo and hostile environment-
cases, as well as some differences).
33 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
34 See id. at 66.
35 Id. at 60.
36 Id. at 64 (quoting L.A. Dept. of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 707
n.13 (1978) (quoting Sprogis v. United Air Lines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194, 1198 (7th Cir.
1971))).
37 Id. at 66 ("[A] plaintiff may establish a violation of Title VII by proving that
discrimination based on sex has created a hostile or abusive work environment.") (em-
phasis added). Subsequent to Vinson, the courts have held that the standards and
elements of hostile environment harassment are the same regardless of whether the
harassment is based on sex, race, color, religion, or national origin. See Crawford v.
Medina Gen. Hosp., 96 F.3d 830, 834 (6th Cir. 1996). They have also clarified that
"instances of harassment need not be stamped with signs of overt discrimination to be
relevant under Title VII if they are part of a course of conduct which is tied to evi-
dence of discriminatory animus. Harassment alleged to be because of sex need not
be explicitly sexual in nature." Carter v. Chrysler Corp., 173 F.3d 693, 701 (8th Cir.
1999) (citations omitted).
38 Vinson, 477 U.S. at 68 ("The gravamen of any sexual harassment claim is that
the alleged sexual advances were 'unwelcome.'").
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ment."39 Accordingly, workplace culture, even when laced with sexu-
ality, is not violative of Title VII unless the plaintiff considers it
unwelcome and severe or pervasive, and a reasonable person would
agree.
Seven years later, in Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc.,40 the Supreme
Court further refined the hostile environment standard. Plaintiff Te-
resa Harris charged that even after complaining about her employer's
antics, he continued to harass her until she felt forced to quit her
job.4 1 She sued, but because she failed to show that she suffered seri-
ous psychological injury, the district court dismissed her case. 42 The
Court rejected the district court's strict approach, holding that Title
VII carried no psychological harm prerequisite, especially because the
statute was enacted to prevent egregious harassment before it results in
serious injury: "Certainly Title VII bars conduct that would seriously
affect a reasonable person's psychological well-being, but the statute is
not limited to such conduct."
43
At the same time, the Court reiterated that only workplaces "per-
meated with 'discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult' that is
'sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim's
employment"' will result in liability.44 While the offending conduct
can take many forms, including sexual advances, requests for sexual
favors, leering, unwanted attention, ridicule, threats, displays of por-
nography, or effigies, it must be sufficiently severe in order for a plain-
tiff to obtain judicial relief. The "conduct must be extreme to amount
to a change in the terms and conditions of employment."45 To deter-
mine the level and frequency of offensiveness, courts must look to the
"totality of the circumstances." 46 Specifically, Harris suggested five
non-exclusive factors that courts should examine in judging the hostil-
ity of an environment, although a plaintiff need not demonstrate the
existence of each factor and indeed could show harassment simply by
demonstrating the existence of, say, a particularly severe incident of
39 Id. at 67-68 (quoting Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 904 (11th Cir.
1982)). Henson v. City of Dundee, another of the seminal hostile environment cases,
involved a police dispatcher who was subject to repeated requests for sex from the
chief of police, as well as daily inquiries into her sexual habits and proclivities. 682
F.2d at 899, 900-01.
40 510 U.S. 17 (1993).
41 Id. at 19.
42 Id. at 20.
43 Id. at 22.
44 Id. at 21 (citation omitted).
45 Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 788 (1998).
46 Harris, 510 U.S. at 23.
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harassment. The factors are: (1) the frequency of the conduct;
47
(2) its severity;48 (3) whether the conduct was physically threaten-
ing or humiliating;49 (4) whether it interfered with work perform-
47 First, courts must look to the frequency or pervasiveness of the conduct. Id. A
single use of bad language does not constitute a claim of harassment, see Torres v.
County of Oakland, 758 F.2d 147, 152 (6th Cir. 1985), and even a "handful of com-
ments spread over months is unlikely to have so great an emotional impact as a con-
centrated or incessant barrage." Baskerville v. Culligan Int'l Co., 50 F.3d 428, 431
(7th Cir. 1995); see also Hocevar v. Purdue Frederick Co., 223 F.3d 721, 738 (8th Cir.
2000) (holding that eight incidents of harassment, primarily the use of foul language,
over a three-year period were not sufficiently frequent to constitute actionable harass-
ment); Penry v. Fed. Home Loan Bank of Topeka, 155 F.3d 1257, 1263 (10th Cir.
1998) (holding that offensive verbal exchanges were not actionable where they oc-
curred over a period of three years); Koelsch v. Beltone Elec. Corp., 46 F.3d 705,
706-08 (7th Cir. 1995) (holding that two isolated incidents of rubbing the plaintiff's
leg and pinching her buttocks did not amount to a violation of Title VII, in part
because the incidents were separated by tvo years). The continued use of racial, eth-
nic, or sexual slurs could constitute actionable harassment. Even where there is no
frequency of conduct-that is, only a single act of harassment has occurred-an em-
ployer can face liability for a hostile environment, see, e.g., Smith v. Sheahan, 189 F.3d
529, 533 (7th Cir. 1999), but this is true only if the act is particularly severe-like rape
or battery.
48 Frequency of conduct is only relevant to the analysis when it is considered in
conjunction with the severity of the conduct. Harris, 510 U.S. at 23; Meritor Say.
Bank, F.S.B. v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 52, 67 (1986). "[T] he required showing of severity or
seriousness of the harassing conduct varies inversely with the pervasiveness or fre-
quency of the conduct." Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 878 (9th Cir. 1991). AsJudge
Posner has characterized the severity requirement "The concept of sexual harass-
ment is designed to protect working women from the kind of male attentions that can
make the workplace hellish for women .... It is not designed to purge the workplace
of vulgarity." Baskerville, 50 F.3d at 430 (7th Cir. 1995). Thus, conduct which is only
mildly offensive-even if frequent-is not actionable, and minor insults do not war-
rant relief. To be actionable, the conduct must be both objectively and subjectively
severe. See Brennan v. Metro. Opera Ass'n, 192 F.3d 310, 318 (2d Cir. 1999).
49 See Harris, 510 U.S. at 23. Like severity, this factor is viewed both objectively
and subjectively. Saxton v. AT&T Co., 10 F.3d 526, 534. Some cases are easy because
the threats are so blatant and egregious. For instance, in one case, a black victim
came to work and found an effigy of a black man, with simulated blood, menacingly
hanging from a noose; later, he found the initials "KKK" written in the employees'
bathroom, along with the slogan "All niggers must die." Daniels v. Essex Group,,Inc.,
937 F.2d 1264, 1266 (7th Cir. 1991). In other cases, however, the threats are not so
obvious. In these cases, determining "what is a threat, like deciding what constitutes
harassment, involves a multi-factored context specific analysis." Suzanne Sangree, Ti-
tle VII Prohibitions Against Hostile Environment Sexual Harassment and the First Amendment:
No Collision in Sight, 47 RUTGERS L. REV. 461, 515 (1995). In assessing threats, courts
look to the type of behavior threatened, whether the harasser was physically capable
of carrying out the threat, the immediacy of threat, the level of fear the threat would
tend to cause in a reasonable person, the proximity of the harasser to the plaintiff
when the threat was made, whether gestures were made or attempts to grab the plain-
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ance;50 and (5) whether the conduct caused psychological harm.5 1 Of
course, because the "totality of the circumstances" includes the gen-
eral culture of the workplace, by the courts looking to this totality,
Harris implicitly instructed courts to consider the social dynamics of
the workplace when analyzing harassment cases. The Supreme Court
later made this explicit in Oncale.
tiff, and any inflection of voice. See, e.g., Smith v. First Union Nat'l Bank, 202 F.3d
234, 239 (4th Cir. 2000); Baskerville, 50 F.3d at 431; Brooms v. Regal Tube Co., 881
F.2d 412, 417 (7th Cir. 1989).
50 Harris, 510 U.S. at 23. This factor sometimes gets short shrift because its exis-
tence is not always necessary to demonstrate actionable harassment, but at least Jus-
tice Ginsburg considers it to be an important factor in the analysis. As Justice
Ginsburg stated:
To show such interference, the plaintiff need not prove that his or her tangi-
ble productivity has declined as a result of the harassment. It suffices to
prove that a reasonable person subjected to the discriminatory conduct
would find, as the plaintiff did, that the harassment so altered working con-
ditions as to make it more difficult to do the job.
Id. at 25 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (citations, internal quotations, and brackets omit-
ted). To demonstrate the existence of this factor, a plaintiff need not show that the
hostile environment resulted in a measurable decline in productivity. See King v. Hil-
len, 21 F.3d 1572, 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1994) ("That women who are objects of discrimina-
tory behavior because of their sex are able to maintain satisfactory job performance is
not grounds for denigrating their concerns."). It is enough to show that performance
of assigned tasks became more difficult after initiation of the harassment, or that it
kept the plaintiff from advancing in her chosen career. See Quick v. Donaldson Co.,
90 F.3d 1372, 1378 (8th Cir. 1996); Davis v. Monsanto Chem. Co., 858 F.2d 345, 349
(6th Cir. 1988).
51 The Harris Court held that Title VII is designed to stop harassment before it
causes a nervous breakdown; consequently, a plaintiff need not show serious psycho-
logical harm from the hostile environment. Harris, 510 U.S. at 22. Some courts have
taken this to mean that psychological harm is irrelevant to the hostile environment
analysis, but a more accurate reading of Harris recognizes that mental injury, if pre-
sent, is still relevant to determining whether the conduct amounts to harassment. See,
e.g., Quick, 90 F.3d at 1379; Kopp v. Samaritan Health Sys., Inc., 13 F.3d 264, 269 (8th
Cir. 1993). The holding of Harris is only that such a showing is not necessary to
establish a hostile environment case, and thus the failure to establish mental injury is
never fatal in itself. See Kopp, 13 F.3d at 269 ("Psychological harm to the plaintiff is
relevant, as one factor among many, but Title VII does not require concrete psycho-
logical harm."). Recognizing the limited holding of Harris, one court held that evi-
dence that the plaintiff suffered extreme stress stemming from workplace
mistreatment-manifested in headaches, nausea, and crying-indicated the plaintiff
subjectively considered the defendant's conduct to be intolerable, thereby satisfying
the subjective component of the test for harassment. See Conner v. Schrader-
Bridgeport Int'l, Inc., 227 F.3d 179, 199 (4th Cir. 2000).
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C. Oncale'v. Sundowner Offshore Services
Five years after Harris, the Supreme Court was again faced with a
hostile environment case. In Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services,
Inc.,52 the Supreme Court was asked to address the issue of whether
same-sex harassment is actionable under Title VII. Plaintiff Joseph
Oncale worked on an oil rig in the Gulf of Mexico. 53 While on the
rig, Oncale was subjected to abuse by male co-workers, including
taunts suggesting he was homosexual, threats of rape, physical assaults
with sexual overtones, and what the Court mildly described as "sex-
related, humiliating actions."5 4 The supervisors routinely ignored On-
cale's complaints, and fearing that he otherwise would be raped or
assaulted, Oncale quit his job.55 He subsequently sued his employer
for hostile environment sexual harassment under Title VII.5 6 The dis-
trict court, however, holding that same-sex harassment was not action-
able under Title VII, granted summary judgment for the defendant.
The Fifth Circuit affirmed, 57 and the Supreme Court granted
certiorari.
58
In an opinion authored by Justice Scalia, the Court first made
clear that same-sex harassment was indeed prohibited by Title VII.5
9
In doing so, it addressed the defendants' argument that "recognizing
liability for same-sex harassment will transform Title VII into a general
civility code for the American workplace. '60 The Court discussed the
traditional standard for sexual harassment liability, stating that it also
52 523 U.S. 75 (1998).




57 Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 83 F.3d 118, 121 (5th Cir. 1996).
58 520 U.S. 1263 (1997).
59 Oncale, 523 U.S. at 79. " ' Because of the many facets of human motivation, it
would be unwise to presume as a matter of law that human beings of one definable
group will not discriminate against other members of that group.'" Id. at 78 (quoting
Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 499 (1977)). Oncale's holding builds upon earlier
decisions concerning same-race discrimination. See St. Francis Coll. v. AI-Khazraji,
481 U.S. 604, 610 n.4 (1987) (allowing Arabic-white's claim of racial discrimination by
European-white because "[c]lear-cut categories do not exist," and "differences be-
tween individuals of the same race are often greater than the differences between the
'average' individuals of different races"). Cases subsequent to Oncale have reaffirmed
this principle. See, e.g., Ross v. Douglas County, 234 F.3d 391, 396 (8th Cir. 2000)
(affirming race harassment case in which both the harasser and victim were black).
60 Oncale, 523 U.S. at 80.
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applied to same-sex harassment.61 It observed that the Harris factors
continue to be relevant in analyzing hostile environment claims 62 and
then emphasized a point it previously made in Vinson: "lIT] he trier of
fact must determine the existence of sexual harassment in light of 'the
record as a whole' and 'the totality of circumstances, such as the na-
ture of the sexual advances and the context in which the alleged inci-
dents occurred.'"63 It stressed the need to look at the alleged
harassment in its social context. In particular, the Court believed that
in judging the severity of the conduct, attention to the cultural con-
text in which the purported harassment occurs will guard against im-
posing liability on behavior that-although offensive to Miss
Manners-does not offend Title VII. Specifically, the Court stated:
We have emphasized, moreover, that the objective severity of harass-
ment should be judged from the perspective of a reasonable person
in the plaintiff's position, considering "all the circumstances." In
same-sex (as in all) harassment cases, that inquiry requires careful
consideration of the social context in which particular behavior oc-
curs and is experienced by its target. A professional football
player's working environment is not severely or pervasively abusive,
for example, if the coach smacks him on the buttocks as he heads
onto the field-even if the same behavior would reasonably be ex-
perienced as abusive by the coach's secretary (male or female) back
at the office. The real social impact of workplace behavior often
depends on a constellation of surrounding circumstances, expecta-
tions, and relationships which are not fully captured by a simple
recitation of the words used or the physical acts performed. Com-
mon sense, and an appropriate sensitivity to social context, will enable
courts and juries to distinguish between simple teasing or rough-
housing among members of the same sex, and conduct which a rea-
sonable person in the plaintiffs position would find severely hostile
or abusive.
6 4
Accordingly, a proper analysis of hostile environment claims en-
tails a close consideration of social context. The only problem with
this directive is that the term "social context" is pregnant with mean-
61 Id. (noting that the danger of Title VII imposing a civility code on employers
"is no greater for same-sex than for opposite-sex harassment, and is adequately met by
careful attention to the requirements of the statute").
62 See id. at 81-82.
63 MeNtor Say. Bank, F.S.B. v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 69 (1986) (quoting 29 C.F.R.
§ 1604.11(b) (1985)) (emphasis added).
64 Oncale, 523 U.S. at 81-82 (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
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ing, and various courts have interpreted this admonition to mean dif-
ferent things.65
II. THE MEANING OF "SOCLAL CONTEXT"
Even before Oncale, courts generally agreed that the "legal defini-
tion of sexual harassment does not and can not enumerate which spe-
cific behaviors or patterns of behaviors, independent of context, rise
to the level of harassment. ' 66 It is not surprising, then, that the Oncale
Court considered context to be essential to any analysis of hostile envi-
ronment harassment claims. The question arises, however, as to what
the Court was attempting to convey in its admonition to look to social
context. Was the Court simply restating its directive from Vinson-
that severity cannot be divorced from the totality of the circum-
stances-or was it urging a new approach to assessing purported hos-
tile environments? In harassment cases, different federal courts have
interpreted Oncale's term "social context" to have different mean-
ings.67 These include social context in the sense of the public or pri-
vate location of the harassment, the special sensibilities of the
particular plaintiff, the social relationship between the harasser and
the victim, and an aggregation of the offensive incidents. As discussed
below, these definitions of social context are not mutually exclusive,
and there may be substantial overlap among them. Each has some
claim to endorsement by the Supreme Court, and it may be that the
Court intentionally used broad language to convey a breadth of
meaning.
A. Public or Private Setting of the Conduct
One possible interpretation of "social context" concerns whether
the conduct occurred in a public or private setting. That is, social
context might pertain to whether purported harassment occurred in
the presence of other employees (after all, one definition of "social"
involves "community" or "companionship with others"), as opposed to
a private, non-social setting.68 Courts have frequently looked to see
whether the severity of purported harassment was increased due to
65 The Supreme Court has subsequently addressed sexual harassment issues, but
has not further refined its "social context" admonition. See, e.g., Clark County Sch.
Dist. v. Breeden, 121 S. Ct. 1508 (2001) (per curiam).
66 Richard L. Weiner & Linda E. Hurt, Social Sexual Conduct at Work: How Do Work-
ers Know When It Is Harassment and Wen It Is Not?, 34 CAL. W. L. Ru. 53, 64 (1997).
67 The subsequent list of interpretations or possible interpretations of "social con-
text" is not meant to be exhaustive.
68 See, e.g., EEOC v. R&R Ventures, 244 F.3d 334, 340 (4th Cir. 2001).
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the public or private context of the conduct. These courts correctly
perceive that the severity of humiliation is often proportional to the
number of people who observe the indignities. 69 Unwanted attention,
magnified by the gaze of others, sometimes proves more harmful. 70
Thus, in Smith v. Northwest Financial Acceptance, Inc.,71 the court consid-
ered in the severity analysis the fact that co-workers overheard harass-
ing remarks and witnessed the degrading treatment of the plaintiff.72
The court stated that the social setting of the supervisor's remarks in-
creased the plaintiffs humiliation, and thus the severity of the con-
duct.75 Similarly, in Conner v. Schrader-Bridgeport International, Inc.,74
the Fourth Circuit found the alleged incidents of harassment-includ-
ing having to mop the floors and being required to display blood
stains from her uterine hemorrhage before she was permitted to leave
work early-were magnified in severity because they occurred in open
view of all the other employees. 75 And in EEOC v. R&R Ventures,76 the
Fourth Circuit noted that the purported harasser made his "com-
ments in front of other employees and customers and, in doing so,
made his victims uncomfortable and visibly upset. ' 77 The court ob-
served that this public display increased the severity of the conduct.
78
Using similar reasoning, some courts have found a decreased se-
verity where comments were made to only the plaintiff, as these pri-
vate encounters involved no public humiliation.79 But closed settings
will not always save the defendant. Some courts have looked to the
private context of propositions or conduct to find that the privacy
made the actions more severe.80 As Judge Posner offered, "Remarks
innocuous or merely mildly offensive when delivered in a public set-
69 See Witt v. Roadway Express, 136 F.3d 1424, 1433 (10th Cir. 1998) ("As to the
setting of the incident, it did not occur in a place in which Mr. Witt was forced to stay
and subject himself to humiliation.").
70 See Howley v. Town of Stratford, 217 F.3d 141, 154 (2d Cir. 2000) (noting that
a co-worker made offensive comments loudly "and in a large group in which [the
plaintiff] was the only female and many of the men were her subordinates").
71 129 F.3d 1408 (10th Cir. 1997).
72 Id. at 1414.
73 Id.
74 227 F.3d 179 (4th Cir. 2000).
75 See id. at 197.
76 244 F.3d 334 (4th Cir. 2001).
77 Id. at 340.
78 See id. ("Here the severity of Wheeler's sexual misconduct was compounded by
the context in which it took place.").
79 See Wible v. Widnall, No. 97-2142-JWL, 1998 WL 259892, at *6 (D. Kan. Apr. 29,
1998) (citing cases).
80 See, e.g., Hathaway v. Runyon, 132 F.3d 1214, 1225 (8th Cir. 1998) (observing
that plaintiff felt threatened when two purported harassers cornered her in a small,
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ting might acquire a sinister cast when delivered in the suggestive iso-
lation of a hotel room."8' The same might hold true for a supervisor's
office, which many employees identify as the locus of employer au-
thority, and so any conduct that takes place there might be more coer-
cive and threatening.82 Furthermore, a private setting can sometimes
exacerbate the harm, because the tormenter is not restrained by the
possibility that someone might catch him in the act. Not only is such
an actor uninhibited by the possibility of interruption, the private con-
text also instills greater fear in the victim because of the knowledge
that the harasser is free to act recklessly, unbridled by the fear of im-
mediate discovery. Additionally, calls for help in a private setting may
be more easily stifled or may be thoroughly useless, or the plaintiff
might believe that nobody will hear and that escape is impossible. Any
of these possibilities can make the harasser's conduct all the more
frightening for the plaintiff and a reasonable person, thereby increas-
ing the severity of the harassment. In light of these considerations, a
reasonable person might perceive an unwelcome hug in the middle of
the plant to be less threatening than the same hug in a secluded of-
fice.8 3 At least one court has used this reasoning in holding that the
private, closed setting of the superyisor's office made his kiss and
grope more severe.
84
It is possible, then, that the Oncale Court was instructing courts to
keep this facet of "social context" in mind when judging the severity of
harassment. Indeed, in the example used by the Court to illustrate
the relevance of "social context," the Court compared a coach patting
the buttocks of a player on a football field, in full view of the crowd,
with the same act performed in the private setting of an office. The
public/private distinction may have been one of the key points the
Court was attempting to illustrate with this example.
private room); Baskerville v. Culligan Int'l Co., 50 F.3d 428, 431 (7th Cir. 1995) (not-
ing the effect privacy can play in aggravating circumstances).
81 Baskerville, 50 F.3d at 431.
82 Cf Timsco, Inc. v. NLRB, 819 F.2d 1173, 1178 (D.C. Cir 1987) (noting that the
'employer's office is the 'locus of authority'") (quoting NLRB v. Knogo Corp., 727
F.2d 55, 58 (2d Cir. 1984)).
83 The reasoning here is similar to the courts' recognition in the NLRB context
that the employer's office is "the locus of authority" and that activity has greater coer-
cive effect. NLRB v. Knogo, 727 F.2d 55, 58 (2d Cir. 1984).
84 See Fall v. Ind. Univ. Bd. of Trs., 12 F. Supp. 2d 870, 878-79 (N.D. Ind. 1998).
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B. Social Sensibilities Inhering in the Plaintiffs Particular Race, Sex,
or Religion
Oncale's suggestion to look to social context also could be viewed
as a command to assess the severity of the defendant's conduct ac-
cording to the particular social sensibilities that might inhere in plain-
tiffs based on their race or sex.8 5 Courts subscribing to this view hold
that "in evaluating the severity and pervasiveness of sexual harass-
ment, we should focus on the perspective of the victim."'8 6 Thus, for
example, if the victim were a woman, in determining whether the de-
fendant's actions were objectively offensive, the court would look to
the way a reasonable woman would perceive the conduct.87 If the
plaintiff were black, the court would examine the conduct to see how
a reasonable black person would perceive it. Of course, this approach
presumes that the hypothetical "reasonable woman" or "reasonable
black man" is properly presumed to have special sensibilities. The im-
portance of this perspectivism, it is argued, centers on the inability of
males or members of other races to fully appreciate the hurt which
words or actions can engender in women and blacks.88 The premise
is that conduct that offends women or blacks is not always offensive to
men or whites, and therefore assessing conduct merely according to a
reasonable person standard will minimize the actual harm suffered by
female or black plaintiffs. 89
Proponents of using the particular perspective of the victim's
class contend that these perspectives are as important to appreciating
the social context of a hostile environment as the harasser's words or
actions, since words and actions only have meaning to the recipients
85 See Brennan v. Metro. Opera Ass'n, 192 F.3d 310, 321 (2d Cir. 1999) (Newman,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
86 Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 878 (9th Cir. 1991).
87 See Nancy S. Ehrenreich, Pluralist Myths and Powerless Men: The Ideology of Reason-
ableness in Sexual Harassment Law, 99 YALE LJ. 1177, 1217 (1990).
88 See Bonnie B. Westman, The Reasonable Woman Standard: Preventing Sexual Har-
assment in the Workplace, 18 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 795, 821 (1992).
89 Proponents take this view even though the hostile environment standard has
always been that of a "reasonable person" and not a "reasonable man." Of course,
one effect of adopting such a standard is different liability for essentially the same
conduct, the only difference being whether the plaintiff was female or male. For
example, if a reasonable woman finds a pinch severely offensive while a reasonable
man does not, the same pinch will result in liability in the case of the female plaintiff,
while the man's harassment may go unremedied, even though both plaintiffs subjec-
tively found the conduct severely offensive. Interestingly, the main criticism of a blue-
collar standard of conduct is that it produces different outcomes in cases that are
identical, save the blue-collar context of the harassment. A woman-specific standard
has the same effect.
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according to their understanding of those terms, and these under-
standings are derived from a lifetime in a particular social group. 90 So
while reasonable men might perceive certain conduct as good-na-
tured banter, reasonable women-so the argument goes-might find
the same conduct repulsive and severely offensive. 91 Proponents of
such a shift in standards believe, probably correctly, that men "are
significantly more accepting of harassing behaviors than are
females":
92
Obscene language and pornography quite possibly could be re-
garded as highly offensive to a woman who seeks to deal with her
fellow employees and clients with professional dignity and without
the barrier of sexual differentiation and abuse. Although men may
find these actions harmless and innocent, it is highly possible that
women may feel otherwise.
93
Accordingly, when it comes time to assess liability for sexual har-
assment, what the average male juror deems severely offensive might
differ substantially from that which the average female juror finds to
be egregious. 94 Plaintiffs fear that the reasonable person standard of
offensiveness will hamper their ability to collect from employers
whose employees are accused of harassment:
[T] here is a risk that a reasonable "person" test, however appropri-
ate for issues like negligence, will permit the perspectives of the ma-
jority to carry the day as to race and gender issues; the majority of
Whites might well not be aware that certain remarks or displays are
offensive to most Blacks, and the majority of men might well be just
as insensitive to certain remarks or displays that most women con-
90 Obviously this argument has a ring of deconstruction about it.
91 See Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 532 n.12 (1975) ("Controlled studies...
have concluded that women bring to juries their own perspectives and values that
influence both jury deliberation and result.").
92 LindaJ. Rubin & Sherry B. Borgers, Sexual Harassment in Universities During the
1980s, in SEXUAL HARASSmNT: CONFRONTATIONS AND DECISIONS 25, 34 (Edmund Wall
ed., 1992) (footnote omitted); see also ROBERT F. NAGEL, JUDICIAL POWER AND AMERI-
CAN CHARACTER: CENSORING OURSELVES IN AN ANXIOUS AGE 19 (1994).
[According to this view] men must experience life on the job fundamentally
differently from working women. What men thought of as jokes were cut-
ting insults or acts of domination. What men thought of as flirtations were
intimidating and oppressive. Behavior that men thought of as a natural pbrt
of the world of pressure, challenge, and conquest was out of place in a world
that women expected to be ordered, decorous, and safe.
Id.
93 Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469, 1485-86 (3d Cir. 1990) (cita-
tions and internal quotations omitted).
94 Id.
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sider offensive. The perspective of the reasonable "person" might
turn out to be the very stereotypical views that Title VII is designed
to outlaw in the workplace.
95
The suggestion that courts and juries assess purported harass-
ment from the perspective of a reasonable woman or reasonable black
person has been around for a while, and several judges and circuits
have even adopted it.9 6 This history of using women-specific stan-
dards suggests that the Oncale Court was not addressing this standard
when it exhorted courts to look at social context, as the Court could
have done so in much clearer terms.9 7 Furthermore, the underpin-
nings of the theory are not exactly self-evident, and it is far from obvi-
ous that "reasonableness" is sex-specific. But even if this proposed
shift in standards were based on sound principles, such standards are
unworkable and will inevitably lead to more problems than they pur-
port to solve. For example, how should a judge instruct jurors-par-
ticularly male jurors, who according to proponents do not reason like
95 Brennan v. Metro. Opera Ass'n., 192 F.3d 310, 321 (2d Cir. 1999) (Newman,J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
96 At least seven federal circuits have either adopted or implied that they would
adopt women-specific standards for hostile environment cases. See Brooks v. City of
San Mateo, 229 F.3d 917, 924 (9th Cir. 2000); Slayton v. Ohio Dep't of Youth Servs.,
206 F.3d 669, 679 (6th Cir. 2000); Brennan, 192 F.3d at 321 (NewmanJ., concurring
in part and dissenting in part); Torres v. Pisano, 116 F.3d 625, 632 n.6 (2d Cir. 1997);
Newton v. Dept. of the Air Force, 85 F.3d 595, 599 (Fed. Cir. 1996); Fuller v. City of
Oakland, 47 F.3d 1522, 1527 (9th Cir. 1995); West v. Phila. Elec. Co., 45 F.3d 744, 753
(3d Cir. 1995); Dey v. Colt Constr. & Dev. Co., 28 F.3d 1446, 1456 (7th Cir. 1994);
Burns v. McGregor Elec. Indus., Inc., 989 F.2d 959, 965 (8th Cir. 1993); Ellison v.
Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 878 (9th Cir. 1991); Andrews, 895 F.2d at 1485-86; Yates v. Avco
Corp., 819 F.2d 630, 637 (6th Cir. 1987); see also Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards,
Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1486, 1526 (M.D. Fla. 1991) ("[T]he standards for assessing wo-
men's psychological harm due to harassment must begin to reflect women's sensitivity
to behavior once considered as acceptable.") (quotations omitted); Bowman v. Hel-
ler, No. 90-3269, 1993 WL 761159, at *8 (Mass. Dist. Ct.July 9, 1993) ("If the purpose
of laws providing remedies for sexual harassment at work is to break down barriers to
the full participation of women in the workplace, then the conduct must indeed be
analyzed from a woman's perspective.") (internal citations omitted), aff'd, 651 N.E.2d
369 (Mass. 1995). But see DeAngelis v. El Paso Mun. Police Officers Ass'n, 51 F.3d
591, 594 (5th Cir. 1995) ("The test is an objective one, not a standard of offense to a
'reasonable woman.'").
97 On this logic, however, it could be argued that the Court certainly was not
disapproving this practice either, since it did not do so explicitly. Furthermore, the
practice of looking to cultural context existed prior to Oncale, and yet the Court ar-
guably was not precise in its endorsement of that practice. In short, divining intent
from what a court failed to say is a hazardous process.
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women-on the sensibilities of a "reasonable woman?"98 Assuming
that a reasonable black man thinks differently than a reasonable white
man-a view which smacks of racism-how can a jury instruction in-
still the race-specific method of reasoning to jurors who are not mem-
bers of that race?
Furthermore, this practice raises the question of why courts
should focus only on race and sex as the primary factors in assessing
susceptibility to harassment when other human attributes arguably af-
fect the way people view the world to a greater extent than race or sex.
That is, if courts should consider whether a reasonable woman would
find particular behavior offensive or unwelcome, why should they not
also consider whether a blue-collar plaintiff would find them offen-
sive?99 Indeed, a plaintiffs social class has just as much to do with
98 It is arguable that a separate set of jury instructions would be necessary for
men, or that perhaps they need some sensitivity training before they will even be
permitted to serve on the jury in a harassment case. Even then, because men are
supposedly incapable of appreciating the way that women think and feel, it is hard to
see how a man could even understand the jury instruction. Furthermore, since the
instruction is contrary to the way a man supposedly thinks and feels, there is a real
danger that men will not take the instruction to heart. Similarly, if applied to race
harassment as well, many a white juror will need to be "re-educated" according to the
proclivities and thought-processes of blacks. Apparently, even black jurors may need
some instruction because, as Derrick Bell criticized Justice Clarence Thomas, some
people "look black" but "think white." See Roland Evans & Robert Novak, Thomas'
Political Campaign, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB.,July 25, 1991, at B-8 ("Harvard Law Profes-
sor Derrick Bell declared that Thomas 'looks black' and 'thinks white.").
Of course, this sounds to reasonable people-or what used to be called the rea-
sonable man-an awful lot like racism and sexism: to be fit forjury service you have to
learn to think white, or black, or like a woman, or like a man. The courts have tried
to eradicate this racism and sexism in selecting juries, and it would be foolish to let it
in through the back door by adopting women- or race-specific standards of conduct.
SeeJ.E.B. v. Alabama,'511 U.S. 127, 143 (1994) (holding that peremptory challenges
cannot be used to discriminate against potential male jurors in a civil case); Edmon-
son v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 616 (1991) (holding that a civil litigant's
use of race-based peremptory challenges to exclude potential jurors because of their
race violated the equal protection rights of those jurors); Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S.
400, 402 (1991) (holding that criminal defendant's right to equal protection was vio-
lated by the prosecution's use of peremptory challenges to exclude potential jurors
based on their race, even though the jurors were of a different race than the defen-
dant); Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 86 (1986) (holding that a criminal defen-
dant's right to equal protection was violated by the prosecution's use of peremptory
challenges to exclude potential jurors of the defendant's race).
99 An obvious, but incorrect, answer might be that Title VII prohibits harassment
based on a plaintiff's race or sex, but not on his socio-economic status or that of his
workplace. This, however, fails to explain the different treatment of socio-economic
status because even harassment that is not overtly racial or sexual in nature is actiona-
ble under Title VII, so long as it is motivated by the plaintiff's sex or race. See O'Shea
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one's psychological makeup-and perhaps therefore one's suscepti-
bility to harassment-as a person's sex or race. The tastes and sensi-
bilities of the wealthy, of whatever race or sex, are probably more
consistent with each other than the sensibilities of, for example, rich
white women and poor white women. There is no principled reason
for courts to examine purported harassment according to the sup-
posed differing sensibilities of a "reasonable woman" or a "reasonable
black woman." According to the reasoning behind the reasonable wo-
man standard, there is no justification for not instructing jurors to
assess harassment from the perspective of a "reasonable, wealthy,
black, homosexual man"; a "reasonable person raised in a home
where profanity was commonplace"; or a "reasonable person raised in
a religious home where even mild profanity is considered egregious."
Of course, once courts head down this road, there is no limit to
the number of hypothetical "reasonable persons" that could be cre-
ated. For those who think that these are outrageous exaggerations
that would never arise, consider that at least one circuit judge has sug-
gested assessing conduct from the perspective of a "reasonable per-
son" with all of the complainant's essential and not-so-essential
attributes. According to Judge Reinhardt, "a reasonable person is not
defined solely by his or her sex. Other immutable traits possessed by
the person bringing the charge, including but not limited to race, age,
physical or mental disability, and sexual orientation, may in particular
cases be relevant to the inquiry as well." 100 No doubt, there are other
judges that concur in this view. Fortunately, this tailoring of the sex-
ual harassment standard to the attributes of each individual plaintiff is
not what Oncale was suggesting in its "social context" admonition.
C. The Social Relationship Between the Harasser and the Plaintiff
It is also possible that, in instructing courts to look at "social con-
text," the Oncale Court sought to emphasize the "social relationship"
v. Yellow Tech. Servs., Inc., 185 F.3d 1093, 1097 (10th Cir. 1999); Carter v. Chrysler
Corp., 173 F.3d 693, 701 (8th Cir. 1999). Thus, a harasser may use incentives directed
at a blue-collar plaintiffs socio-economic status to insult even though it is the plain-
tiff's sex or race that motivated the harasser. For all relevant purposes, this is no
different than using a plaintiffs race to insult him because of a hatred for the plain-
tiff's sex. The main difference is that overt statements of hatred for a particular race
or sex will make it much easier to prove motivation, while a harasser who hides be-
hind insults about the plaintiff's socio-economic status -may be able to conceal his
prohibited motives. In that sense, this latter harassment is more inimical to the goals
of Title VII than is the harassment where the harasser's motivation is obvious.
100 Nichols v. Frank, 42 F.3d 503, 512 (9th Cir. 1994) (Reinhardt, J., with two
judges concurring in the result).
2002] SOCIAL CONTEXT IN HOSTILE ENVIRONMENT LITIGATION 459
between the alleged harasser and the plaintiff-whether they were
friends, lovers, or mortal enemies-as this relationship can often be
relevant to unwelcomeness, motivation, and objective and subjective
severity. Indeed, recall that just before its "social context" admoni-
tion, the Oncale Court stated: "The real social impact of workplace
behavior often depends on a constellation of surrounding circum-
stances, expectations, and relationships which are not fully captured by
a simple recitation of the words used or the physical acts per-
formed."10 1 Also, it has repeatedly been noted that a significant num-
ber of harassment claims arise from failed romances,10 2 and so it is
possible that the Supreme Court was instructing courts to take these
failed social relationships into account when evaluating the un-
welcomeness and severity of the conduct. Because the "parties to the
dispute usually have some prior or ongoing relationship,"10 3 the na-
ture, duration, and extent of the relationship could be highly relevant
to assessing harassment claims. Take, for example, two friends who
frequently swap dirtyjokes. Their friendship would be highly relevant
to showing that the jokes were welcome and inoffensive. Two friends
who jokingly call each other names do not create the level of offen-
siveness that arises from two workplace enemies who bandy about the
same expressions with a hostile intent.
Similarly, in cases where the plaintiff and the purported harasser
ended a romance just before charges of harassment were lodged,
these facts would be highly relevant to assessing the offensive conduct
and in understanding a possible motive for the charge of harass-
ment.10 4 Social context is particularly important in these jilted-lover
harassment suits. Plaintiffs in such cases often are unable to show that
101 Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 81-82 (1998) (empha-
sis added).
102 See, e.g., Mosher v. Dollar Tree Stores, Inc., 240 F.3d 662, 668 (7th Cir. 2001);
Succar v. Dade County Sch. Bd., 229 F.3d 1343, 1345 (11th Cir. 2000) (per curiam);
Place v. Abbott Labs., 215 F.3d 803, 811 (7th Cir. 2000); Parks v. City of Warner Rob-
ins, 43 F.3d 609, 615 (11th Cir. 1995); McCollum v. Bolger, 794 F.2d 602, 610 (lth
Cir. 1986); Huebschen v. Dept. of Health & Soc. Servs., 716 F.2d 1167, 1172 (7th Cir.
1983); Seldomridge v. Uni-Marts, Inc., No. 99-469, 2001 WL 771011, at *4 (D. Del.
July 10, 2001); Fitzgerald v. Ford Marrin Esposito Witmeyer & Gleser, L.L.P., 153 F.
Supp. 2d 219, 225 (S.D.N.Y. 2001); Smith v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., 25 F. Supp. 2d
578, 579 (E.D. Pa. 1998); Keppler v. Hindsdale Township High Sch. Dist. 86, 715 F.
Supp. 862, 869 (N.D. Ill. 1989); Freeman v. Cont'l Tech. Servs., Inc., 710 F. Supp. 328,
330-31 (N.D. Ga. 1988); Mauro v. Orville, 697 N.Y.S.2d 704, 707-08 (App. Div. 1999).
103 RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROuNDs: THE CASE AGAINST EMPLOYMENT DIS-
CRIMINATION LAvs 350 (1992).
104 See Huebschen, 716 F.2d at 1172; Fitzgerald, 153 F. Supp. 2d at 225 ("[D]efense
witnesses said that Fitzgerald manifested anger at Beke's unwillingness to date her.").
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the harassment was "because of sex."105 Frequently, the record indi-
cates that the "harassment" occurred during the relationship, and the
complained-of touching and excessive attention are quite normal in
the context of a romantic relationship.10 6 As to the plaintiff's motiva-
tion for bringing the suit, the existence of a relationship is highly pro-
bative. "Personal animosity," perhaps incident to a messy breakup, "is
not the equivalent of sex discrimination and it is not proscribed by
Title VII. The plaintiff cannot turn a personal feud into a sex discrim-
ination case by accusation."10 7 Of course, it is true that these relation-
ships occurred only because the harasser was attracted to members of
the plaintiff's particular sex. So there is a sense in which the harass-
ment was based on sex (a heterosexual by definition would not have
had a romance with a member of the same sex; and thus members of
the harasser's gender will never be subjected to post-romance harass-
ment). But courts consider this relationship to sex to be too attenu-
ated to invoke Title VII's prohibition of sex discrimination. 108 They
turn their attention instead to the more proximate cause of the har-
assment-the failed romance-and usually find the harassment not to
be covered by Title VII.
Cases where the relationship between the plaintiff and the har-
asser is highly relevant abound. For instance, in Succar v. Dade County
School Board,'0 9 the court noted that plaintiff Joseph Succar com-
105 Huebschen, 716 F.2d at 1172.
When the consensual romance between Huebschen and Rader ended in No-
vember 1979, Rader did indeed react spitefully towards Huebschen by rec-
ommending that he be demoted at the end of the probationary period. But
Rader's motivation in doing so was not that Huebschen was male, but that
he was a former lover who had jilted her.
Id.
106 See Mosher, 240 F.3d at 668 ("[A]fter a longtime sexual relationship like this
one goes sour, it will be only the unusual case that can escape summary judgment.").
107 McCollum, 794 F.2d at 610.
108 Preference of a paramour over other members of the same or opposite sex,
according to the courts that have considered the issue, is not discrimination because
of sex. See DeCintio v. Westchester County Med. Ctr., 807 F.2d 304, 307-08 (2d Cir.
1986); cf Candelore v. Clark County Sanitation Dist., 975 F.2d 588, 590 (9th Cir.
1992) (per curiam) (holding that allegations another employee "received favorable
treatment" because of her consensual relationship with a co-worker are insufficient to
state a claim of sex discrimination under Title VII). A co-worker's romance with a
supervisor similarly does not in itself create a hostile environment for a plaintiff. See
Drinkwater v. Union Carbide Corp., 904 F.2d 853, 862 (3d Cir. 1990). Also, terminat-
ing a plaintiff because of anger over a failed relationship, rather than her sex, does
not itself constitute sex discrimination. See Huebschen, 716 F.2d at 1172; Mauro v.
Orville, 697 N.Y.S.2d 704, 707 (App. Div. 1999).
109 229 F.3d 1343 (11th Cir. 2000).
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menced a consensual relationship with fellow-teacher Clemencia Lo-
renz.110 When Succar later attempted to extricate himself from the
affair, Lorenz threatened Succar's wife and son, physically harassed
him, and attempted to embarrass him in front of his colleagues."11 In
affirming summaryjudgment for the defendant, the Eleventh Circuit
held that "Lorenz's harassment of Succar was motivated not by his
male gender, but rather by Lorenz's contempt for Succar following
their failed relationship; Succar's gender was merely coincidental."'
1 2
This is not to say that a former paramour can never experience
harassment at the hands of her former sweetheart. She certainly
can.'13 But to prevail she must usually rebut evidence that the alleged
harassment is just fallout from the breakup" 4 br that the conduct
about which the plaintiff complains was the normal social interactions
of a romantic couple. 115 "[When an employer penalizes an employee
after the termination of a consensual relationship, a presumption
arises that the employer acted not on the basis of gender, but on the
basis of the failed interpersonal relationship .... ,116 A plaintiff can
rebut the presumption, for example, by showing that other members
of her sex also experienced harassment or were similarly mistreated by
her former mate." 7 Alternatively, a presumption that the purported
harassment was motivated by the breakup will become irrelevant if the
harasser threatens the victim with termination if she does not con-
tinue the relationship, thereby creating a quid pro quo case.118
D. An Aggregation of Incidents
The Oncale Court might also have intended its "social context"
discussion to reiterate the totality of the circumstances approach nec-
essary to an accurate evaluation of a work environment. 19 The Court
may have been trying to tell judges to consider the cumulative effect
110 Id. at 1344.
111 Id.
112 Id. at 1345.
113 See id.; see also Keppler v. Hindsdale Township High Sch. Dist. 86, 715 F. Supp.
862, 869 (N.D. 11. 1989).
114 See Keppler, 715 F. Supp. at 869.
115 See Mosher v. Dollar Tree Stores, Inc., 240 F.3d 662, 668 (7th Cir. 2001).
116 See Keppler, 715 F. Supp. at 869.
117 See Huebschen v. Dept. of Health & Soc. Servs., 716 F.2d 1167, 1172 (7th Cir.
1983) ("[W]e note that there is no evidence that Rader discriminated against other
men in the office or that she attempted to have romances with other men in the
office.").
118 Keppler, 715 F. Supp. at 869 n.6.
119 See, e.g., O'Rourke v. City of Providence, 235 F.3d 713, 730 (1st Cir. 2001)
("Courts should avoid disaggregating a hostile work environment claim .... .").
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of all incidents of harassment the plaintiff has had to endure, as an
undivided whole, rather than as isolated incidents unconnected to
each other.120 As the Eighth Circuit has described the proper
analysis:
Under the totality of the circumstances analysis, the district court
should not carve the work environment into a series of discrete inci-
dents and then measure the harm occurring in each episode. In-
stead the trier of fact must keep in mind that "each successive
episode has its predecessors, that the impact of the separate inci-
dents may accumulate, and that the work environment created may
exceed the sum of the individual episodes."
121
A specific command to perform an aggregate examination may
have been necessary since, as several judges have complained, some
courts tend to address incidents of harassment piecemeal, thereby los-
ing the "flavor" of the case. 122 Rather than separating the events,
courts need to aggregate them in order to get the full picture. I23
"The existence of sexual harassment must be determined in light of
the record as a whole . . . because the very term 'environment' indi-
cates that allegedly discriminatory incidents should not be examined
in isolation."'124 "[I]n the usual case an isolated offensive incident
does not create an abusive or intimidating environment. However, by
viewing each incident in isolation, as if nothing else had occurred, a
realistic picture of the work environment [is] not presented."12
5
120 The idea behind this principle is similar to the one behind the "cumulative
effect" analysis of due processjurisprudence. Because the "cumulative effect of two or
more individually harmless errors has the potential to prejudice the defendant to the
same extent as a single reversible error," courts will examine multiple harmless errors
to ascertain whether their synergistic effect rises to the level of a reversible error.
United States v. Rivera, 900 F.2d 1462, 1469 (10th Cir. 1990) (en banc).
121 Burns v. McGregor Elec. Indus., Inc., 955 F.2d 559, 564 (8th Cir. 1992) (quot-
ing Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1486, 1524 (M.D. Fla.
1991)).
122 See Williams v. Gen. Motors Corp., 187 F.3d 553, 562 (6th Cir. 1999) ("[W]hen
the complaints are broken into their theoretical component parts, each claim is more
easily dismissed.").
123 Id. ("[I]t is well-established that the court must consider the totality of the
circumstances."). Courts have long recognized that they should aggregate different
forms of harassment to determine whether a hostile environment exists. See Smith v.
N.W. Fin. Acceptance, Inc., 129 F.3d 1408, 1413 (10th Cir. 1997) ("[W]e can aggre-
gate evidence of racial hostility with evidence of sexual hostility to establish a hostile
work environment.").
124 O'Shea v. Yellow Tech. Servs., Inc., 185 F.3d 1093, 1096-97 (10th Cir. 1999)
(citations and internal quotations omitted).
125 King v. Hillen, 21 F.3d 1572, 1581 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
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Chief Judge Boyce Martin, dissenting in Burnett v. Tyco Corp.,1
26
leveled this same sort of criticism at his colleagues. In that case, plain-
tiff Jenny Burnett complained of three incidents of harassment over a
six-month period. First, a supervisor allegedly placed a pack of ciga-
rettes inside Burnett's tank top and brassiere strap; the same supervi-
sor gave Burnett a cough drop, while stating, "Since you've lost your
cherry, here's one to replace the one you lost"; and finally, while Bur-
nett was wearing a sweater that said "Deck the Malls," the same super-
visor childishly yelled: "Dick the malls, dick the malls, I almost got
aroused."'127 The divided court held that "under the totality of the
circumstances, a single battery coupled with two merely offensive re-
marks over a six-month period does not create an issue of material
fact as to whether the conduct alleged was sufficiently severe to create
a hostile work environment." 28 Therefore, the panel agreed with the
district court that there was no factual issue as to severity and affirmed
the summary judgment. Despite the court's statement that it consid-
ered the three incidents together, Chief Judge Martin disagreed:
The majority creates a scorecard, finding one act to be severe and
two to be innocuous. While I do not fully agree with their conclu-
sions, I object more strongly to their method of computation. The
majority concludes that these numbers are insufficient to create an
issue of material fact as to whether the conduct was sufficiently se-
vere to create a hostile work environment. In doing so, the majority
fails to examine the aggregate effects of the incidents.
29
As Judge Martin's dissent suggests, when courts address each inci-
dent in isolation, they tend to minimize the extent of the harm in-
flicted.' 30 The "very term 'environment' indicates that alleged
discriminatory incidents should not be examined in isolation," 131 as
126 203 F.3d 980 (6th Cir. 2000).
127 Id. at 981.
128 Id. at 985.
129 Id. at 985-86 (Martin, CJ., dissenting); see also Smith v. Legett Wire Co., 220
F.3d 752, 765 (6th Cir. 2000) (Martin, CJ., dissenting).
I believe that the Supreme Court did not intend for us to interpret the "to-
tality of the circumstances" test so narrowly by disaggregating the effect of
each incident over time until its significance is lost or diluted. Instead, we
should look more at the cumulative effect of these incidents over time in
order to assess whether the atmosphere at the plant was racially hostile ....
Id.
130 Vance v. S. Bell Tel. & Tel..Co., 863 F.2d 1503, 1510 (11th Cir. 1989) ("What
may appear to be a legitimate justification for a single incident of alleged harassment
may look pretextual when viewed in the context of several other related incidents.").
131 Penry v. Fed. Home Loan Bank of Topeka, 155 F.3d 1257, 1262 (10th Cir.
1998).
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isolated incidents can appear innocuous and seldom convey the whole
picture. As the Third Circuit put it: "A play cannot be understood on
the basis of some of its scenes but only on its entire performance, and
similarly, a discrimination analysis must concentrate not on individual
incidents, but on the overall scenario."1 32 When split into discrete
parts, the successive individual acts of harassment often seem less se-
vere. 133 Because an examination of each incident, divorced from the
social context of all the episodes of harassment, fails to appreciate the
full extent of the harm inflicted, plaintiffs whose claims are subject to
such an analysis frequently do not survive summary judgment. Simi-
larly, consideration of the incidents separately might distort the real
reason for the conduct. "'What may appear to be a legitimate justifi-
cation for a single incident of alleged harassment may look pretextual
when viewed in the context of several other related incidents.'" 134 In
light of these legitimate concerns, it is possible that the Oncale Court
was using its "social context" exhortation to remind courts to consider
individual acts of harassment in the total social context of the work
environment, including prior and subsequent acts of harassment.1 3 5
Ill. SOCIAL CONTEXT AS CULTURAL CONTEXT
The foregoing demonstrates that the term "social context" can
denote a multiplicity of understandings, and indeed Oncale may have
left this somewhat open-ended in order to allow its words to take on
their fullest possible meaning. Until the Court elects to clarify its lan-
guage, lawyers and litigants may only guess as to its full meaning.
Some lawyers, however, have taken the bull by the horns and have
successfully argued that "social context" means the cultural context of
the workplace, in the sense of the prevalence or lack of harsh lan-
guage and juvenile behavior at a particular worksite. Thus, according
to this view, purported acts of harassment must be examined accord-
ing to the totality of the circumstances in the sense that general vul-
garity is highly relevant to motivation, unwelcomeness, and severity.
Courts that have adopted this understanding of "social context"-
which arguably include the Fifth, Seventh, Eighth, Tenth, and District
of Columbia Circuits-are especially sensitive to work environments
132 Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469, 1484 (3d Cir. 1990).
133 Peny, 155 F.3d at 1262.
134 Andrews, 895 F.2d at 1484 (quoting Vance, 863 F.2d at 1510).
135 The Supreme Court clearly made this point in Clark County School District v.
Breeden, 121 S. Ct. 1508, 1510 (2001) (per curiam), where it observed, "Workplace
conduct is not measured in isolation; instead, 'whether an environment is sufficiently
hostile or abusive' must be judged 'by looking at all the circumstances. .. .'" 121 S.
Ct. at 1510 (quoting Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 787-88 (1998)).
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that are permeated with "blue-collar" behavior, regardless of the race
or sex of the plaintiff.
136
The theory behind this practice certainly has much to recom-
mend it. Many hostile environment cases are based simply on words
spoken to the plaintiff, and these words-indeed all words-have
meaning only in context.13 7 As the Supreme Court has noted, "Words
that are commonplace in one setting are shocking in another."38
Under Title VII, courts are called.upon to assess the purported har-
asser's words in an effort to determine: (1) whether they were moti-
vated by the plaintiff's sex; (2) whether a reasonable person would
find them severely offensive; (3) whether the plaintiff himself found
them severely offensive; and (4) whether the words were unwelcome.
These determinations, which are essential to a Title VII claim, are
highly (perhaps utterly) dependent upon the cultural context of the
particular workplace.
136 See, e.g., Barbour v. Browner, 181 F.3d 1342, 1349 (D.C. Cir. 1999); Shepherd v.
Slater Steels Corp., 168 F.3d 998, 1010-11 (7th Cir. 1999); Johnson v. Hondo, Inc.,
125 F.3d 408, 412 (7th Cir. 1997); Montandon v. Farmland Indus., Inc., 116 F.3d 355,
358 (8th Cir. 1997); Gross v. Burggraf Constr. Co., 53 F.3d 1531, 1537-38 (10th Cir.
1995); Reed v. Shepard, 939 F.2d 484, 491-92 (7th Cir. 1991); Vaughn v. Pool Off-
shore Co., 683 F.2d 922, 924, 925 (5th Cir. 1982); Pirolli v. World Flavors, Inc., No. 98-
3596, 1999 WL 1065214, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 23, 1999); Weston v. Pa. Dep't of Corr.,
No. 98-CV-3899, 1998 WL 695352, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 29, 1998); Smith v. Sheahan,
No. 95-C-7203, 1997 WL 797663, at *7 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 24, 1997), revd, 189 F.3d 529
(7th Cir. 1999); Fortner v. Kansas, 934 F. Supp. 1252, 1269 (D. Kan. 1996); Bernard v.
Doskocil Cos., 861 F. Supp. 1017, 1021 (D. Kan. 1994); Reynolds v. Atlantic City Cony.
Ctr. Auth., No. 88-4232, 1990 WL 267417, at *18 (D.N.J. May 26, 1990), affd, 925 F.2d
419 (3d Cir. 1991); Rabidue v. Osceola Refining Co., 584 F. Supp. 419, 430 (E.D.
Mich. 1984), afTd, 805 F.2d 611 (6th Cir. 1986); Webster v. Coastal Transp., Inc., No.
42693-1-I, 1999 WL 360625, at *5 (Wash. Ct. App. June 1, 1999).
137 See FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 132 (2000)
("The meaning-or ambiguity-of certain words or phrases may only become evident
when placed in context."); Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 58 (1999)
("[L]anguage must not be torn from the context out of which it arose....") (quoted
out of context); Moskal v. United States, 498 U.S. 103, 108 (1990) ("[T]he meaning of
language is inherently contextual. .. ."); ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATrER OF INTERPRETA-
TION 37 (1997) ("In textual interpretation, context is everything . . . ."); Frank H.
Easterbrook, Text, Histoy, and Structure in Statutory Interpretation, 17 HARv. J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 61, 61 (1993) ( "[W]ords are not born with meanings. Words take their mean-
ing from contexts, of which there are many... .");John T. Noonan, Jr., The Relation of
Words to Power, 70 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 13, 15 (1996) ("We all recognize that words can
be taken out of context.").
138 FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 747 (1978).
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Accordingly, some courts have begun to take note of workplace
culture when analyzing hostile environment cases, 139 based on the no-
tion that foul language and sexual banter are common occurrences in
certain workplaces 40 and thus have a different effect and meaning
than in other settings. That is, some courts-both before and after
Oncale-have reasoned that certain "blue-collar" work environment
and their traditionally unrefined atmospheres are highly relevant to
the hostile environment analysis, particularly with respect to whether
the harassment was "because of sex"; whether the conduct at issue was
unwelcome; and whether the purported harassment was objectively
and subjectively severe. These courts see Oncale as an endorsement of
their analytic technique, particularly because this approach is consis-
tent with Justice Scalia's views on language and communication: the
meaning of language "cannot be determined in isolation, but must be
drawn from the context in which it is used."1 41 Nevertheless, at least
three circuits have rejected this approach, 42 holding that a considera-
139 In most cases, the blue-collar context of the harassment is simply one factor
that the courts consider. But at least the Sixth Circuit has interpreted some cases as
creating a separate, blue-collar standard of conduct. See Williams v. Gen. Motors
Corp., 187 F.3d 553, 564 (6th Cir. 1999) ("[W]e reject the view that the standard for
sexual harassment varies depending on the work environment. Thus, we disagree
with the Tenth Circuit decision in Gross v. Burggraff Const. Co., 53 F.3d 1531, 1538
(10th Cir. 1995) . . ").
140 See, e.g., Ebert v. Lamar Truck Plaza, 878 F.2d 338, 339 (1 Oth Cir. 1989) ("In its
findings the district court recognized that rough language by employees and supervi-
sors alike was commonplace in the kitchen area at the Truck Plaza, noting that such
language was used indiscriminately by both male and female employees, including
certain of the plaintiffs.").
141 Deal v. United States, 508 U.S. 129, 132 (1993) (Scalia, J.); see also Easterbrook,
supra note 137, at 64 (1994) ("Because interpretation is a social enterprise, because
words have no natural meanings, and because their effect lies in context, we must
consult these contexts.").
142 Specifically, the First, Fourth, and Sixth Circuits seem to reject an examination
of workplace culture. In doing so, they often construe a workplace culture analysis as
the creation of a new hostile environment standard for blue-collar employers. See
O'Rourke v. City of Providence, 235 F.3d 713, 735 (1st Cir. 2001) ("[T]here is no
merit to the City's argument at the first trial that it was entitled to a jury instruction
that the firefighters' conduct should be evaluated in the context of a blue collar envi-
ronment."); Conner v. Schrader-Bridgeport Int'l, Inc., 227 F.3d 179, 194 (4th Cir.
2000) ("We are unable to discern an 'inhospitable environment' exception to Title
VII's mandate ... ."); Jackson v. Quanex Corp., 191 F.3d 647, 662 (6th Cir. 1999)
("[T] he district court was wrong to condone continuing racial slurs and graffiti on the
grounds that they occurred in a blue collar environment."); Williams, 187 F.3d at 564
("[W]e reject the view that the standard for sexual harassment varies depending on
the work environment."); see also Adkins v. Kelly-Springfield Tire Co., No. 97-C-50381,
2001 WL 219636, at *7 n.7 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 6, 2001) (stating that the fact that all em-
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don of workplace culture is completely unwarranted. An understand-
ing of these conflicting views of "social context" can best be achieved
by examining the reasoning and justifications behind them, in the
context of the actual cases.
A. Workplace Culture and Motivation
As discussed above, "[t]he essence of a disparate treatment claim
under Title VII is that an employee or applicant is intentionally sin-
gled out for adverse treatment on the basis of a prohibited crite-
rion."'143 In hostile environment cases, the prohibited criteria is most
frequently the plaintiff's sex,"4 although race-based harassment also
exists. Because Title VII is designed to eliminate only discriminatory
harassment, and not just rudeness or unfriendliness unconnected to
the plaintiff's sex, "inappropriate conduct that is inflicted on both
sexes, or is inflicted regardless of sex, is outside the statute's ambit. '
1 45
"Title VII is not a shield against harsh treatment at the workplace; it
protects only in instances of harshness disparately distributed."'
146
Thus, the critical issue in any harassment case "is whether members of
one sex are exposed to disadvantageous terms or conditions of em-
ployment to which members of the other sex are not exposed."' 47 To
prevail in a hostile environment claim, then, a "plaintiff must produce
evidence that she was the object of harassment because of her gen-
der.1 48 "An employee is harassed or otherwise discriminated against
ployees were exposed to harassment, and not just the plaintiff, militates in favor of
Title VII liability and does not help the employer's defense). The Seventh Circuit
adopted the practice of examining cultural context in Reed v. Shepard, 939 F.2d 484,
491-92 (7th Cir. 1991), and reaffirmed the reasoning behind this practice in Johnson
v. Hondo, Inc., 125 F.3d 408, 412 (7th Cir. 1997) (noting that in assessing whether
certain words and conduct are motivated by sex, courts must take into consideration
that vulgarity is common in certain contexts and thus is not because of sex), and
Sheptherd v. Slater Steels Corp., 168 F.3d 998, 1010 (7th Cir. 1999) ("Whether the sexual
content of the harassment is indicative of sex discrimination must therefore be ex-
amined with attention to the context in which the harassment occurs."). But later, a
split panel (notably not an en banc panel) arguably disavowed this practice. See Smith
v. Sheahan, 189 F.3d 529, 534 (7th Cir. 1999).
143 Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 903 (11th Cir. 1982).
144 See Lipsett v. Univ. of P.R., 864 F.2d 881, 898 n.19 (1st Cir. 1988).
145 Holman v. Indiana, 211 F.3d 399, 403 (7th Cir. 2000).
146 Jackson v. City of Killeen, 654 F.2d 1181, 1186 (5th Cir. 1981).
147 Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 25 (1993) (Ginsburg, J., concurring);
see also Scusa v. Nestle U.S.A. Co., 181 F.3d 958, 965 (8th Cir. 1999) ("Stated differ-
ently, the harassment must be based on the complaining person's sex.").
148 Penry v. Fed. Home Loan Bank of Topeka, 155 F.3d 1257, 1261 (10th Cir.
1998); see also Conner v. Schrader-Bridgeport Int'l, Inc., 227 F.3d 179, 192 (4th Cir.
2000).
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'because of his or her gender if, 'but for' the employee's gender, he
or she would not have been the victim of the discrimination."
149 Put
another way, if "the nature of an employee's environment, however
unpleasant, is not due to her gender, she has not been the victim of
sex discrimination as a result of that environment." 150 Thus, harass-
ment is not actionable simply because it is highly offensive, fulsome,
mean-spirited, or insensitive.15 1 There must be a causal nexus be-
tween the harassment and a protected attribute, such as sex, race, re-
ligion, or national origin.
152
Importantly, however, a victim's sex or race need not be the sole
cause of the harassment for it to be actionable;155 it merely has to be a
substantial or motivating factor of the harassment. 154 But harassment
that is meted out equally to all victims-regardless of their sex, race,
religion, or national origin-is not disparate treatment and therefore
is not a violation of Title VII. 15 5 Although "equal opportunity harass-
149 Smith v. First Union Nat'l Bank, 202 F.3d 234, 242 (4th Cir. 2000); see also
Bowman v. Shawnee State Univ., 220 F.3d 456, 463 (6th Cir. 2000) ("Non-sexual con-
duct may be illegally sex-based and properly considered in a hostile environment
analysis where it can be shown that but for the employee's sex, he would not have
been the object of harassment."); Seldomridge v. Uni-Marts, Inc., No. CIV.A.99-469,
2001 WL 771011, at *8 (D. Del.July 10, 2001) ("[A]Illegedly harassing conduct that is
motivated by a bad working relationship, by a belief that the plaintiff has in some way
acted improperly, or even by personal animosity is not actionable under Title VII.");
Weiland v. Dept. of Transp., 98 F. Supp. 2d 1010, 1017 (N.D. Ind. 2000) ("The key
inquiry in these cases is whether the alleged acts of harassment occurred 'but for' the
employee's sex.").
150 Peny, 155 F.3d at 1263 (quoting Stahl v. Sun Microsystems, Inc., 19 F.3d 533,
538 (10th Cir. 1994)).
151 See Wrightson v. Pizza Hut of Am., Inc., 99 F.3d 138, 142 (4th Cir. 1996); Mc-
Williams v. Fairfax County Bd. of Supervisors, 72 F.3d 1191, 1196 (4th Cir. 1996).
152 See Hartsell v. Duplex Prods., Inc., 123 F.3d 766, 772 (4th Cir. 1997).
153 Galdieri-Ambrosini v. Nat'l Realty & Dev. Corp., 136 F.3d 276, 289 (2d Cir.
1998); Armstrong v. Chrysler Fin. Corp., No. CIV.3:97-CV-1557, 1999 WL 608831, at
*5 (D. Conn.July 29, 1999) ("[T]o show that gender played a motivating factor in the
allegedly harassing conduct, a female employee must show that one of the reasons was
that she was a woman.").
154 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (1994); Foster v. Arthur Andersen, L.L.P., 168 F.3d
1029, 1033-34 (7th Cir. 1999).
To be a motivating factor.., the forbidden criterion must be a significant
reason for the employer's action. It must make such a difference in the
outcome of events that it can fairly be characterized as the catalyst which
prompted the employer to take the adverse employment action, and a factor
without which the employer would not have acted.
Id.
155 See Pasqua v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 101 F.3d 514, 517 (7th Cir. 1996) ("Harass-
ment that is inflicted without regard to gender, that is, where males and females in
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ers" may make a work environment just as degrading and unpleasant
as a sexual harasser, 5 6 if an employer is willing to face the risk that his
employees will leave his employment or unionize rather than tolerate
hostile working conditions, Title VII allows him that freedom.
15 7
This disparate treatment rule, more than anything, demonstrates
that Title VII is not a general civility code. Accordingly, Oncale has
been interpreted as a directive to examine the regular atmosphere of
the work environment to ensure that any indignity suffered by the
plaintiff was due to her sex, and not that she suffered insults that are
cast about freely at both men and women.' 58 As the Seventh Circuit
observed:
Whether the sexual content of the harassment is indicative of sex
discrimination must therefore be examined with attention to the
context in which the harassment occurs. The Supreme Court [in
Oncale] so stated with respect to the objective severity of the harass-
ment, and we believe the Court's observations in that regard are
apropos here as well. Where... "[i] t appears plain on the record as
a whole" that the statements or conduct in question "were nothing
other than vulgar provocations haVing no causal relationship to the
plaintiff's gender as a male," the sexual content or connotations of
the same setting do not receive disparate treatment, is not actionable because the
harassment is not based on sex."); Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 904 (11th
Cir. 1982) (holding that, in cases where the conduct is equally offensive to male and
female workers, "the sexual harassment would not be based on sex because men and
women are accorded like treatment").
156 See, e.g., Lack v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 240 F.3d 255, 262 (4th Cir. 2001)
("Bragg was just an indiscriminately vulgar and offensive supervisor, obnoxious to
men and women alike."); Holman v. Indiana, 211 F.3d 399, 403 (7th Cir. 2000)
("[T]his circuit does not recognize Title VII sexual harassment claims in the case of
the 'equal opportunity' harasser."). But an employee will not be treated as an equal
opportunity harasser where, despite his poor treatment of all employees, he treats one
class of employees worse than others or directs sexual comments only at one group.
See, e.g., EEOC v. R&R Ventures, 244 F.3d 334, 339 (4th Cir. 2001) ("R&R claims that
Wheeler was a difficult manager who abused male and female employees alike. The
EEOC claims, however, that Wheeler singled out his female subordinates for espe-
cially cruel treatment and that this constituted sexual harassment.").
157 As the courts are fond of saying, they "do not sit as a super-personnel depart-
ment." Krenick v. County of Le Sueur, 47 F.3d 953, 960 (8th Cir. 1995). Thus, em-
ployees can act foolishly with their resources, so long as they do not discriminate on
the basis of protected characteristics. See Furr v. Seagate Tech., Inc., 82 F.3d 980, 986
(10th Cir. 1996) (finding that the discrimination laws are not violated by erroneous or
even illogical business decisions).
158 See Scusa v. Nestle U.SA. Co., 181 F.3d 958, 965 (8th Cir. 1999) ("[N]one of
the incidents involving Lonnie Schoenfield was based on appellant's sex. Appellant
admitted that Schoenfield used profanity toward both male and female
employees . . ").
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those statements or conduct will not alone raise a question of fact as
to the sex-based character of the harassment.
1 59
Like the Seventh Circuit, many courts see this motivation analysis
as one of the features that Oncale was emphasizing in its "social con-
text" exhortation, even though the general discussion in Oncale prima-
rily concerned an analysis of objective severity. These courts have
seized upon the social context language and have made it one of the
foundations of their practice of closely examining workplace culture.
Under this view, cases such as Gross v. Burggraf Construction Co.1 6 0 may
have factored social context into the hostile environment analysis
even before Oncale endorsed this practice.
1. Gross v. Burggraf Construction Co.
In Gross, plaintiff Patricia Gross worked as a truck driver for a
construction company.1 6 1 She complained of nine different incidents
of harassment, including harsh reprimands, being called "dumb," be-
ing told to "get your ass back in the truck," and when she failed to
respond to a radio call from her supervisor, she overheard him say to
a co-employee, "Mark, sometimes, don't you just want to smash a wo-
man in the face?" 16 2 Despite these allegations (or because of them),
the district court granted summary judgment for the defendant. On
appeal, the Tenth Circuit affirmed, analyzing the hostile environment
claim with an eye to the blue-collar context in which the alleged har-
assment occurred:
In determining whether Gross has established a viable Title VII
claim, we must first examine her work environment. In the real
world of construction work, profanity and vulgarity are not per-
ceived as hostile and abusive. Indelicate forms of expression are
accepted and endured as normal human behavior .... Accord-
ingly, we must evaluate Gross' claim of gender discrimination in the
context of the blue-collar environment where crude language is
commonly used by male and female employees. Speech that might
be offensive or unacceptable in a prep school faculty meeting, or on
the floor of Congress, is tolerated in other work environments. We
agree with the following comment... : "The standard for determin-
ing sexual harassment would be different depending upon the work
environment. Indeed, it cannot seriously be disputed that in some
159 Shepherd v. Slater Steels Corp., 168 F.3d 998, 1010-11 (7th Cir. 1999) (quot-
ingJohnson v. Hondo, Inc., 125 F.3d 408, 413 (7th Cir. 1997)) (citation omitted).
160 53 F.3d 1531 (10th Cir. 1995).
161 Id. at 1535.
162 Id. at 1536.
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work environments, humor and language are rough hewn and
vulgar."1
63
From this excerpt, it is obvious that the Tenth Circuit took the
cultural context into account in assessing the hostile environment
claim. What the court did not make clear is its reason for emphasiz-
ing the blue-collar facet of social context. Similarly, the court did not
explain the extent to which social context enters into the hostile envi-
ronment calculus.
The Tenth Circuit's assertion that indelicate forms of expression
are "accepted and endured" in blue-collar contexts suggests that the
court considered social context relevant to the analysis of unwelcome-
ness. Because unwelcomeness and severity are closely related, it's also
not surprising that the Gross court also suggests that the workplace
culture is relevant to the severity analysis. But the court's main focus
seems to be on motivation. It noted that vulgar language exists in
blue-collar contexts regardless of whether the employees are male or
female, suggesting that social context is relevant to whether the har-
assment was "because of sex." Along these lines, the court observed:
The term "ass" is a vulgar expression that refers to a portion of the
anatomy of both sexes. Thus, the term is gender-neutral. Its usage
on a construction site does not demonstrate gender
discrimination .... 164
... Gross has failed to demonstrate that Anderson's reprimand was
motivated by gender discrimination .... 165
The remaining evidence that Gross presented in support of her
claim of gender discrimination reflects crude and rough comments
used by a construction boss in reprimanding or motivating his em-
ployees regarding their job performance. None were related to
Gross' gender.
166
From these portions of the opinion, proponents of a "social con-
text" analysis can readily make the argument that the court's analysis
was true to Tide VII, and particularly Oncale's instruction that sensitiv-
163 Id. at 1537-38 (quoting Rabidue v. Osceola Ref. Co., 584 F. Supp. 419 (E.D.
Mich. 1984), affd, 805 F.2d 611 (6th Cir. 1986)) (emphasis added and citation omit-
ted). The court's characterization of the typical construction environment does not
seem to be disputed, and other cases confirm the accuracy of the Tenth Circuit's
description. See Parkins v. Civil Constructors of Ill., 163 F.3d 1027, 1031 (7th Cir.
1998).
164 Gross, 53 F.3d at 1543.
165 Id. at 1545.
166 Id. at 1547.
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ity to social context will preclude liability for "genuine but innocuous
differences in the ways men and women routinely interact with mem-
bers of the same sex and of the opposite sex."
16 7
Of course, the actions about which Patricia Gross complained
could have been motivated by her sex, but "[c]ommon sense, and an
appropriate sensitivity to social context, will enable courts and juries
to distinguish between simple teasing"168 and actual harassment. That
is, the social mores of each particular context-the football field or
construction site on the one hand and an office setting on the other-
suggest that slapping someone on the buttocks in the social context of
a white-collar, office environment is not a simple case of an over-en-
thusiastic celebration in the end-zone, but is more probably based on
sexual interest in the secretary, which in turn is based on her sex.
From the facts of Gross and the court's reasoning, it is apparent that a
special consideration of the blue-collar context does not preclude
consideration of other evidence as to motivation, it is simply one fac-
tor relevant to the analysis, especially where there is little else to sug-
gest that the conduct was based on the plaintiff's sex. Although the
Sixth Circuit has accused the Tenth Circuit of lowering the standard
of harassment in blue-collar cases, 169 it is readily apparent that this
was neither the intent nor the effect of the Tenth Circuit. Rather, it
seems that workplace culture is simply one factor that the court will
consider in assessing motivation and, perhaps, severity and un-
welcomeness. The value of this analytical tool is similarly demon-
strated in other cases.
2. Johnson v. Hondo, Inc.
The Seventh Circuit also has looked to social context in evaluat-
ing motivation. In Johnson v. Hondo, Inc.,170 the context was a Coca-
Cola truck loading facility where both the harasser and the victim
worked as "night loader[s]. "171 The court was faced with a same-sex
harassment case in which Ollie Hicks verbally threatened his co-
worker, plaintiff Craig Johnson with crude statements like: "I am go-
ing to make you suck my dick."' 72
167 Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 81 (1998).
168 Id. at 82.
169 See Williams v. Gen. Motors Corp., 187 F.3d 553, 564 (6th Cir. 1999) ("[W]e
reject the view that the standard for sexual harassment varies depending on the work
environment. Thus, we disagree with the Tenth Circuit decision in Gross v. Burggraff
Const. Co., 53 F.3d 1531, 1538 (10th Cir. 1995) ... .
170 125 F.3d 408, 412 (7th Cir. 1997).
171 Id. at 410.
172 Id.
[VOL- 77:2
2002] SOCIAL CONTEXT IN HOSTILE ENVIRONMENT LITIGATION 473
Despite complaints to management, the abuse continued, and
even worsened. Hicks persistently came up to Johnson and would
brush against him, or grab and manipulate his crotch while saying
"[g] onna [sic] get my dick sucked.'17 3 When management repeatedly
refused to address the problem, Johnson tried talking to Hicks about
his conduct, but Hicks responded by attacking Johnson with a jack
stand.174 Johnson defended himself with a baseball bat, which re-
sulted in his arrest for aggravated battery.175 Both men were subse-
quently fired for the incident, although Hicks was reinstated after the
union put pressure on the employer. Johnson sued his employer for
hostile environment harassment under Title VII. The district court
granted summaryjudgment for the defendant, holding that the con-
duct was not sufficiently severe or intimidating to amount to
harassment. 
176
The Seventh Circuit affirmed, but it focused more on causation
than the offensiveness of Hicks's conduct. In analyzing the claim, the
court took into account the fact that both Johnson and Hicks used
vulgar language in this blue-collar context.177 This seemed to be the
key to the analysis, even though Hicks was the instigator of the verbal
sparring, Johnson never threatened Hicks, and Johnson's rejoinders
were not as consistently vulgar as Hicks's threats. According to the
court's chain of reasoning: (1) this was a blue-collar context; (2) vul-
gar language is common in such contexts;178 and (3) thus, in such
blue-collar contexts, vulgar language is usually motivated by the imma-
ture personalities of workers like Hicks, and not by the plaintiff's
sex. 179 As the court itself stated:
173 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
174 Id. at 411.
175 Johnson was subsequently acquitted by a jury on the grounds of self-defense.
Id.
176 Id.
177 See id. at 412 n.4.
178 Id. at 412-13 (referring to the vulgar language as "generic shoptalk" and not-
ing that such language is "commonplace in certain circles").
179 See id. at 412. The Seventh Circuit has long made this inference. Over the
years, it has instructed the district courts to examine "the lexicon of obscenity that
pervaded the environment of the workplace both before and after the plaintiff's intro-
duction into its environs." Rodgers v. W.-S. Life Ins. Co., 12 F.3d 668, 674 (7th Cir.
1993) (quoting Daniels v. Essex Group, Inc., 937 F.2d 1264, 1274 (7th Cir. 1991)
(quoting Brooms v. Regal Tube Co., 881 F.2d 412, 419 (7th Cir. 1989) (citing Rabidue
v. Osceola Refining Co., 805 F.2d 611, 620 (6th Cir. 1986)))). The obvious rationale
is that obscenity that preexisted the plaintiff's advent could not have been based on
the plaintiff's sex, race, color, or religion. The ABA has picked up on this in its model
jury instructions, where it proposes that jurors consider, among other things, the de-
gree and type of obscenity that filled the environment before and after the plaintiff
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Besides the sexual content of Hicks' remarks there is absolutely
nothing in this record that supports a reasonable inference that the
remarks were directed at Johnson on account of his gender. Al-
though explicit sexual content or vulgarity may often take a
factfinder a long way toward concluding that harassing comments
were in fact based on gender... this need not necessarily be the
case. Most unfortunately, expressions such as "fuck me," "kiss my
ass," and "suck my dick," are commonplace in certain circles, and
more often than not, when these expressions are used (particularly
when uttered by men speaking to other men), their use has no con-
nection whatsoever with the sexual acts to which they make refer-
ence-even when they are accompanied, as they sometimes were
here, with a crotch-grabbing gesture. Ordinarily, they are simply
expressions of animosity or juvenile provocation, and there is no
basis in this record to conclude that Hicks' usage was any
different.180
This part of the opinion illustrates several salient features about
the practice of analyzing harassment claims according to workplace
culture. First, courts that have adopted this practice will look to see
whether the plaintiff himself also used coarse language, as this sug-
gests that the harasser's offensive comments were just part and parcel
of the blue-collar context, and not based on sex.'8 1 The fact that the
harasser verbally"abused other employees is also relevant, as this sug-
gests that the harassment was not aimed at the plaintiff, or at least not
exclusively at him.18 2 Unpleasant talk or conduct by other employ-
ees-i.e., employees other than the purported harasser and the plain-
tiff-is also relevant.'8 3 These courts will look beyond the overt sexual
arrived. ABA Model Charge § 104[21 [b] (1994), quoted in Hurley v. Atlantic City Po-
lice Dep't, 174 F.3d 95, 114 n.13 (3d Cir. 1999).
180 Johnson, 125 F.3d at 412.
181 See, e.g., Vaughn v. Pool Offshore Co., 683 F.2d 922, 924-25 (5th Cir. 1982)
("The court determined that Vaughn used racial slurs along with his co-employees
and that other Pool employees were subjected to the same obnoxious treatment.");
Reynolds v. Atlantic City Conv. Ctr. Auth., No. 88-4232, 1990 WL 267417, at *18
(D.N.J. May 26, 1990) ("[P]laintiff also used obscene language at work."), affd, 925
F.2d 419 (3d Cir. 1991).
182 Johnson, 125 F.3d at 414 ("Hicks did not single outJohnson as the object of his
vulgar taunting-at least two other workers at the Coca-Cola plant were harassed by
Hicks in a similar fashion."); Reynolds, 1990 WL 267417, at *18 ("Plaintiff testified that
male electricians called each other obscene names.").
183 See Vaughn, 683 F.2d at 924, 925. Like Oncale, Vaughn involved workers on an
oil rig. Dennis Vaughn claimed that he suffered hostile environment race harass-
ment, based on numerous acts of hazing and his co-workers' use of terms such as
"nigger," "coon," and "black boy." The record, indicated that life on the rig was
"rowdy and rough. Raw pranks, crude practical jokes and verbal abuse abounded,
some of it permeated with racial overtones." Id. at 923. The court found it relevant
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nature of comments in assessing motivation,1 8 4 instead ascribing the
motivation to the general immaturity pervading the blue-collar envi-
ronment. Even when the record creates the culturally-based presump-
tion that this conduct was not motivated by sex, a plaintiff can
sometimes rebut this presumption with evidence that the harasser was
attracted to members of the victim's sex or held a strong antipathy for
persons of the plaintiffs sex.'8 5 Thus, although a consideration of
workplace culture presents plaintiffs with an evidentiary hurdle, it
does not foreclose liability for hostile environment harassment in a
blue-collar context.
One final aspect of Johnson is worth noting: the way the court
treated Hicks's violence. Johnson is an exceptional "workplace cul-
ture" case in that most of the cases that closely consider social context
do not involve acts of violence and certainly not battery with a
weapon. Yet the Johnson court seemed not to be troubled by this fact,
as the "altercation was not of a sexual nature .... ,186 Although this is
consistent with the court's discussion of causation and the abusive
taunts, it does raise some eyebrows. Obviously the cost of an error in
the court's analysis in cases where violence was used is certainly
greater than in those where the plaintiff merely had to weather a bar-
rage of caustic remarks. Nevertheless, in light of the cultural context,
the court was certain that there were insufficient grounds to infer that
sex was the motivating factor for the harassment, and so it consistently
stood by its conclusion.
that Vaughn also used abusive language, including some racial slurs, and that white
workers were also hazed by co-workers. Id. at 924-25. It further noted that "Vaughn
joined in similar opprobriums which, insofar as the record reflects, were bandied
back and forth without apparent hostility or racial animus. Indeed, the relations be-
tween Vaughn and the other Pool employees, aside from the crude excesses of the
platform atmosphere, were friendly and cordial." Id. at 924. The Fifth Circuit af-
firmed the summary judgment for the employer, holding that in light of the work-
place culture the acts were not severely offensive and were not based on race,
particularly because even Vaughn "did not believe the pranks were racially motivated
or that he was singled out for abusive treatment." Id. at 925.
184 Johnson, 125 F.3d at 413 ("[T]he plaintiff's sole evidence bearing on the gen-
der-based nature of Hicks' provocation is the facially sexual content of Hicks' re-
marks. Upon scrutiny, however, no reasonable factfinder could conclude that Hicks
directed his vulgar comments atJohnson because of his gender.").
185 See Shepherd v. Slater Steels Corp., 168 F.3d 998, 1009 (7th Cir. 1999).
186 See Johnson, 125 F.3d at 414.
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3. Temple v. Auto Banc of Kansas, Inc.
Temple v. Auto Banc of Kansas, Inc.187 is another example of the
way in which cultural context is factored into the motivation analysis.
This case demonstrates that crude conduct typical of certain worksites
will often indicate that, because vulgarity existed regardless of the
plaintiff's presence, the conduct was not motivated by sexual
animus.I8
8
Temple involved the showroom floor of an automobile dealership,
where the plaintiff was employed as a saleswoman. 189 In an effort to
increase business, the dealership held a two-day sales event with a
beach party theme. Keeping with this theme, the dealership hired two
female models to sit in a hot tub located on the showroom floor. Giv-
ing new meaning to the term "showroom," the models wore only
thong bikinis. 190 If they had stayed in the hot tub, things might have
been okay, but when they started talking to a friend who happened to
be talking to the plaintiff Melissa Temple, she became incensed. 191
Temple complained to her manager that she was offended by the
presence of the models and their attire (or lack thereof). The man-
ager declined to do anything about the models or their skimpy attire,
but offered Temple the rest of the day off, which she accepted.
192
Temple returned the next day, but after the models arrived, she again
expressed her displeasure, and the management again suggested that
she leave for the rest of the day.
193
Because the compensation of sales personnel largely depends on
commissions, two days away from work could have had a tangible ef-
fect on Temple's wages. Nevertheless, in her complaint, Temple al-
leged hostile environment sexual harassment based on these two
incidents and apparently did not assert the "lost opportunity to sell,"
which her absence from the dealership undoubtedly entailed. In
granting summary judgment for the defendant, the court seemed to
recognize that while the models would be inappropriate in most For-
tune 500 boardrooms, they were not out of line in a sales context
where the employer hoped to lure male customers to the dealer-
187 76 F. Supp. 2d 1124 (D. Kan. 1999).
188 Id. at 1130-31.
189 A showroom floor is, perhaps, not a traditional blue-collar environment in the
sense of manual labor being performed, but it has some attributes typically ascribed
to blue-collar environments.
190 Templ, 76 F. Supp. 2d at 1126.
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ship.19 4 More importantly, the court held that there was no evidence
that the dealership used the models because of Temple's sex. Rather,
the social context indicated that they were simply a means of at-
tracting customers, and the dealer would have used them regardless
of Temple's sex. As the court stated:
[T] he circumstances surrounding the sales event had nothing at all
to do with the plaintiff or her sex. Rather, the nature of the sales
event strongly suggests that it was aimed at potential purchasers,
most likely male purchasers. In other words, defendant would have
been as likely to have a "beach party" sales event regardless of
whether plaintiff or any other female salespersons were present in
the workplace.
195
It is important to note that Temple did not involve any violent con-
duct, which is presumably unacceptable in any work context.19 6 It is
also worth noting that these two instances probably were not suffi-
ciently offensive to constitute actionable harassment, so the court may
not have needed to rely on the cultural context in making its decision.
Indeed, the lack of severity may have made reliance on that ground
much easier, as even if the social context were irrelevant, the plaintiff
still would not have prevailed. The case demonstrates, however, that
the general culture of a workplace can be highly relevant to analyzing
motivation and that some courts are not shy about employing this
analysis.
B. Workplace Culture as a Gauge of Unwelcomeness and Offensiveness
Oncale's admonition about social context may also have been a
reminder for courts to look to cultural context in assessing whether
conduct was unwelcome or severely offensive. Indeed, this was the
194 See id. at 1130. To the extent the court believed that the environment could be
legitimized based on the customers' desires, it might have been going a little too far.
The argument that the employer's discrimination was merely an attempt to serve cus-
tomer preference has failed employers that have asserted that sex, due to customer
preference, is a bona fide occupational qualification that justified discriminatory hir-
ing practices. See, e.g., Fernandez v. Wynn Oil Co., 653 F.2d 1273, 1276 (9th Cir.
1981) (rejecting defendant's assertion that Latin American men would refuse to do
business with a female employee in her hotel room); Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways,
442 F.2d 385 (5th Cir. 1971) (holding that customer surveys that showed customer
preference for young female flight attendants were not sufficient to justify discrimina-
tory hiring practices). Although Fernandez and Diaz involved discrete adverse employ-
ment actions, they are disparate treatment cases, and harassment is simply another
form of disparate treatment.
195 Temple, 76 F. Supp. 2d at 1130.
196 But even serious violence-say, attempted murder-which is not motived by
the victim's sex (or other protected attribute) does not violate Title VII.
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practice of several courts even before Oncale.197 Because conduct is
unwelcome when the plaintiff neither invited nor solicited it, and
where he regards it as offensive, 198 the concepts of unwelcomeness
and severity are related. 199 Horseplay and teasing which does not of-
fend the plaintiff's subjective sensibilities, or the objective sensibilities
of a reasonable person, frequently will not be unwelcome. Further-
more, conduct and attention which the plaintiff welcomes is, by defi-
nition, not offensive to the particular plaintiff,200 for people do not
welcome conduct which significantly offends them.
Resolving questions of whether attention was unwelcome can
sometimes be difficult. 20 1 Paying particular attention to the social
context in which the alleged harassment occurred can sometimes be
of assistance in the endeavor. Courts have come to realize that
"[c]haracterizing behavior as sexually harassing can only be accom-
plished in a specific context."20 2 In determining whether sexual ad-
vances and similar conduct are unwelcome, and severely offensive,
courts look to the plaintiff's conduct and in particular to the way she
associates with co-workers through her words and actions.20 3 Specifi-
cally, they look to the plaintiffs own use of foul language or the per-
197 See, e.g., Meritor Say. Bank, F.S.B. v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 68 (1986) ("The gra-
vamen of any sexual harassment claim is that the alleged sexual advances were 'unwel-
come.'"); Johnson v. Hondo, Inc., 125 F.3d 408, 412 (7th Cir. 1997) (taking
workplace environment into account).
198 See, e.g., Bales v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 143 F.3d 1103, 1108 (8th Cir. 1998)
(stating that conduct is "unwelcome" where it is "uninvited and offensive"); Hall v.
Gus Constr. Co., 842 F.2d 1010, 1014 (8th Cir. 1988).
199 See Quick v. Donaldson Co., 90 F.3d 1372, 1378 (8th Cir. 1996) ("Harassing
conduct is considered unwelcome if it was 'uninvited and offensive.'").
200 Of course, conduct which is not subjectively unwelcome nor subjectively offen-
sive could still be objectively offensive. Take, for example, a woman being pursued by
a co-worker with a host of unsavory characteristics-bad breath, offensive odors, un-
kempt appearance, disagreeable personality, no manners, a tendency to use profanity,
or an extensive criminal record. While most reasonable women might find contact
and attention from such a man offensive, there may be a particular woman who does
not.
201 See Vinson, 477 U.S. at 68.
202 Gallagher v. Delaney, 139 F.3d 338, 342 (2d Cir. 1998); see also Draper v. Coeur
Rochester, Inc., 147 F.3d 1104, 1109 (9th Cir. 1998) ("Discriminatory behavior comes
in all shapes and sizes, and what might be an innocuous occurrence in some circum-
stances may, in the context of a pattern of discriminatory harassment, take on an
altogether different character. .. ").
203 See, e.g., Vinson, 477 U.S. at 68-69; Scusa v. Nestle U.S.A. Co., 181 F.3d 958, 966
(8th Cir. 1999) (holding that behavior is not unwelcome where plaintiff engaged in
similar behavior toward other employees); Burns v. McGregor Elec. Indus., Inc., 955
F.2d 559, 565 (8th Cir. 1992) (stating that evidence regarding a plaintiff's dress and
speech should be taken into account).
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formance of acts similar to the ones about which she complains.
These facets of workplace culture often have a bearing on the ques-
tions of unwelcomeness and the level of offensiveness. 20 4 Accordingly,
where a plaintiff engaged in the very type of conduct about which she
complains, courts usually hold that the purported harassment was
neither severely offensive nor unwelcome when the plaintiff was later
forced to endure similar conduct.205 As the Fourth Circuit stated with
respect to a plaintiff who "fully participated in, and even enjoyed, the
office banter until" she became an object of it, she "cannot now cry
'foul' for conduct that was, at the time, not 'unwelcome."' 206 Thus,
voluntary participation in offensive conduct can give rise to the infer-
ence that the plaintiff finds similar conduct unobjectionable and
welcome.
Along these lines, Oncale might have been instructing courts to
keep in mind the evolving social mores of the workplace and society
generally when analyzing the issues of unwelcomeness and offensive-
ness.20 7 After all, "an objective standard for any legal determination is
supposed to take into account changing views." 208 Certainly society's
tolerance of profanity and lewd talk has changed over the years. In
hostile environment cases, courts must realize that conduct and talk
that once would have been considered highly offensive or in extreme
204 See Scusa, 181 F.3d at 966 ("The undisputed evidence showed that appellant
engaged in behavior similar to that which she claimed was unwelcome and offen-
sive."); Quick, 90 F.3d at 1378 ("[T]he question of whether particular conduct was
unwelcome will turn largely on credibility determinations by the trier of fact.").
205 See Scusa, 181 F.3d at 967 (holding that the plaintiff's performance of similar
acts prevents a finding of severe offensiveness).
206 Hartsell v. Duplex Prods., Inc., 123 F.3d 766, 774 n.7 (4th Cir. 1997).
207 See Smith v. Sheahan, 189 F.3d 529, 534-35 (7th Cir. 1999).
208 Barbara A. Gutek et al., The Utility of the Reasonable Woman Legal Standard in
Hostile Environment Sexual Harassment Cases: A Multimethod, Multistudy Examination, 5
PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 596, 626 (1999). Actually, that is not the sole or primary
reason for an objective standard, nor must it always be the case that an objective
standard is designed to take into account contemporary notions or propriety. Pur-
ported harassment is judged from an objective viewpoint, as opposed to just the plain-
tiff's subjective viewpoint, to preclude liability in cases of a hypersensitive plaintiff. See
Gupta v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 212 F.3d 571, 586 (11th Cir. 2000) ("But a plaintiff's
subjective feelings and personal reactions are not the complete measure of whether
conduct is of a nature that it interferes with job performance. If it were, the most
unreasonably hypersensitive employee would be entitled to more protection than a
reasonable employee ... ."); Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469, 1483 (3d
Cir. 1990) ("The objective standard protects the employer from the 'hypersensitive'
employee ....").
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bad taste, are now a regular part of American culture. 209 Because
modern American workplaces and employee sensibilities reflect the
dynamic culture, Title VII cannot be expected to have set a standard
of conduct which is stuck in 1964.210 Just as the propriety of general
social conduct evolves over time, so too do the standards for appropri-
ate workplace conduct. And just as propriety changes temporally, so
too does it change spatially and socially. Conduct that is perfectly ac-
ceptable in a neighborhood tavern may be unwelcome and consid-
ered severely offensive to patrons of fine restaurants, 211 even though
both can broadly be considered dining establishments. Harassment,
therefore, must be judged by the standard of a reasonable person liv-
ing in the profanity and sex-filled culture of the twenty-first century,
and not according to the sensibilities of a nun working in a convent in
medieval England. Its severity must be assessed according to the mo-
res of the particular type of workplace, not according to a one-size-fits-
all standard. In short, "the culture of the workplaces does differ from
setting to setting,"212 and courts need to be sensitive to this when as-
sessing offensiveness and unwelcomeness.
According to this interpretation, Oncale was instructing that "the
severity of alleged harassment must be assessed in light of the social
mores of American workers and workplace culture .... ,,21 Several
courts have recognized that American culture has become much more
coarse. Accordingly, in assessing allegations of harassment, one judge
209 See Baskerville v. Culligan Int'l Co., 50 F.3d 428, 431 (7th Cir. 1995) (consider-
ing purported harassment in light of "contemporary American popular culture in all
its sex-saturated vulgarity").
210 Some scholars make a similar assertion with respect to the "cruel and unusual
punishment" clause of the Eighth Amendment. They contend that the Framers in-
tended to set up a standard which could evolve according to the changing moral
standards of the populace. Thus, while an eighteenth-century judge might find noth-
ing cruel about capital punishment, a twenty-first-centuryjudge might feel differently.
See Ronald Dworkin, Comment, in SCALA, supra note 137, at 120. Justice Scalia is not
among the scholars adcpting this position, at least with respect to the Constitution.
See SCALIA, supra note 137, at 46 (1997) ("Under The Living Constitution the death
penalty may have become unconstitutional. And it is up to each Justice to decide for
himself (under no standard that I can discern) when that occurs."). Justice Scalia has
realized that the protection these changing standards provide is illusory, as what goes
up often comes down. Thus, while extending the reach of the Eighth Amendment
may currently be in vogue, there may come a time when courts wish to curtail its
protective scope. Id.
211 In all fairness, it is also true that conduct typical of patrons of upscale establish-
ments might be highly offensive to regular denizens of Moe's Tavern or similar pur-
veyors of alcohol.
212 Smith, 189 F.3d at 535.
213 Id. at 534-35.
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noted that the purported harasser's "remarks and innuendos (about
his own anatomy) were no more offensive than sexual jokes regularly
told on major network television programs. '214 Others have acknowl-
edged that "the sporadic use of abusive language, gender-related
jokes, and occasional teasing are fairly commonplace in some employ-
ment settings .... ,,215 Under this interpretation of Oncale, then,
courts must not be overly critical of this conduct in judging severity,
lest Title VII be used as blunt instrument to regulate American cul-
ture, rather than a means of preventing discrimination.216 Several
cases illustrate a proper use of workplace culture in analyzing un-
welcomeness and offensiveness.
1. Reed v. Shepard
The necessity of examining social context when assessing un-
welcomeness and offensiveness is aptly demonstrated in Reed v. Shep-
ard,217 a pre-Oncale decision which involved a close judicial look at a
prison work environment. Plaintiff JoAnn Reed was a jail employee
who, after being fired for misconduct, brought an action for hostile
environment harassment.218 The Seventh Circuit described the jails'
blue-collar environment as "a modem version of TV's Barney Miller,
with the typically raunchy language and activities of an R-rated movie,
and the antics imagined in a high-school locker room. '21 9 For exam-
ple, Reed claimed that she was frequently handcuffed and subjected
to suggestive remarks, had her face forced into the groin of other
214 Indest v. Freeman Decorating, Inc., 164 F.3d 258, 264 (5th Cir. 1999) (Jones,
J., with two judges concurring in the judgment).
215 Savino v. C.P. Hall Co., 199 F.3d 925, 933 (7th Cir. 1999); see also Breeding v.
ArthurJ. Gallagher & Co., 164 F.3d 1151, 1159 (8th Cir. 1999) (citing Faragher v. City
of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 788 (1998)).
216 But one court suggests that some courts may go too far in this endeavor. Ac-
cording to the Federal Circuit, pre-Oncal.
[N]o principled argument supports the view that sex-based offensive behav-
ior in the workplace is immune from remedy simply because it may be cul-
turally tolerated outside of the workplace. The purpose of Title VII is not to
import into the workplace the prejudices of the community, but through law
to liberate the workplace from the demeaning influence of discrimination,
and thereby to implement the goals of human dignity and economic equal-
ity in employment.
King v. Hillen, 21 F.3d 1572, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
217 939 F.2d 484 (7th Cir. 1991).
218 Id. at 487. The misconduct involved trafficking marijuana to inmates and en-
couraging two prinsoners to assault another inmate. Id.
219 Id. at 486.
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workers, had a cattle prod placed between her legs, was maced, hit,
and punched, and had chairs pulled out from under her.2
20
In short, the work environment would be considered anything
but pleasant to people not accustomed to such behavior. But as the
trial judge saw firsthand, the plaintiff was no shrinking violet, and she
appeared to enjoy the coarseness of the work environment. 22' In fact,
the evidence showed that Reed frequently instigated the sexual horse-
play, often told sexually-explicitjokes, and was actually placed on pro-
bation for her own use of foul language. 222 As to sexual sugges-
tiveness and an apparent desire for attention, the plaintiff had to be
instructed to wear a bra when she wore T-shirts to work.223 Based on
this social context-meaning the plaintiffs own conduct and the gen-
eral workplace atmosphere about which the plaintiff never com-
plained until her termination-the trial court and the court of





222 Id. at 486-87. Considering the prison setting, where the use of profanity is a
way of life, Reed must have had to use some pretty harsh language with some fre-
quency to merit suspension.
223 Id. at 487.
224 Id. at 491 ("[Reed] was a willing and welcome participant."). The district court
also held that the conduct was not because of the plaintiff's sex. Id. at 491-92. Pre-
sumably, reasonable people would find the conduct in question in Reed severely
offensive.
It is interesting to compare the facts and outcome of Reed with the facts and
outcome of a case in a circuit which does not place an emphasis on social context. In
Swentek v. USAir, Inc., the Fourth Circuit described the plaintiffs actions:
[N]umerous witnesses described [the plaintiff] Swentek as a vindictive per-
son who often threatened her coworkers with lawsuits for real or imagined
personal slights. . . . There was also testimony that Swentek was a foul-
mouthed individual who often talked about sex. In addition, unrebutted
testimony at the first trial revealed that Swentek placed a "dildo" in her su-
pervisor's mailbox to get her to "loosen up," urinated in a cup and passed it
as a drink to another employee, and once grabbed the genitals of pilot Don
Matthews with a frank invitation to a sexual encounter.
Swentek v. USAir, Inc., 830 F.2d 552, 556 (4th Cir. 1987). Despite the plaintiffs egre-
gious behavior, the Fourth Circuit held that "it was improper for the trial judge to
suggest that Swentek's past conduct meant that she welcomed" similar behavior that
was directed at her. Id. at 557. Of course, it is true that some employees who inflict
harm may not welcome the same harm from others, see, e.g., Lauro v. Tomkats, Inc., 9
F. Supp. 2d 863, 872 (M.D. Tenn. 1998) ("[T]he fact that Lauro might have willingly
participated in the use of foul language does not foreclose the possibility that the
harassment of which she complains was unwelcome."), but it is reasonable, on these
facts, to believe that a crude individual like Swentek would not have found similar
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In cases such as Reed, the operative principle seems to be that if a
plaintiff can dish it out to others, it is probable that similar conduct is
not all that distasteful to her.225 In such cases, social context was ex-
amined to see (1) whether conduct similar to that which engendered
the plaintiffs complaints was the cultural norm of the plaintiffs work-
place, and (2) whether the plaintiff instigated similar conduct. Reed
demonstrates that where the plaintiff reveled in the crude culture of
her work environment before filing her Tide VII suit, courts will be
highly suspicious when later confronted with claims that the conduct
at issue was subjectively offensive or unwelcome. These courts also
believe that an actionable level of offensiveness, from an objective
viewpoint, is also doubtful in these cases.2 26 Since Oncale, courts have
given particular attention to these facets of social context.
2. Standifer v. Teamsters Union
Union picket lines are another work-related context that are gen-
erally characterized by hostility and bad manners, suggesting that the
mean-spirited behavior of picketers and strike-breakers is not terribly
offensive to either group and that rude behavior would exist in this
social context regardless of their race, color, sex, religion, or national
origin. Thus, the federal district court in Standifer v. General Teamsters
conduct severely offensive from a subjective viewpoint, and the only question faced by
the court was whether Swentek created a genuine issue for trial.
225 But see Galloway v. Gen. Motors Serv. Parts Operations, 78 F.3d 1164, 1167 (7th
Cir. 1996) ("[T]here is no principle of law, or for that matter psychology, that decrees
that the use of bad language automatically demonstrates the user's insensitivity to like
language directed against himself or herself."); Mernik v. Classic Cars, Inc., No. 3:99-
CV-1327, 2000 WL 869398, at *7 n.5 (N.D. Tex. June 28, 2000) (refusing to consider
plaintiff's former employment as a topless dancer and Hooters wvaitress in assessing
whether plaintiff found her present workplace unbearable); Kloke v. Buckley Indus.
Inc., No. 95-1298-JTM, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9135, at *20 n.3 (D. Kan.June 28, 1996)
(observing that plaintiff could find vulgarity humorous in one context, yet still be
offended by it when used in a sexually derogatory manner).
226 Take, for example, Reynolds v. Atlantic City Convention Center Authority, where
the district court observed:
To evaluate the impact on a reasonable person of the obscene gestures
made by a single co-worker and the obscene remarks made by two other co-
workers, we must discount the impact of those obscenities in an atmosphere
otherwise pervaded by obscenity. These gestures and remarks were not
made in church. And we must also evaluate their impact over a- two-year
period. Given these factors, the complained of incidents are "isolated,"
rather than "pervasive," and their severity is undermined by the general use
of obscenities by both Reynolds and her co-workers.
Reynolds v. Ad. City Convention Ctr. Auth., No. 88-4232, 1990 WL 267417, at *18
(D.N.J. May 26, 1990), afrd, 925 F.2d 419 (3d Cir. 1991).
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Union227 granted summary judgment for several defendant strikers
based on the plaintiff strike-breakers' failure to demonstrate that con-
duct around the picket line was objectively severe, as well as their fail-
ure to show that the harassment was motivated by racial "animus."228
Standiferwas a § 1981 action brought by three black strike-break-
ers against the union and various picketers. 2 29 During the strike, the
union picketers repeatedly yelled racial epithets at the workers (along
with race-neutral obscenities), including "slave boy," "nigger boy,"
"nigger," "fucking nigger," and "black bastard."230 After forcing a
truck driven by one plaintiff off the road, and while pounding on the
disabled truck, the strikers yelled invectives such as "kill the nigger"
and "hang the nigger."2 31 The angry mob then struck the driver with
a weapon (inflicting serious wounds) and violently smashed the win-
dows of the truck.232 On other occasions, they yelled: "Nigger boy,
remember that you have to leave tonight and we can't wait to get your
nigger ass. We're going to mess you up bad."233 After having to toler-
ate taunts of "nigger" every day, and after having his life threatened,
one of the plaintiffs succumbed to the threats and quit his job.234 An-
other plaintiff sought refuge by requesting assignment to another lo-
cation, and another avoided further confrontations by taking leave.
235
The plaintiffs alleged that the racial harassment created a hostile
environment that interfered with their contractual relationship with
the employer, but the court granted summary judgment for most of
the defendants. In doing so for the defendants who used only a few
epithets, the court noted that "in the context of a labor dispute, de-
fendants' behavior might be characterized as objectively reasona-
227 No. 97-2037-GTV, 1998 WL 229553 (D. Kan. Apr. 13, 1998).
228 Id. at *6.
229
In Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164 (1989), the Supreme Court
held that actions for discrimination or harassment in employment are not
cognizable under § 1981 because such harassment occurs after the forma-
tion of a contract. The Civil Rights Act of 1991 added section (b)-regard-
ing the performance and enjoyment of contracts-to § 1981 for the express
purpose of overruling Patterson.
Whidbee v. Garzarelli Food Specialties, Inc., 223 F.3d 62, 69 n.5 (2d Cir. 2000).
230 Sadly, some unions have a long history of racism. In an effort to address this
problem, Congress made Title VII applicable to both employers and unions. See 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-2(c) (1994).
231 See Standifer, 1998 WL 229553, at *3.
232 Id.
233 Id.
234 Id. at *4.
235 Id. at *3.
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ble."23 6 It quoted Oncale for the idea that in assessing harassment
courts must look at the "constellation of surrounding circum-
stances,"2 37 and it accepted the union's suggestion that "a picket line
is not an ice-cream social, and Emily Post hardly dictates the manner
of behavior."
238
Like the courts in Reed and Gross, the judge here believed that
certain unpleasant conduct, to put it mildly, is inherent in blue-collar
picket lines. Accordingly, employees claiming harassment in relation
to their attempts to cross picket lines, in light of this confrontational
social context, will have a difficult time creating a genuine issue as to
the severe offensiveness of the defendants' conduct, unless they offer
some evidence that the strikers' behavior was inordinately offensive.
In short, demonstrating that picket lines-which by all accounts are
never friendly social contexts-were saturated with abusive language
is not enough. Reasonable people who know anything about typical
union behavior expect vituperative confrontations between strike-
breakers and picketers. For better or worse, hurling insults at strike-
breakers is one method commonly employed by unions to coerce
workers to toe the union line. Plaintiffs in these blue-collar contexts
will have a more difficult time demonstrating objective severity, espe-
cially where they participate in similar abusive name-calling and where
such conduct is a regular part of the workplace. It is not surprising,
then, that the district court granted summary judgment even for de-
fendants who repeatedly hurled racial slurs at the plaintiffs.
Nevertheless, even in this blue-collar context,23 9 the district court
declined to grant summary judgment for those defendants who both
236 Id. at *6 n.5.
237 Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 82 (1998).
238 Standifer, 1998 WL 229553, at *6 n.5.
239 Of course, mild offensiveness is not indigenous only to certain blue-collar
workplaces, and so even cases involving white-collar employment warrant an examina-
tion of social context. In Barbour v. Browner, for example, the plaintiffJoyce Barbour,
worked in an office position for the Environmental Protection Agency. 181 F.3d
1342, 1348-49 (D.C. Cir. 1999). She claimed that employees of a contractor hired by
the EPA treated her with disrespect, once by one employee turning her back to Bar-
bour. Id. at 1344. On another occasion, one of the contractor's employees was inten-
tionally slow in responding to the plaintiffs request for information, and the
contractor's employees called the plaintiffs supervisor to verify orders which the
plaintiff had given. Id. Based on these incidents, Barbour claimed that the EPA
failed to protect her from a hostile environment based on her race. Id. When ajury
found otherwise, Barbour appealed.
The court of appeals held that the jury did not err in finding as it did, because
the evidence did not indicate that the conduct was objectively severe. The court
based part of its holding on the principle that offensive conduct that is customarily
part of a given job or work environment usually will not constitute sufficiently severe
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used racial slurs and battered one of the plaintiffs.2 40 The court rea-
soned that the battery created a genuine issue as to the "objective se-
verity" and unwelcomeness elements, and the use of racially offensive
names would permit a jury to conclude that the attack was racially-
motivated.2 41 As the various cases demonstrate, where workplace cul-
ture is analyzed by the courts and that culture normally entails a
threshold level of offensiveness, verbal conduct alone will seldom be
sufficiently severe to constitute harassment, and violence without a
readily apparent racial animus will not be actionable. Violence com-
bined with racial or sexual epithets, however, will nearly always get the
plaintiff a trip to the jury. Of course, this outcome is not much differ-
ent from the one that would have occurred even if the court had not
considered the workplace culture. All courts-regardless of whether
they specially consider workplace culture-generally consider vio-
lence to be objectively severe and unwelcome, and these courts fre-
quently hold that mere invectives are insufficiently severe to constitute
actionable harassment.
3. Weston v. Department of Corrections
Weston v. Department of Corrections is yet another post- Oncale deci-
sion analyzing harassment according to workplace culture. 242 It in-
volves a prison context similar to that described above in Reed v.
Shepard.243 Plaintiff Michael Weston claimed that a female co-worker
sexually harassed him. Initially she provocatively rubbed his back de-
spite his objections, and a few days later she touched his buttocks by
putting her finger through a hole in his pants. 244 The offensive
conditions giving rise to a hostile environment. Id. at 1348. Quoting Oncale's re-
minder to pay attention to social context, the court explained:
[Barbour] does complain specifically that employees of CBSI, in an attempt
to have the deadlines she imposed relaxed, would often ask [Barbour's su-
pervisor] to confirm her instructions. It is hardly surprising, however, that a
contractor would try to play off one of its Government overseers against an-
other in this way. Barbour's protestation is like to [sic] that of a waitress who
complains that her customers are sometimes rude: treatment that would be
objectionable in other contexts is an inevitable part of the job. Although
CBSI's gamesmanship, like its other questionable behavior, was probably re-
grettable, it subjected Barbour to little if anything more serious than the
"ordinary tribulations of the workplace."
Id. at 1348-49 (citation omitted).
240 Standifer, 1998 WL 229553, at *8.
241 Id. at *7.
242 No. 98-CV-3899, 1998 WL 695352 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 29, 1998).
243 939 F.2d 484 (7th Cir. 1991); see supra Part III.B.1.
244 Weston, 1998 WL 695352, at *1.
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touching ceased after Weston complained to superiors, but soon his
co-workers and managers made offensive comments, taunts, and jokes
about the incidents.
245
Although Weston alleged that a hostile environment existed, the
district court granted summary judgment for the defendant. It held
that there was an insufficient showing of severity, based on the blue-
collar context in which Weston worked, the food service division of a
state prison.2 46 Because prisons are not exactly known for their re-
fined environments, 247 it is reasonable to expect some objectionable
banter to occur in this context, and perhaps even some offensive
touching. It is probably impossible for an employer to turn a prison
into a bastion of civility and good manners, even among just the em-
ployees.2 48 As the court stated:
245 Id.
246 Id. at *2.
Mr. Weston works with those regularly confronting the criminal population;
the abrupt or intensive demeanor of those whose duty it is to maintain order
in prison and the stress borne out of daily conflict with the prison popula-
tion pervades Mr. Weston's working environment. These conditions almost
necessarily must foster "offensive comments, jokes, and jibes."
Id.
247 "Prisons, by definition, are places of involuntary confinement of persons who
have a demonstrated proclivity for antisocial criminal, and often violent, conduct. In-
mates have necessarily shown a lapse in ability to control and conform their behavior
to the legitimate standards of society by the normal impulses of self-restraint .... "
Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 526 (1984). Of course, that does not mean that
prison employees must behave in the same antisocial manner.
248 Compare Weston, 1998 WL 695352, with Slayton v. Ohio Dep't of Youth Servs.,
206 F.3d 669 (6th Cir. 2000). Slayton arose in the Sixth Circuit, which does not take
into account the workplace culture in which purported harassment occurs. In the
case, the plaintiff was a female corrections officer serving in a prison for juvenile
offenders. Id. at 673. She faced treatment similar to that of Michael Weston, al-
though unlike Weston, nobody ever touched her. Instead, one of the other guards
frequently played misogynistic rap music with the inmates, along with erotic video-
tapes, and frequently performed erotic dances to the music or videos. Id. at 674. The
same co-worker encouraged inmates to drop their towels when the plaintiff was on
shower duty, laughed when they did so, and suggested that the plaintiff check on
inmates when he thought they were naked. Id. He also opined that her attitudes
were due to menstruation, called the plaintiff a "bitch," and encouraged inmates to
do the same. Id.
In analyzing the hostile environment claim, the Sixth Circuit agreed with the
defendants that by "choosing to work in a prison, corrections personnel have ac-
knowledged and accepted the probability that they will face inappropriate and socially
deviant behavior." Id. at 677. But the court believed that tolerating juvenile behavior
from juvenile delinquents is one thing; having to withstand it from co-workers is an-
other. Therefore, the court rejected the argument that the defendant was entitled to
a little slack based on the social context of the prison work environment. It refused to
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These comments, jokes, and jibes fall easily into the category of sim-
ple teasing when considered in light of the social context of prison.
It is difficult for the Court to imagine a more caustic environment,
or one more likely to promote harsh or even acidic banter, than
prison. Working in the staff dining room, Mr. Weston works with
those regularly confronting the criminal population; the abrupt or
insensitive demeanor of those whose duty it is to maintain order in
prison and the stress borne out of daily conflict with the prison pop-
ulation pervades Mr. Weston's working environment. These condi-
tions almost necessarily must foster "offensive comments, jokes, and
jibes." In light of the social context of the prison, the Court finds
the joking and jibing.., is [not] severe enough to create a hostile
work environment.
249
Weston demonstrates, yet again, that workplace culture can be
highly relevant to judging the severity and unwelcomeness of particu-
lar conduct.
C. The Import of the Workplace Culture Cases
Before considering the analytic advantages of considering work-
place culture in hostile environment cases, it might be helpful to sum-
marize the salient points of the cases that have adopted this approach.
First, courts that pay close attention to the workplace culture do so
because they believe that social context is relevant to analyzing (1)
severity of the offensiveness, (2) unwelcomeness, and (3) motivation.
When, regardless of the plaintiff's presence, the background culture
is vulgar, courts are more likely to hold that there was no hostile envi-
ronment, and the probability of a court so holding increases as the
background crudeness of the workplace increases. The courts may
base their holding on the plaintiffs failure to create a genuine issue as
to offensiveness, unwelcomeness, or motivation. In this sense, these
courts are simply employing longstanding principles of hostile envi-
ronment law. Thus, there should be nothing controversial about con-
sidering the social context in which the harassment occurred.
A second important point concerns the extent to which the plain-
tiff participated in the purported harassment or similar conduct.
When courts focus on workplace culture, the likelihood of a plaintiff
prevailing diminishes when the plaintiff: (1) instigated the conduct at
take context into account in assessing the severity or unwelcomeness of the conduct,
and instead affirmed the $125,000 verdict that the jury returned for the plaintiff. Id.
at 680. Had the case arisen in a different circuit, it is not clear that Slayton would
have prevailed.
249 Weston, 1998 WL 695352, at *2. It is not clear how the court arrived at the
conclusion that prison environments "must foster" offensive comments and jokes.
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issue; or (2) actively participated in similar conduct.250 Where the
conduct at issue is truly serious, the background culture of the work-
place will come into play only if the plaintiffs actively participated in
or encouraged offensive conduct similar to that about which they
complain. This was certainly true in Gross,251 Johnson,252 Reed,253 and
Standfer.25 4 The moral for plaintiffs in these types of cases is to avoid
acting like the purported harassers, as juvenile outbursts and the use
of foul language will reduce their chances of prevailing in a Title VII
suit.
Of course, this rule also tells employees that it is okay to misbe-
have so long as their comrades willingly participate in their antics or
similar behavior and never display any reticence. It is true that work-
place culture is considered relevant even in cases such as Temple and
Weston, where the plaintiffs admittedly were not involved in conduct
similar to that which sparked their complaints. But these cases in-
volved relatively .minor conduct that never reached a level of severity
that most people would consider offensive, regardless of the social
context of the workplace. Because the "harassment" was relatively
mild, it would not have been actionable regardless of the social con-
text in which it occurred. In short, these cases would have come out
the same way even if the social context analysis had been omitted.
The courts' consideration of workplace culture was simply the icing
on the cake that made the defects in the plaintiffs' cases more
poignant.
The cases discussed above also demonstrate that workplace cul-
ture is merely one of many factors that these courts consider, al-
though in some cases it can be an outcome-determinative factor.
255
The social context variable becomes increasingly outcome determina-
tive as the background vulgarity of the workplace and the plaintiff's
participation in similar conduct increases, as either of these phenom-
ena suggest that the plaintiff is missing an essential element of his
hostile environment case. Because social context is simply one factor
in the analysis, even where courts place great emphasis on workplace
culture, it is hard to say that they are doing anything novel, as work-
place culture is part of the totality of the circumstances the Supreme
250 Also relevant is whether the plaintiff failed to complain about similar acts,
which might suggest that he found them neither severely offensive nor unwelcome.
251 See supra Part III.A.1.
252 See supra Part III.A2.
253 See supra Part III.B.1.
254 See supra Part 1II.B.2.
255 See Gross v. Burggraf Constr. Co., 53 F.3d 1531, 1538 (10th Cir. 1999).
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Court has long instructed courts to consider.256 Sensitivity to social
context simply gives courts another perspective on the plaintiff's
claim, which in many cases helps courts to see that the conduct at
issue was not based on sex and was neither severely offensive nor
unwelcome.
IV. ADVANTAGES OF CONSIDERING SOCIAL CONTEXT
Courts usually do not defend their prior decisions from criticism
nor the analytical tools they employed to arrive at them. Not surpris-
ingly, then, courts that have factored "social context" or "workplace
culture" into the harassment analysis have not dwelt on the advantages
of this approach, other than offering that this analysis is required
under the prevailing jurisprudence. Many courts have not explicitly
considered the other benefits (or shortcomings) of emphasizing cul-
tural context. In assessing the value of this analytic tool, its advantages
and disadvantages are certainly relevant. First, consider some of the
advantages that a consideration of cultural context of the plaintiff's
particular workplace might entail.
A. Minimizing the Vagueness and Overbreadth of Hostile Environment
Law
Since courts first construed Title VII as outlawing harassment in
the workplace, judges and scholars have criticized the vague standard
for distinguishing between unpleasant banter and a full-blown case of
harassment.257 One would think that, in time, as the courts addressed
more cases, they would be able to discover some guiding principles.
But as yet, this has not proven true. "As the case law has grown to
show, determining the intensity/quantity of sexual gesturing, touch-
ing, bantering and innuendo that it takes to render a work environ-
ment sexually hostile is now no less difficult than trying to nail a
256 See Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 23 (1993).
257 See, e.g., Gallagher v. Delaney, 139 F.3d 338, 349 (2d Cir. 1998) ("This disad-
vantage of imprecision is an unfortunate byproduct of the current uncertainties in a
developing area of sociology and the law."); Breda v. Wolf Camera, Inc., 148 F. Supp.
2d 1371, 1376 (S.D. Ga. 2001) ("[T]his entire area of law is enervated by vague, al-
most circular standards"); Fall v. Ind. Univ. Bd. of Trs., 12 F. Supp. 2d 870, 877 (N.D.
Ind. 1998) ("To be sure, exactly what act or combination of actions may 'objectively'
constitute a hostile work environment is a rather gray area."); Mark Mclaughlin Ha-
ger, Harassment as a Tort: Why Title VII Hostile Environment Liability Should Be Curtailed,
30 CONN. L. REV. 375, 393 (1998) ("As evolved under Title VII, the anti-harassment
duty is overly broad and vague.").
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jellyfish to the wall."25 8 In hostile environment cases, as with other
litigation involving standards of conduct, incidents at the two ex-
tremes of harmlessness or unlawfulness can be usually classified as
harmless or actionable without too much effort. But dull, faint
lines-much less bright lines-are almost impossible to discern in the
majority of hostile environment cases that fall within that expansive
wasteland between actionable harassment and merely unpleasant teas-
ing.2 59 With harassment cases comprising a greater portion of the fed-
eral and state court dockets, it seems desirable to tighten up existing
hostile environment standards.
260
As some of the cases discussed above have shown, a consideration
of social context can be particularly helpful in determining whether
words are truly offensive or are just part of the general banter of the
workplace; 261 whether they are unwelcome or just accepted as un-
pleasant "background noise" that occasionally wafts through the work-
place; and whether offensive speech was designed to harm another
employee based on her sex or was just a regular facet of the particular
employment setting. As Justice Scalia mentioned in Oncale, activities
that are inappropriate in one social context, are the norm in
258 Breda v. Wolf Camera, Inc., 148 F. Supp. 2d 1371, 1377 (S.D. Ga. 2001) (cita-
tion and internal quotations omitted).
259 See Indest v. Freeman Decorating, Inc., 164 F.3d 258, 264 n.8 (5th Cir. 1999)
("Cases will vary widely, as there is a continuum of sexually-categorized behavior rang-
ing from the use of diminutives like 'sweetie-pie' on one extreme to physical assault
on the other . . . ."); Hathaway v. Runyon, 132 F.3d 1214, 1221 (8th Cir. 1997)
("There is no bright line between sexual harassment and merely unpleasant con-
duct.... ."); Baskerville v. Culligan Int'l Co., 50 F.3d 428, 431 (7th Cir. 1995) ("It is
not a bright line, obviously, this line between a merely unpleasant working environ-
ment on the one hand and a hostile or deeply repugnant one on the other.... .").
260 Justice Scalia is among the critics of vague hostile environment standards. The
author of the Oncale opinion, he previously denounced the vagueness of the hostile
environment standard in his Harris concurrence:
"Abusive" (or "hostile," which in this context I take to mean the same thing)
does not seem to me a very clear standard-and I do not think clarity is at all
increased by adding the adverb "objectively" or by appealing to a "reasona-
ble person['s]" notion of what the vague word means. Today's opinion does
list a number of factors that contribute to abusiveness, but since it neither
says how much of each is necessary (an impossible task) nor identifies any
single factor as determinative, it thereby adds little certitude. As a practical
matter, today's holding lets virtually unguided juries decide whether sex-re-
lated conduct engaged in (or permitted by) an employer is egregious
enough to warrant an award of damages.
Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 24 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring) (internal
citation omitted).
261 As the Supreme Court has stated: "Words that are commonplace in one setting
are shocking in another." FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 747 (1978).
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others.262 By creating a practice whereby purported harassment is as-
sessed in the light of the background conduct of particular work-
places, courts move one small step closer to greater uniformity and
predictability in hostile environment cases, as sensitivity to culture
gives courts a principle by which to differentiate various cases. 263 By
examining workplace culture, employers, employees, and courts have
at least one further indicia by which to assess unwelcomeness, severity,
and motivation. Thus, the consideration of the workplace culture
could be a partial cure for the uncertainty implicit in the broad "rea-
sonable person standard," which both liberals and conservatives criti-
cize, 264 although for different reasons, as being too vague and
indeterminate. 265 These courts realize that terms "like 'reasonable'
and 'undue' are relative to circumstances"266 and have meaning only
in the context in which the conduct occurs. Moreover, "standards of
reasonableness ... vary according to individual views." 267 Reasonable
people-and judges-may differ as to what constitutes offensive or se-
verely offensive conduct.268 This has led one federal judge to observe
that a plaintiff who loses on summary judgment before one judge,
might well have prevailed before another;269 "inconsistency is no
stranger to this area of law." 270 Sensitivity to social context can be a
partial cure for this inconsistency.
To some extent, a consideration of cultural context can diminish
the vagueness of the "reasonable person" standard because employers
and employees can know that the background swearing which is nor-
262 See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 81-82 (1998).
263 The desirability of this goal should be obvious. See KENNETH GULP DAVIS, Dis-
CRETIONARYJUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY 109 (1969) ("We should not fail to clarify
standards when we have the requisite understanding to clarify standards, we should
not fail to develop principles when experience leads toward principles, and we should
not fail to formulate rules when rules have become feasible.").
264 SeeAndrews v. City of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469, 1482 (3d Cir. 1990) (noting
the uncertainty in hostile work environment law).
265 See JEFFREY ROSEN, THE UNWANTED GAZE: THE DESTRuCrON OF PRIVACY IN
AMERICA 82-83 (2000) ("[l]t is often impossible for a supervisor or employer to know
in advance whether or not offensive conduct is illegal, because of the amorphousness
of the legal definitions of harassment itself.").
266 Crawford v. Ind. Dep't of Corr., 115 F.3d 481, 487 (7th Cir. 1997).
267 HOWARD BALL, HUGO L. BLACK: COLD STEEL WARRIOR 203 (1996) (quotingJus-
tice Hugo L. Black, Draft of concurrence in Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569
(1941)).
268 Ellis v. Bhd. of Ry., Airline & S.S. Clerks, 466 U.S. 435, 458 (1984) (Powell, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
269 See Breda v. Wolf Camera, Inc., 148 F. Supp. 2d 1371, 1381 (S.D. Ga. 2001)
("Admittedly, this case might make the grade in some jurisdictions.").
270 Id.
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mal in certain cultural contexts will not result in liability for hostile
environment harassment. As long as no or minimal touching has oc-
curred, and invectives are not directed solely or primarily at the plain-
tiff, employers will not be saddled with the responsibility of a
kindergarten teacher, namely, ensuring that their charges do not use
dirty words.271 Thus, an appreciation of what is normal conduct in
many workplaces is merely one step, and a small one at that, toward
greater continuity and predictability in hostile environment cases. A
full appreciation of this advantage can only occur after examining the
state of hostile environment law without the benefits of the social con-
text analysis. As Judge Reinhardt has recognized:
The question of what constitutes sexual harassment is a complicated
and increasingly important one in our society. There is no agreed
upon definition of the newly popular term. In some versions, it ap-
pears to cover the widest possible range of sins, from physical assault
to reading a magazine in a public facility. Whether particular con-
duct is appropriate or whether it crosses the line is the subject of
disagreement and controversy, always heated and often
legitimate.
2 72
In other words, judges and scholars from various political persua-
sions who frequently agree on little else agree that the present stan-
dard of judging hostile environment harassment suffers from an
intolerable vagueness. 273 On the one hand are those who claim the
standard leaves too many victims unprotected,274 on the other hand
are critics who contend that the reasonable person standard is too
restrictive of freedom. Because there really is no single hostile envi-
ronment standard, it is possible for both sets of critics to be right. It
may be that in some cases vague standards result in egregious conduct
going unpunished, while in other cases relatively mild comments re-
sult in substantial awards. 275 Regardless of who has the better argu-
271 Of course, that is usually the outcome of cases even without a consideration of
the blue-collar environment.
272 Nichols v. Frank, 42 F.3d 503, 509-10 (9th Cir. 1994) (Reinhardt, J., with two
judges concurring only in the judgment).
273 See Smith v. N.W. Fin. Acceptance, Inc., 129 F.3d 1408, 1415 n.3 (10th Cir.
1997) ("[T]here are differing views among the circuits about what constitutes a hos-
tile work environment."); Kanzler v. Renner, 937 P.2d 1337, 1342 n.3 (Wyo. 1997)
("The term 'sexual harassment' is susceptible of many definitions, and potentially
encompasses a broad range of conduct."); Hager, supra note 257, at 393 ("As evolved
under Tide VII, the anti-harassment duty is overly broad and vague.").
274 See supra Part II.B.
275 Hennessy v. Penril Datacomm Networks, Inc., 69 F.3d 1344, 1353 (7th Cir.
1995) ("Sexual harassment in the workplace raises sensitive and complex concerns.
For courts, these concerns are often competing.").
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ment, both sides concur that the vagaries of the reasonable person
standard leaves the criteria for prohibited or permitted conduct
largely under-defined.
276
As Professor Jeffrey Rosen recently argued, "it is often impossible
for a supervisor or employer to know in advance whether or not offen-
sive conduct is illegal, because of the amorphousness of the legal defi-
nitions of harassment itself."277  Considering the wide-ranging
opinions expressed in various court decisions, apparently this amor-
phous definition is no easier for judges and juries to digest.2 78 Exper-
ienced litigators know that whether "a work environment [is] 'hostile'
or 'abusive' is a case-by-case determination guided by no sharply de-
fined rules."279 Although some courts seem to pretend that there are
discernable principles supporting the myriad hostile environment de-
cisions, other courts are more candid in their assessment.280 Anyone
capable of reading the Federal Reporter would have to agree with the
sentiments of one district court that attempted to reconcile the con-
flicting decisions: "The courts deciding summary judgment motions
have reached a broad range of conclusions regarding what actions ac-
tually constitute a hostile environment."281 Put more bluntly, many
decisions which purport to apply the same standard for defining a
hostile environment are inconsistent with one another. Conduct
which seems severe to one judge or panel of judges is perceived by
others as simply a mild irritation. Consequently, the term "irreconcil-
able differences" takes on new meaning for lawyers attempting to dis-
276 See Fall v. Ind. Univ. Bd. of Trs., 12 F. Supp. 2d 870, 877 (N.D. Ind. 1998)
("The Supreme Court has consistently counseled that the test for whether an environ-
ment is 'hostile' or 'abusive' is not a mathematically precise one ...
277 ROSEN, supra note 265, at 82-83.
278 Indest v. Freeman Decorating, Inc., 164 F.3d 258, 264 n.8 (5th Cir. 1999)
("Cases will vary widely, as there is a continuum of sexually-categorized behavior rang-
ing from the use of diminutives like 'sweetie-pie' on one extreme to physical assault
on the other.... ."); Baskerville v. Culligan Int'l Co., 50 F.3d 428, 431 (7th Cir. 1995)
("It is not a bright line, obviously, this line between a merely unpleasant working
environment on the one hand and a hostile or deeply repugnant one on the
other....").
279 Fortner v. Kansas, 934 F. Supp. 1252, 1269 (D. Kan. 1996). Justice Scalia has
suggested that, in at least the Fourth Amendment context, he would "object to the
formulation of a standard so devoid of content that it produces rather than eliminates
uncertainty .... " O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 730 (1987) (Scalia, J., concur-
ring in the judgment). The standards for analyzing hostile work environment claims
certainly fit that description.
280 See, e.g., Breda v. Wolf Camera, Inc., 148 F. Supp. 2d 1371, 1376 (S.D. Ga.
2001) ("[T] his entire area of law is enervated by vague, almost circular standards.").
281 Wieland v. Dep't of Transp., 98 F. Supp. 2d 1010, 1017 (N.D. Ind. 2000).
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till concrete principles from sexual harassment decisions that are all
over the board.
Several different problems are directly traceable to this vague-
ness: (1) the present reasonable person standard results in jury ver-
dicts against employers for conduct Title VII was not designed to
regulate and which they could not reasonably have known was illegal;
(2) consequently, in an attempt to avoid liability, some employers
over-regulate the workplace, chilling speech and conduct that is not
prohibited by Title VII; (3) innocent employees are punished for con-
duct that is not illegal or are accused of harassment where none actu-
ally existed, damaging morale and ruining reputations; and (4) at the
other extreme, some employers under-regulate their workplaces, and
their employees fail to regulate their own conduct, because neither
group can discern what exactly is prohibited.28 2 Examining harass-
ment in light of workplace culture might mitigate some of these
problems, as at least employers in blue-collar contexts will not be
forced to perform the (impossible) task of regulating the minutiae of
crude language and vulgar banter which unfortunately is typical of
many workplaces. Judicial sensitivity to workplace culture will not
cure the vagueness of the myriad hostile environment standards, but it
is a small step in the right direction.
B. Preventing a Discriminatory Backlash
Employers and consumers are not the only beneficiaries of ana-
lyzing sexual harassment cases in light of workplace culture. Women
who desire employment in these workplaces, particularly blue-collar
ones-which frequently pay more than otherjobs traditionally consid-
ered "women's work"-also benefit from any certainty that a consider-
ation of social context provides. This is because some employers may
presently be discriminating against women in their hiring practices in
282 This defect of the hostile environment standard is particularly harmful, be-
cause in employment contexts predictability of outcomes is important to commercial
stability and fairness. Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 765 P.2d 373, 398 (Cal. 1988)
(noting that in the employment context, the ability to predict the consequences of
employment actions is important to the employment relationship and to commercial
stability). Without a uniform and predictable hostile environment standard, employ-
ers cannot order their affairs so as to abide by the law, and thereby minimize viola-
tions and the monetary penalties they entail. Cf Int'l Longshoremen's Ass'n, AFL-
CIO v. Davis, 476 U.S. 380, 407 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (noting the need
for uniformity in interpreting labor laws). And hostile environment standards differ
from federal circuit to federal circuit, or more frequently, from district to district, and
are therefore particularly burdensome for employers with facilities in several states.
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order to prevent a future hostile environment Suit.2 8 3 Indeed, the un-
defined standards of hostile environment law encourage employers to
discriminate against women, the most frequent hostile environment
plaintiffs, in their hiring practices in order to prevent hostile environ-
ment lawsuits. These loose standards, which have resulted in a wind-
fall for some plaintiffs, actually hurt other women-the backlash-by
providing employers with a strong incentive not to hire them and in-
ducing co-employees not to socialize with women out of fear of facing
a hostile environment charge.284 Particularly for blue-collar employ-
ers,285 it might be financially wise to discriminate against women in
hiring in order to avoid a hostile environment suit down the road, the
outcome of which nobody can predict with any certainty. True, if an
employer intentionally declines to hire women because they are wo-
men, he faces the possibility of a Titie VII, sex-discrimination law-
suit.286 But for several reasons, the average employer is still probably
better off-from a financial standpoint-in discriminating against wo-
men in the blue-collar context. First, because rejected applicants fre-
quently do not know why they did not obtain a position and
employers can easily craft a believable excuse, it is often the case that
discriminatory hiring goes undetected. "Most workers are not perfect.
As to them, it is usually easy to supply a plausible reason why they were
283 "Backlash" here refers to actions taken because of hostile environment, which
are contrary to the presumed purposes of that law. Thus, while hostile environment
law was intended to prevent women from being excluded from workplaces, it has
instead resulted in the very evil it attempted to prevent.
284 This is not the first time, nor will it probably be the last time, that laws de-
signed to benefit a particular group actually prove harmful in their application. Such
was the case with the District of Columbia's schedule of minimum wages for women,
but not for men. Because employers were forced to pay women a premium, and men
were free to undercut the women and offer the same services for less pay, many ra-
tional-maximizing employers fired their female employees and hired men at the mar-
ket rate. SeeAdkins v. Lyons, 261 U.S. 525, 553 (1923). For an excellent discussion of
the case, see HADLEv ARKEs, THE RETURN OF GEORGE SUTHERLAND: RESTORING AJURIS-
PRUDENCE OF NATURAL RIGHTS 13 (1994) ("[T]he law, in its liberal tenderness, in its
concern to protect women, had brought about a situation in which women were be-
ing replaced, in their jobs, by men.").
285 SeeJuliano & Schwab, supra note 13, at 561 ("Where occupation status of the
[sexual harassment] plaintiff could be identified .... 38% of the plaintiffs we could
classify were blue-collar (40% of the workforce).").
286 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1994) ("It shall be an unlawful employment prac-
tice for an employer-(1) to fail or refuse to hire.., because of such individual's...
sex .... ").
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not hired .... -"287 Because of this, many of these potential failure-to-
hire suits are never even initiated.
Furthermore, even if a plaintiff commences a failure-to-hire dis-
crimination suit, the employer's chances of prevailing in such a suit
are probably greater than in the average hostile environment action.
This is due, in part, to information deficits that failure-to-hire plain-
tiffs face,288 the ease by which an employer can come up with a believ-
able reason for his hiring decisions, and the fact that the law is more
definite and predictable in the failure-to-hire context than in the sex-
ual harassment one. An employer knows that in a failure-to-hire suit
he merely must come up with a believable explanation for his hiring
decision. Contrast that to a hostile environment suit, where the em-
ployer cannot be sure that his male employees did not proposition or
stare at an attractive female employee, and neither he nor his lawyers
can predict the standard by which his workplace will be judged. Thus,
it makes sense for some employers to exclude women altogether and
instead take their chances with a failure-to-hire suit. This is part of the
backlash that indeterminate hostile environment standards have
caused for women. To the extent that an examination of cultural con-
text solidifies the hostile environment analysis, and blue-collar em-
ployers are made aware of these changes, rational employers should
curtail the backlash against hiring women.28 9 Similarly, as the bound-
aries between acceptable and actionable conduct are more clearly de-
fined, co-employees might have less reason to fear a harassment suit,
and thus might be more willing to include women in social outings
which can often prove career enhancing for the women.290 There-
287 Richard A. Posner, The Efficiency and the Efficacy of Title VII, 136 U. PA. L. REV.
513, 518 (1987).
288 Specifically, she, the applicant, does not know for certain why she was not
hired and particularly whether it was based on her sex. Furthermore, she is usually
deprived of knowledge that might suggest discriminatory hiring, such as the sex of the
person actually hired.
289 This assumes that these employers learn that the vulgar banter normal in such
workplaces will no longer be held against them in a hostile environment suit, at least
as long as the plaintiff is not singled out for abuse.
290 Under the present system, women are often excluded from social groups be-
cause employers and co-employees fear hostile environment suits. "Not surprisingly,
many women begin to feel shut out: with fewer chances to join in informal lunches,
business travel, weekend-socializing, and general camaraderie, they may find it hard
to do their jobs as well or rise as far as the men." WALTER OLSON, THE EXCUSE FAG-
TORY. How EMPLOYMENT LAW Is PARALYZING THE AMERICAN WORKPLACE 82 (1997).
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fore, female employees and applicants are also beneficiaries of a sensi-
tivity to social context.291
Examining cultural context, by increasing certainty, consistency,
and predictability in hostile environment litigation, also benefits legiti-
mate hostile environment plaintiffs. These plaintiffs presently must
suffer under the same loose standards that employers face. This re-
sults in substantial and unnecessary litigation costs, 29 2 expenses which
some plaintiffs are not always able to bear.293 Similarly, the greater
certainty will allow plaintiffs' attorneys to know when a case is more
likely to be a loser, so that he can either decline the case or cut his
losses early, perhaps by the summary judgment stage. This, in turn,
should save courts the trouble of having to address the large number
of less-than-meritorious hostile environment cases that now flood the
federal docket. Settlement of meritorious and non-meritorious cases
should also increase, as parties will have a greater ability to accurately
predict their chances of success. The average American will also bene-
fit from increased certainty because they presently pay for loose stan-
dards in at least two ways: (1) through increased litigation costs and
erroneous judgments, which employers pass on to consumers in the
price of goods or services produced; and (2) through increased taxes
which citizens must pay to fund the courts and their staff, who in turn
must sift through the facts of each hostile environment case in an at-
tempt to apply the presently loose standards.
This is not to say that an examination of workplace culture solves
all problems associated with hostile environment cases. Indeed, al-
though it increases certainty and uniformity in close cases, even courts
that consider workplace culture are cabined by the mtilti-factored
analysis required by the Harris factors and the genuinely difficult ques-
tion of determining unwelcomeness. Because of the fact-intensive na-
ture and other peculiarities of hostile environment law, it is not
surprising that litigation costs for hostile environment cases are "far
higher than those associated with the major criminal offenses or tor-
291 This also holds true for other groups that have traditionally faced
discrimination.
292 See Posner, supra note 287, at 514. In light of the Supreme Court's recent
decision in Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105 (2001) (holding that the
Federal Arbitration Act does not preclude arbitration of discrimination claims), the
frequency of employers requiring employees to arbitrate rather than litigate harass-
ment claims will rise, and the costs of uncertainty will certainly diminish.
293 Although contingency agreements with their attorneys can ameliorate this con-
cern, some plaintiff's lawyers will only take cases that have a reasonable potential for
victory. Furthermore, even in contingency fee cases plaintiffs are frequently responsi-
ble for incidental expenses, such as filing fees, depositions, and transcript fees, which
are usually steep.
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tious actions against strangers."294 Somebody is forced to bear theses
costs-whether it is employees, employers, or consumers. So any fac-
tor that adds greater certainty to the equation performs a great service
to all concerned parties. To the extent that a consideration of work-
place culture adds even a modicum of additional certainty and pre-
dictability, this analytical tool provides something positive for an area
of law greatly in need of some clarity.
C. Chilling of Speech
In the First Amendment context, the courts have recognized the
negative, chilling effect that vague and substantially overbroad laws
can have on speech, especially those that regulate speech based on its
content and viewpoint. Thus, in most free speech cases, the courts are
particularly solicitous to ensure that regulations of speech are not
vague or overly broad and that viewpoint- and content-based restric-
dons receive exacting scrutiny.295 Modern judges are so protective of
free speech rights that laws are now frequently struck down as uncon-
stitutional based merely on fears that they might "chill" protected con-
duct. Their rationale is that vague restrictions might cause cautious
individuals to refrain from expressing their views out of fear that they
will be held liable for violating the law in question.296 Similarly, in
overbreadth cases, laws are struck down when they restrict more
speech than is necessary to achieve compelling governmental
interests.
297
294 EPSTEIN, supra note 103, at 350-51.
295 See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 393-96 (1992).
296 Other rationales for striking down vague laws include the belief that the actor
has insufficient notice of what is prohibited, authorities have insufficient guidelines to
check their enforcement of the law, and requiring legislatures to draft narrowly drawn
laws encourages considered legislative judgment. The void for vagueness doctrine
exists under both the Due Process Clause and the First Amendment, with the latter
requiring laws with greater specificity than the Due Process Clause. See Grayned v.
City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972) ("It is a basic principle of due process that
an enactment is void for vagueness if its prohibitions are not clearly defined."). A law
is void for vagueness where reasonable persons could differ as to the meaning of the
law.
297 See NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
[T]he instant decree may be invalid if it prohibits privileged exercises of
First Amendment rights whether or not the record discloses that the peti-
tioner has engaged in privileged conduct. For in appraising a statute's in-
hibitory effect upon such rights, this Court has not hesitated to take into
account possible applications of the statute in other factual contexts besides
that at bar.
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For reasons that are not entirely clear,298 the same cautious ap-
proach is generally not employed by the American judiciary when fac-
ing hostile environment cases. 299 "There is no bright line between
sexual harassment and merely unpleasant conduct .... "300 Conse-
quently, hostile environment law has developed a standard of conduct
that is both vague and overly broad.3° 1 This leaves many employers-
among others-unable to discern what exactly is prohibited by Title
VII, as was discussed above.30 2 According to Justice Kennedy, this
means that potential hostile environment defendants must operate in
"a climate of fear."303 Because it is often difficult for employers to
know whether their employees have committed acts of harassment, to
be safe, both employers and employees often curb their speech and
Id. at 432. "A regulation is unconstitutional on its face on overbreadth grounds where
there is 'a likelihood that the statute's very existence will inhibit free expression' by
'inhibiting the speech of third parties who are not before the Court.'" Saxe v. State
Coll. Area Sch. Dist., 240 F.3d 200, 214 (3d Cir. 2001) (quoting Members of City
Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 799 (1984)).
298 Professor Nagel has suggested that offensive speech receives less protection in
the workplace because of society's desire to make the workplace comfortable for wo-
men, apparently to encourage more women to work:
Sexual harassment on the job is treated specially in our society for the plain
reason that we have decided that it is crucially important to remove impedi-
ments to job opportunities for women. As a society, our choice is that it is
more important to protect women from sexual pressure and vulgarity on the
job than at the newsstand or along the street or in the home.
NAGEL, supra note 92, at 16. Although noble, this is hardly a good reason to alter the
constitutional analysis.
299 This may be changing. See Saxe, 240 F.3d at 214 (holding school district's anti-
harassment policy, which looks an awful lot like the Title VII "standard" for harass-
ment, facially unconstitutional). Interestingly, the school district defended its anti-
harassment policy by arguing that it was merely a replica of the Title IX standard,
which is a knock off of the Title VII standard of harassment. The Third Circuit's
response to this argument is that "there is no categorical 'harassment exception' to
the First Amendment's free speech clause." Id. at 204.
300 Hathaway v. Runyon, 132 F.3d 1214, 1221 (8th Cir. 1997).
301 See Saxe, 240 F.3d at 214; Breda v. Wolf Camera, Inc., 148 F. Supp. 2d 1371,
1381 n.11 (S.D. Ga. 2001) (suggesting that the varying standards for hostile environ-
ment sexual harassment are challengable on vagueness grounds).
302 See Wayne Lindsey Robbins, Jr., When Two Liberal Values Collide in an Era of
"Political Correctness". First Amendment Protection as a Check on Speech-Based Title VII Hostile
Environment Claims, 47 BAYLOR L. REV. 789, 809 (1995) ("The vagueness of the defini-
tion of what constitutes harassment leaves those subject to regulation without clear
notice of what is permitted and what is forbidden.").
303 Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 681 (1999) (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting) (discussing the result of allowing unlimited liability under Title IX).
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steer clear of anything that might conceivably offend co-workers.
0 4
Although the co-employee harassers cannot be held liable under Title
VII, as at-will employees, they are certainly terminable simply for be-
ing accused of harassment, regardless of whether they actually
harassed anyone.3
0 5
Since an employer receives no direct economic benefit from his
employee's free speech, 0 6 but can face civil liability under EEOC
guidelines if his workers' statements on politics, religion, or sex are
construed by the courts as creating "an intimidating, hostile, or offen-
sive working environment," the employer's incentive is to overcensor
his employee's speech.3
0 7
This inhibition of speech is believed to be commonplace. The
Sixth Circuit has suggested that this censorship, and the signal it sends
about these types of speech, is the intended effect of hostile environ-
ment law.30 8 It may frequently be "good" censorship-that is, the
Judeo-Christian tradition recognizes the immorality of vulgar and ra-
cist speech, and this censorship presumably reduces the amount of
such speech-but nobody should lose sight of the fact that it is still
censorship that the courts are endorsing, and oftentimes "good" cen-
sorship stifles useful speech along with the harmful.8 0 9
304 See David E. Bernstein, Sex Discrimination Laws Versus CivilLiberties, 1999 U. CHL
LEGAL F. 133, 142. Professor Bernstein relates:
No wonder, then, that the Murfreesboro, Tennessee city government re-
moved an impressionistic painting by Maxine Henderson, depicting a par-
tially clad woman, after a city employee filed a hostile environment
complaint. After the city removed the painting, the City Attorney said, "I
feel more comfortable siding with protecting the rights under the Title VII
sexual harassment statutes than I do under the First Amendment." The at-
torney also commented, "You really can't be too cautious. A sexual harass-
mentjudgment usually has six zeroes behind it."
Id. (footnotes omitted).
305 See, e.g., Pacheco v. Rice, 966 F.2d 904, 905 (5th Cir. 1992) (stating that em-
ployee was terminated after being accused of sexual harassment); Pealo v. AAF Mc-
Quay, Inc., 140 F. Supp. 2d 233, 236 (N.D.N.Y. 2001) (same).
306 It is true that restricting employee speech could result in a reduction in mo-
rale, which could result in an economic loss. But such a loss is hardly a sure thing,
and certainly not as probable, or probably as great, as the loss that Title VII's compen-
satory and punitive damages could entail.
307 See Robert W. Gall, Note, The University as an Industrial Plant: How a Workplace
Theory of Discriminatory Harassment Creates a "Hostile Environment" for Free Speech in
Americas Universities, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1997, at 203, 208.
308 See Davis v. Monsanto Chem. Co., 858 F.2d 345, 350 (6th Cir. 1988) ("By in-
forming people that the expression of racist or sexist attitudes in public is unaccept-
able, people may eventually learn that such views are undesirable in private, as well.").
309 For instance, because religious speech could be construed as creating a hostile
environment, it too is often censored by employers. See Wilson v. U.S. W. Commun.,
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Because the vague hostile environment standards fail to ade-
quately inform employers as to how much speech they should censor,
employment attorneys forthrightly admit that they advise employer-
clients to be highly restrictive of employee speech,310 as contrary ad-
vice would violate their duties to their clients.
Imagine an employer comes to you for legal advice: one of his em-
ployees has told him she feels harassed by a coworker's sexist politi-
cal statements, or by a Gauguin calendar the coworker has posted
on his cubicle wall. What do you tell your client?
Theoretically, the client can only be held liable if the coworker's
speech is "severe or pervasive" enough to create a "hostile or abu-
sive" environment. But how can you tell whether this standard will
be met? How can you predict whether a jury (perhaps a jury that is
not keen on Gauguin nudes, for reasons entirely unrelated to sex
discrimination) will indeed find the speech to be "severe" or "perva-
sive," or the environment "hostile" or "abusive"?
You would be committing malpractice if you did not tell the client
to shut the offending employee up. The downside of letting the
employee talk is uncertain, but possibly huge. The downside of re-
straining the employee is slight-maybe some ruffled feathers, but
it is doubtful that the employee will quit over this.
31
Yet another attorney advises employers:
Your policy should go beyond what the law forbids. If you set your
standards too low, one mistake by one supervisor could make you
the next landmark case. Also, the EEOC accepts claims for conduct
that clearly is not illegal. Since it's costly to respond to such claims,
it's in an organization's best interest to minimize them.
312
Considering that this advice is probably frequently given to em-
ployers and that many employers wisely follow this counsel, it is not
surprising that Title VII is often criticized for discouraging innocuous
speech and conduct.313 This excerpt also demonstrates a false hope
58 F.3d 1337, 1342 (8th Cir. 1995) (affirming dismissal of employee's religious dis-
crimination complaint arising from her termination for disseminating religious/pro-
life message that other employees purportedly found offensive).
310 See Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech, Cyberspace, Harassment Law, and the Clinton
Administration, LAW & CoNTEMP. PROBS., Winter/Spring 2000, at 299, 301 ("The pru-
dent employer is wise to restrict speech ... [even if not directed at a particular co-
worker].").
311 Eugene Volokh, How Harassment Law Restricts Free Speech, 47 RuTGERS L. REv.
563, 567-68 (1995) (footnotes omitted).
312 ROSEN, supra note 265, at 81-82 (quoting RITA RISSER, RESEARCH REPORT: NEW
LAW OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT (Fair Measures Mgmt. Law Consulting Group 1997)).
313 At the same time, some avid fans of present hostile environment standards
trivialize the chilling effect they have on workplace speech:
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that sexual harassment standards will someday become sufficiently
definite as to eliminate the present over-regulation of speech. This is
unlikely, especially considering that courts have spent thirty years at-
tempting to develop workable hostile environment standards all to no
avail.
Title VII has also led to a greater monitoring of employees by
their employers.314 "To protect themselves from the risks of expensive
liability, companies face increasing pressure to launch formal investi-
gations in response to allegations of relatively trivial offenses, monitor-
ing and prohibiting far more speech than the law actually forbids. '3 15
This is especially true now that the Supreme Court has given employ-
ers, through an affirmative defense, increased incentive for more inva-
sive investigations and harsher disciplinary measures that are designed
to prevent or correct "offensive" conduct.3 16 In light of Faragher and
Ellerth, if the accused harasser is a fungible commodity, the employer
would be well advised to terminate him-regardless of the employee's
guilt or innocence-lest the employer lose the benefit of the affirma-
tive defense. Undoubtedly, this further inhibits a free exchange of
ideas, forces employers to act something like George Orwell's Big
Brother, and, understandably, leads to a form of workplace paranoia
that cannot be conducive to productivity.
Beyond the pure speech that it chills, Title VII also inhibits social
interactions and office relationships. For example, although some
wealthy employers like Bill Gates have enough capital to risk being
rejected and accused of harassment by his former employee Melinda
French (who is now his wife), most employers frequently prohibit in-
teroffice relationships in an attempt to reduce their potential liability
for harassment lawsuits when the romance sours.317 This is not be-
cause they lack the romantic flare of a computer geek. Rather, in "an
increasingly litigious environment, employers are concerned that
what starts as a romantic relationship may end as a claim of harass-
Lack of predictability of an ultimate jury reaction might cause employers
and employees to be more formal in their workplace relationships than is
necessary or desirable, in order to avoid any possible claim of sexual harass-
ment. This disadvantage of imprecision is an unfortunate byproduct of the
current uncertainties in a developing area of sociology and law.
Gallagher v. Delaney, 139 F.3d 338, 349 (2d Cir. 1998).
314 See ROSEN, supra note 265, at 79-80.
315 Id. at 81.
316 See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807 (1998); Burlington In-
dus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998).
317 See Niloofar Nejat-Bina, Comment, Employers as Vigilant Chaperones Armed with
Dating Waivers: The Intersection of Unwelcomeness and Employer Liability in Hostile Work
Environment Sexual Harassment Law, 20 BERKELEYJ. EMP. & LAB. L. 325, 326 (1999).
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ment.' 3 18 These concerns are certainly legitimate, as a substantial mi-
nority of sexual harassment claims arise out of consensual
relationships,3 19 whether because ofjealousy, a jilted lover's quest for
revenge, or just a refusal to concede defeat in a failed relationship.3 20
Thus, while the banning of interoffice dating might seem excessive,3 2 1
such practices make particularly good sense from the perspective of
avoiding Tide VII liability. This chilling of such romance may seem
trivial to some,3 22 but in an age where Americans spend an increasing
amount of time at work, and thus have less time to search for a suita-
ble mate, 323 the workplace has become one of the primary places to
meet a future spouse.
3 24
318 Randi Wolkenbreit, In Order To Form a More Perfect Union: Applying No-Spouse
Rules to Employees Who Meet at Work, 31 CoLuM.J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 119,127 n.44 (1997);
see also Carpenter v. Fed. Nat'l Mortgage Ass'n, 165 F.3d 69, 71 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (not-
ing that when attorney learned about a consensual relationship between employees
she immediately suggested an investigation to prevent a sexual harassment claim).
319 Hager, supra note 257, at 380 n.8 ("27% of sexual harassment complaints
stemmed from intra-office relationships gone bad.").
320 As noted previously, many Tide VII cases arise out of failed relationships. See
cases cited supra note 102 and accompanying text.
321 As an alternative, some employers require dating employees to disclose their
relationships to the employer and to sign dating waivers reminiscent of parental per-
mission slips of elementary school. See Nejat-Bina, supra note 317, at 327. In moder-
nity, a young man no longer seeks a father's permission to date his daughter; instead
he asks her employer. You've come a long way baby!
322 The Second Circuit's ChiefJudge McLaughlin is not one of those who trivial-
izes this problem. He offers: "It is repugnant to our most basic ideals in a free society
that an employer can destroy an individual's livelihood on the basis of whom he is
courting .... " McCavitt v. Swiss Reinsurance Am. Corp., 237 F.3d 166, 170 (2d Cir.
2001) (per curiam) (McLaughlin, C.J., concurring). But the cause of these anti-court-
ing rules is the employer's well-founded fear that it will become an attorney's object of
affection, and that this unwanted pursuing will result in its own "court-ing," the result
of which will be the employer getting screwed. Unfortunately, rather than admitting
that this problem is caused, in part, by the judiciary's promulgation of vague hostile
environment standards, the good judge thinks that yet another layer of judicial in-
volvement should be added to the mess in the form a cause of action against employ-
ers who are merely trying to protect themselves from a Title VII lawsuit. Id.
323 Or, to put it more poetically: "As the work force grows and people spend more
of their time at work, the workplace inevitably becomes fertile ground for the dating
and mating game." Hennessy v. Penril Datacomm Networks, Inc., 69 F.3d 1344, 1353
(7th Cir. 1995).
324 See Nichols v. Frank, 42 F.3d 503, 510 (9th Cir. 1994) (Reinhardt, J., with two
judges concurring only in the judgment).
As our workforce grows, and more and more of us find it necessary, or desir-
able, to earn our own living, we spend an increasing amount of our time at
work. Sexual barriers to employment have lessened. We tend these days, far
more than in earlier times, to find our friends, lovers, and even mates in the
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Despite the increased amount of time spent in the workplace,
325
and, thus, the increased need for social interaction in that context,
workplace dating is more frequently being curtailed to protect em-
ployers from potential liability for harassment.3 26 As supervisors dat-
ing their charges becomes particularly dangerous from a hostile
environment perspective, 3 27 perhaps only a person with the financial
resources of Microsoft would risk a Title VII sexual harassment suit.
"Vith the increase in office relationships, despite their initially con-
sensual nature, employers are increasingly exposed to sexual harass-
ment liability for the conduct of supervisory employees."
3 28
This increased exposure to liability is partly traceable to the vague
standards of Title VII. These vague standards raises a host of ques-
tions for employees, employers, and the courts, as one judge has
noted:
When does a healthy constructive interest in romance become sex-
ual harassment? To what extent is pursuit of a co-worker proper but
of a subordinate forbidden? Is wooing or courting a thing of the
past? Must a suitor cease his attentions at the first sign of disinterest
or resistance? Must there be an express agreement before the per-
son seeking romance may even hold the hand of the subject of his
affection?3 2
9
workplace. We spend longer hours at the office or traveling for job-related
purposes, and often discover that our interests and values are closer to those
of our colleagues or fellow employees than to those of people we meet in
connection with other activities.
Id.
325 "It is, unfortunately, all too true that the workplace has become another home
for most working Americans. Many employees spend the better part of their days and
much of their evenings at work." O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 739 (1987)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting).
326 See McCavit 237 F.3d at 167 (observing that male employee was terminated for
dating co-worker, even though company had no written policy against dating); Shum-
way v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 118 F.3d 60, 65 (2d Cir. 1997) (affirming dismissal of
female supervisor's Title VII claim, when she was forced to resign for dating a male
employee in violation of company's anti-fraternization rule); Sarsha v. Sears, Roebuck
& Co., 3 F.3d 1035, 1042 (7th Cir. 1993) (affirming dismissal of Title VII claim of
employee terminated for violating company's "no-dating" policy); Karp v. The Fair
Store, Inc., 709 F. Supp. 737, 741 (E.D. Tex. 1988) (denying recovery to male em-
ployee when male and female employee were both terminated for violating unstated
no-dating policy).
327 See Sarsha, 3 F.3d at 1039 (Sears claimed that it fired its manager because his
relationship with a subordinate "exposed Sears to potential liability in the form of a
sexual harassment suit.").
328 Nejat-Bina, supra note 317, at 327.
329 Nichols v. Frank, 42 F.3d 503, 510 (9th Cir. 1994) (Reinhardt, J., with two
judges concurring only in the judgment).
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Unfortunately, the present hostile environment standards provide no
answers, just educated guesses, to Judge Reinhardt's questions.
Prohibiting dates with coworkers will necessarily result in the de-
nial of rewarding relationships for some. Perhaps more importantly,
potential workplace romances of today will never blossom into the sta-
ble, tax-paying, citizen-producing families of tomorrow. 330 As Judge
Terence Evans has opined, federal judges "should not be in the busi-
ness of throwing a wet blanket over activities that can lead to consen-
sual amour."33 1 Furthermore, as "it is the man who usually makes the
first move,"332 men may be hit harder by Title VII than women.333 But
women, too, feel the effects. Women meet more future husbands at
work than any other place except perhaps school.3 3 4 Therefore,
prohibitions on workplace dating are yet another backlash from hos-
tile environment law that women are forced to suffer.
And of course, it is not just romance that is chilled by vague sex-
ual harassment standards,3 35 but also simple friendships, or the telling
of jokes with a splash of "unacceptable" humor. Still, a little lost
speech in these areas might be characterized as inconsequential and
might not justify any changes in the law. What is far more important
is the chilling of religious and political speech which hostile environ-
ment law has wrought.33 6 Because religious harassment is also action-
able under Title VII, certain forms of religious proselytizing can be
330 True, where there's a will there's a way, and employees intent on dating will
not let their bosses get in the way. But there is an added cost: the stress of keeping
the romance a secret and worrying about others discovering it, not to mention the
dishonesty that will be necessary to pull off the whole charade. This, in turn, will
result in lower productivity and happiness.
331 Hennessy v. Penril Datacomm Networks, Inc., 69 F.3d 1344, 1353 (7th Cir.
1995).
332 Id.
333 See, e.g., Sarsha v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 3 F.3d 1035, 1042 (7th Cir. 1993)
(noting that male supervisor was terminated for dating female subordinate, who re-
tained her job).
334 See generally George Pendle, Male Shot, TiMES (London), Aug. 8, 2001, at 6 (The
Times Crome); Jacqueline Fitzgerald, Partners 9 to 5-And Beyond; More Spouses Are
Working Together, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 11, 2001, § 8, at 2; James Podgers, Marriage Traps in
the Workplace, A.B.A. J., Jan. 1996, at 46.
335 As to the vagueness contention, see Sangree, supra note 49, at 529 ("[Hlostile
environment prohibitions are not impermissibly vague."). The key word in that asser-
tion is "impermissibly." Even if they are not unconstitutionally vague, it is hard to
contend that the present hostile environment standards are optimally certain. There
is plenty of room for improvement.
336 See Bowman v. Heller, No. 90-3269, 1993 WL 761159, at *2 (Mass. Super. Ct.
July 9, 1993), affd in part and rev'd in part, 651 N.E.2d 369 (Mass. 1995).
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considered harassment.3 37 As with dating, perhaps these are de
minimis concerns, but it is interesting to compare the amount of
speech that is repressed due to fears of Title VII liability to speech that
is left unregulated because of other federal statutes or constitutional
provisions. For example, in one Title VII case, the First National Bank
of Boston prohibited an employee from posting political photographs
in opposition to the Iranian government-one showed Iranians burn-
ing an American flag and the other depicted America's favorite
Ayatollah, Ayatollah Khomeini-because an Iranian co-employee ob-
jected that they were a form of national-origin harassment. 338 If burn-
ing an American flag is protected by the First Amendment, should not
the posting of a picture displaying a burning flag merit comparable
protection?33 9 True, the employer, not the government, forced the
employee to take the pictures down, and thus the First Amendment is
not implicated, but apparently this was done only out of fear of a hos-
tile environment lawsuit. In another case, U.S. West Communications
fired a management-level employee for wearing, in accordance with
the dictates of her faith, an anti-abortion button, because co-workers
said this constituted harassment.3 40 Compare this to the facts of the
Republic Aviation case, where the Supreme Court held that the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board can prevent employers from firing em-
ployees who wear pro-union buttons.34 1 Consider also that through
the First Amendment, courts protect the "speech" of nude dancers
337 See, e.g., Chalmers v. Tulon Co., 101 F.3d 1012 (4th Cir. 1996) (management-
level employee discharged for sending religious letters to co-workers). See generally,
Thomas C. Berg, Religious Speech in the Workplace: Harassment or Protected Speech, 22
HAv.J.L. & PUB. POL'" 959 (1999) (discussing standards for, and defenses to, restrict-
ing harassment under Title VII); Debbie N. Kaminer, When Religious Expression Creates
a Hostile Work Environment: The Challenge of Balancing Competing Fundamental Rights, 4
N.Y.U.J. LEGIs. & PUB. POL'y 81 (2000) (discussing when expression of religious belief
is actionable).
338 Pakizegi v. First Nat'l Bank of Boston, 831 F. Supp. 901, 904 (D. Mass. 1993).
Because the employer immediately forced the employee to remove the pictures, the
court did not address whether their continued display would have constituted a hos-
tile work environment. Id. at 909.
339 See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 406 (1989) (burning of flag constituted
expressive conduct protected by the First Amendment).
340 SeeWilson v. U.S. W. Commun., 58 F.3d 1337 (8th Cir. 1995). Even employers
sometimes get dinged for innocuous behavior that plaintiffs characterize as religious
harassment. For example, in Brown Transportation Corp. v. Commonwealth, 578 A.2d
555 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1990), a Pennsylvania court held that the employer created a
hostile work environment because he had Biblical verses printed on paychecks and
expressed religious viewpoints in a company newsletter. Id. at 561-62 (discussing
Pennsylvania hostile work environment law).
341 Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793, 802-03 (1945).
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and other adult entertainers from the chill of "vague" laws, 342 while
Title VII freezes out much more valuable speech through the strict
enforcement of its vague standards.
The point here is not to criticize the NLRA or First Amendment
jurisprudence, but to point out that values which Americans cherish
are unnecessarily being trammeled through the vagueness of the hos-
tile environment standards, 343 thereby suggesting a greater need for a
more definite benchmark, perhaps starting with an examination of
harassment claims in light of workplace culture.3 44 When vague hos-
tile environment standards cause employers to over-regulate the work-
place, they harm everyone.3 45 They chill the speech of both men and
women, black or white, based largely on the viewpoint or content of
the speech.3 46 The harm goes one step further When employers pass
along the added cost of regulating the workplace to the consumers-
both men and women, black and white-so that everyone pays the
price for vague and overbroad harassment standards.3 47 Because a
greater sensitivity to workplace culture has the potential to prevent
some of this over-regulation, this analytic tool entails advantages that
should not be ignored.
D. Deterrence of Serious Harassment
To the extent that an examination of workplace culture provides
slightly greater definitude to hostile environment law, it will also result
in Title VII deterring serious harassment to a much greater extent
342 Cf Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560 (1991) (holding that law requir-
ing dancers to wear "pasties" and G-strings not vague); Paris Adult Theatre v. Slayton,
413 U.S. 49 (1973) (exhibiting adult films).
343 See Daniels v. Essex Group, Inc., 937 F.2d 1264, 1272 (7th Cir. 1991) ('[T]he
objective standard allows the fact-finder to consider the work environment and the
instances of harassment against a reasonableness standard.").
344 It is worth noting that a sensitivity to social context might not have helped
either of the employees in Pakizegi or Wilson, as the expressive activity in those cases
took place in white-collar contexts.
345 The judiciary also suffers from the unpredictability fomented by vague hostile
environment standards in that people are less likely to respect their decisions, since
these decisions seem to be rooted in nothing but caprice and each judge's beliefs as
to what is unacceptable behavior. See Breda v. Wolf Camera, Inc., 148 F. Supp. 2d
1371, 1378 (S.D. Ga. 2001) ("Statutes requiring judges to 'know it when they see it'
ultimately eviscerate the very predictability respected judicial systems require.") (foot-
note omitted).
346 See Saxe v. State Coll. Area Sch. Dist., 240 F.3d 200, 207 (3d Cir. 2001)
("Loosely worded anti-harassment laws may pose some of the same problems as the St.
Paul hate speech ordinance: they may regulate deeply offensive and potentially dis-
ruptive categories of speech based, at least in part, on subject matter and viewpoint.").
347 See RicHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 367 (5th ed. 1998).
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than it does now. The present, vague standards probably cause most
employers who know about the potentially devastating damage awards
to err on the side of caution and over-regulate conduct that is not
truly unlawful. But it might also be true that other employers-those
who have not yet had to defend a harassment case-under-regulate
actionable conduct, since they too are uncertain as to what exactly is
prohibited by Title VII.3 48 When "a law is unclear, prospective viola-
tors will discount the punishment cost of the violation not only by the
probability that they will be caught but also by the additional
probability, significantly less than one, that the law will be held appli-
cable to the conduct in which they engaged."349 This almost certainly
happens with Title VII.
The vagueness of hostile environment law, therefore, may cause
some employers to incorrectly think that their workplaces are in com-
pliance with Title VII,3 5 0 or that even if they are not, that a plaintiff
will not prevail in a hostile environment suit. Similarly, plaintiffs
might not sue in some egregious cases because of their, or their law-
yer's, mistaken interpretation of vague hostile environment standards.
Since they are susceptible to variable and broad interpretations, a rea-
sonable lawyer might not think that his client's travails rise to the level
of being "pervasive or seriously offensive." Or he might mistakenly
believe that he could not prove his case to such a high standard.351
Where an attorney is called upon to risk his own money in litigating
harassment cases, he might be less inclined to do so where the stan-
dard for recovery, and thus his chance of remuneration, seems specu-
lative at best.
The greater certainty that a consistent examination of workplace
culture would entail will allow employers, plaintiffs, and attorneys to
ascertain with greater certainty exactly what is prohibited and any ad-
ditional steps they need to take in order to comply with Title VII. In
the few workplaces where employers are presently interpreting hostile
environment standards minimalistically, sensitivity to workplace cul-
348 "[N] early all businessmen will normally comply with law they understand." DA-
vis, supra note 263, at 72.
349 POSNER, supra note 347, at 591.
350 See McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publ'g Co., 513 U.S. 352, 358 (1995) ("Con-
gress designed the remedial measures in these statutes [ADEA and Title VII] to serve
as a 'spur or catalyst' to cause employers 'to self-examine and to self-evaluate their
employment practices and to endeavor to eliminate, so far as possible, the last ves-
tiges' of discrimination.").
351 Obviously there is a risk of attorney error in interpreting any statute. Hostile
environment law, however, presents particular difficulties since there is nothing in the
text of Title VII that provides guidance. Even after scouring the Federal Reporter, a
lawyer will be hard pressed to say he has found a clear standard, Harris factors or not.
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ture should result in increased self-regulation. Where they can more
accurately ascertain what is prohibited, and can realistically predict
their potential liability, employers might be more conscientious about
policing their workplaces. 352 Likewise, where potential plaintiffs know
that they are being subjected to actionable harassment, they will be
more likely to seek a remedy, whether internal, administrative, or
judicial.
E. Fewer False Accusations
Because an examination of workplace culture results in greater
definiteness, this practice also should result in fewer findings of har-
assment where none indeed existed. Errors often can result in gross
injustices being inflicted on innocent persons.3 53 Although purported
harassers, unless they own the defendant company, are not financially
responsible for any damages awarded in a hostile environment suit,3 5 4
money damages are not the only damage inflicted in these cases.
There is also damage to reputation,3 5 5 loss of respect among one's
peers, and, of course, the -stress of litgating a sexual harassment
case.356 Employers are also more likely to fire employees accused of
harassment, whether guilty or not, particularly because a termination
will help satisfy their duty under the Faragher/Ellerth affirmative de-
352 There may be a drawback in situations where employers are over-regulating
conduct (i.e., prohibiting conduct that is not proscribed by Title VII), but where no
useful speech is inhibited. For example, where employers prohibit profanity in the
workplace. Even in those situations, however, it might be better not to saddle employ-
ers and consumers with the costs of censoring employee speech.
353 See, e.g., Nichols v. Frank, 42 F.3d 503, 512 (9th Cir. 1994) (Reinhardt, J., with
two judges concurring only in the judgment).
354 See EEOC v. AIC Sec. Investigations, Ltd., 55 F.3d 1276, 1282 (7th Cir. 1995).
Another step in the right direction would entail inflicting liability on the harassers,
rather than the employers, since harassers are in the best position to prevent hostile
environment harassment. But employers have deeper pockets, and so they are held
responsible instead.
355 Kathleen Murray, A Backlash on Harassment Cases, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18, 1994, at
23 (writing that men are frequently presumed to be guilty when accused of sexual
harassment).
356 Litigation, so everyone hears, is not a pleasant experience, as Learned Hand
expressed: "After some dozen years of experience I must say that as a litigant I should
dread a lawsuit beyond almost anything else short of sickness and death." Learned
Hand, The Deficiencies of Trials To Reach the Heart of the Matter, in 3 LErURES ON LEGAL
Topics, 1921-1922, at 89, 105 (Ass'n of the Bar of the City of New York 1926), quoted
in RicHARD A. POSNER, LAW AND LITERATuRE, A MISUNDERSTOOD RELATION 124-25
(1988).
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fense.3 57 Falsely accused employees, because they are usually at-will
employees, frequently have no remedy for an adverse employment ac-
tion precipitated by false accusations. 358 In short, it "is as necessary to
protect defendants against false accusations that can destroy family
and career as it is to protect plaintiffs from forced advances with the
same devastating effects." 359
Vague and malleable harassment standards make it easier to con-
strue innocent conduct as harassment and to "prove" false charges. In
many hostile environment cases, the plaintiff was truly the object of
unwanted attention and genuinely found the conduct annoying.
These plaintiffs may mistakenly think that unwanted attention alone
amounts to actionable conduct, and because they think that the con-
duct at issue is hostile environment harassment, they are likely to
charge harassment. The vague standards of hostile environment har-
assment law, by failing to let potential plaintiffs know what is and is
not actionable, lead to complaints about conduct that is not truly pro-
hibited by Title VII. Furthermore, because the severity of even mildly
offensive conduct can be magnified through creative interpretations,
it is not difficult to construe simple teasing as "objectively severe"
harassment.
Take, for example, a plaintiff who claims that he works in a hos-
tile environment because a supervisor repeatedly stares at him.
Where workplace culture is taken into account and supervisors are
required to watch over their charges, "staring" by a supervisor whose
job it is to oversee the plaintiff's work would not be considered objec-
tively severe or motivated by the plaintiffs sex. But under the hostile
environment standards presently applied by most courts, the "staring"
is turned into a federal case, even though it may actually be a manifes-
357 Under this defense, an employer must show that it exercised reasonable care
to prevent and correct promptly any sexually harassing behavior. See Faragher v. City
of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 805 (1998). Terminating an accused harasser, even if
the employer knows the employee was falsely accused, will go a long way towards
showing that an employer exercised reasonable care in immediate cases and any sub-
sequent cases of harassment.
358 But see Shannon P. Duffy, Jury Awards $150,000 to Employee Subjected To Question-
ing on Relationship with Co-Worker, THE LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, Oct. 24, 2001, at 3.
In a case that turned the tables on sexual harassment, a Philadelphiajury has
awarded $150,000 to a man who said his employer invaded his privacy by
subjecting him to an embarrassing, police-style interrogation after he had an
innocent, romantic tryst with a female co-worker that she had reported to
management as a rape.
Id.
359 EPSTEIN, supra note 103, at 355.
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tation of a supervisor's assigned task of oversight.360 Supervisors, after
all, are paid to oversee and supervise work. Thus, "although 'follow-
ing and staring' can betray romantic or sexual attraction, the everyday
observation of fellow employees in the workplace is also a natural and
unavoidable occurrence when people work together in close quarters
or when a supervisor keeps an eye on employees." 361 Although this
seems obvious, the fact that the Eleventh Circuit had to explicitly state
this proposition means that at least one plaintiffs lawyer was willing to
risk his own money on the hope that vague hostile environment stan-
dards would result in a victory.
Without a real standard by which to judge conduct, you cannot
really fault the plaintiff or his attorney. Since there is no objective
standard of hostile environment harassment to which the court's rul-
ing might be compared to ensure its accuracy, is it not just as reasona-
ble to say that the court got it wrong? Who is to say that the plaintiff
wrongly perceived himself as a target of inordinate attention, or the
attorney wrongly interpreted this conduct as a violation of Title VII?
This, of course, assumes that the accuser has no ill intentions and
honestly believed that his supervisor was intentionally harassing him.
The point is, he might simply have misinterpreted otherwise innocent
conduct, which is easy to do where the lines separating the permitted
from the prohibited are not clear. But in other cases, where an ac-
cuser has malevolent designs, the lack of clarity in hostile environ-
ment standards makes it all the easier to carry out those evil
intentions.3 62 With manipulable standards, it is not surprising that
more than one competitive co-worker or jilted lover has resorted to
Title VII in an attempt to exact some revenge. 363 Similarly, harass-
ment claims "have become a powerful weapon for a disgruntled em-
ployee seeking to settle a perceived private score with his or her
employer. '364 In other cases, it has been charged that plaintiffs seek
to take advantage of loose standards to obtain quick payoffs through
hostile environment suits. Because "it is often difficult under current
360 On the other hand, workplace culture might also show that the supervisors
never or only seldom observe employees at work. This practice would suggest that
extra attention paid to the plaintiff might be the result of her sex, although it might
also be explained by her poor performance or newness at the job, and thus her need
for greater supervision.
361 Mendoza v. Borden, Inc., 195 F.3d 1238, 1248 (11th Cir. 1999).
362 See, e.g., Swentek v. USAir, Inc., 830 F.2d 552, 555-56 (4th Cir. 1987) ("Various
witnesses testified that [the plaintiff] Swentek told them that she intended to get Lud-
lam [her supervisor] fired.").
363 See OLSON, supra note 290, at 62.
364 Heflin v. Daly, 742 F. Supp. 515, 516 (C.D. Ill. 1990).
[VOL- 77:2
2002] SOCIAL CONTEXT IN HOSTILE ENVIRONMENT LITIGATION 513
law to distinguish 'simple teasing, offhand comments, and isolated in-
cidents,"' 365 it is easy to portray innocuous conduct as harassment.
True enough, false accusations occur regardless of the clarity of
standards. Indeed, in the criminal context, where crimes are usually
clearly defined, and the prosecution has the burden of proof beyond
a reasonable doubt, false accusations nevertheless occur. But Title
VII's loose standards for assessing conduct encourage fabrications by
increasing the chance of success and making small exaggerations
more meaningful. 366 Innocent conduct is thus more readily misinter-
preted, or intentionally misconstrued, as actionable harassment. Ac-
tions characteristic of a king of kindness can be construed as conduct
typical of the prince of darkness. For example, in some cultures and
among certain ethnic groups, standing in close to proximity to others
is considered normal, and even a sign of friendliness. Such conduct
can easily be construed, by a scheming plaintiff or a skilled lawyer, as
an offensive invasion of one's personal space. While this might not be
actionable in itself, it can easily be spun together with other questiona-
ble deeds to create a web of purported harassment. Furthermore,
with the American rule of attorneys' fees, some plaintiffs will have lit-
tle to lose in attempting such a scheme.3 67 To the extent that a sensi-
tivity to workplace culture will curtail some of the vagueness and
uncertainty that encourages these practices, it is a welcome addition
to an area of law greatly in need of reform.
F. A Guard Against Paternalistic Employee-Specific Standards
Sensitivity to workplace culture might also be defended as a
means of repelling the paternalism that is creeping into hostile envi-
ronment law through the use of the "reasonable woman" standard of
conduct.3 68 Indeed, this standard might more aptly be named the
365 Barbour v. Browner, 181 F.3d 1342, 1348 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (quoting Faragher v.
City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 788 (1998)).
366 Judge Kleinfeld has hypothesized a case of false accusation that not only is
despicable, but would actually be contrary to the purposes of Title VII. He consid-
ered the possibility that an employee would accuse a black co-worker of sexual harass-
ment just to get the employee terminated. See Fielder v. UAL Corp., 218 F.3d 973,
1000 (9th Cir. 2000) (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting). Loose hostile environment standards
make racist schemes like this much more likely to succeed.
367 The plaintiffs' attorneys, however, have an interest in not taking unwinnable
cases, so they presumably will be the first line of defense against frivolous lawsuits.
But even they are handicapped (or empowered) in this endeavor by the vague stan-
dards of conduct.
368 For a discussion of these standards and the list of courts that have adopted
them, see supra Part II.B.
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"woman-specific standard" since it requires employers to make their
workplaces fit for the apparently more-delicate sensibilities of some
women. To this extent, adopting women-specific standards does ex-
actly the opposite of what Title VII was designed to do: eradicate Vic-
torian notions of the fragility of women.
369
As discussed above, proponents of woman-specific standards es-
sentially argue that the "reasonable woman" standard is necessary be-
cause women are not as crude or tough as men.3 70 This harkens back
to an age where women were considered unequal, and indeed infer-
ior, to men. Women were considered unable to work in male-domi-
nated work environments. The efforts to impose women-specific
standards perpetuate these outdated notions. They are nothing less
than an "attempt to insulate women from everyday insults as if they
remained models of Victorian reticence."371 They turn Title VII on its
head, as this statute was designed "to prevent the perpetuation of ste-
reotypes." 372 Proponents therefore do a great disservice to the women
who have worked hard to prove that they can perform as well as men
in the modem workplace. 373 Adoption of the woman-specific stan-
dard of severity or unwelcomeness would eliminate some of these
gains and turn the clock back to the days when women were believed
to be too delicate for manly work environments. They would con-
structively amend Title VII to require employers to accommodate the
special sensibilities of those women who cannot tolerate male-domi-
nated work environments.
374
A consideration of workplace culture would prevent this from oc-
curring by ensuring that the same standard of conduct is applied to
369 Title VII was designed to "level the playing field for women" so that they would
be permitted to "compete on an equal basis with men"; it was not intended to require
special accommodations for them. DeAngelis v. El Paso Mun. Police Officers Ass'n,
51 F.3d 591, 593 (5th Cir. 1995). Women-specific standards are based on "on old,
'outdated' stereotypes of female vulnerability and male strength." NAGEL, supra note
92, at 18 (1994).
370 Jane K. Dolkart, Hostile Environment Harassment: Equality, Objectivity, and the
Shaping of Legal Standards, 43 EMORY L.J. 151, 153 (1994).
371 DeAngelis, 51 F.3d at 593.
372 Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469, 1483 (3d Cir. 1990).
373 See Paul B. Johnson, The Reasonable Woman in Sexual Harassment Law: Progress or
Illusion?, 28 WAKE FoREsT L. REv. 619, 634-35 (1993).
374 Title VII does not mandate special accommodations for race or sex. See Lynch
v. Freeman, 817 F.2d 380, 390 (6th Cir. 1987) (Boggs,J., dissenting). The statute does
require employers to accommodate some religious practices. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j)
(1994) ("The term 'religion' includes all aspects of religious observance and practice,
as well as belief, unless an employer demonstrates that he is unable to reasonably accom-
modate to an employee's or prospective employee's religious observance or practice
without undue hardship .... .") (emphasis added).
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both male and female workers in a given workplace. Under this ap-
proach, women would not be considered delicate flowers that must be
protected from the foul language and sexual innuendos of men.
Rather, the law would treat them as adults and as fully competent to
decide for themselves whether to participate in the blue-collar banter
or not. Acknowledgment of workplace culture-both the good and
the bad-treats women and men as equals, recognizing that when
they choose to participate in workplace pranks and banter they can-
not use similar behavior to later claim that they were innocent victims
of harassment. Their own use of foul language or participation in
conduct similar to that about which they complain will be examined
as one relevant factor in the unwelcomeness, severity, and motivation
analyses.
V. CRiTcisMs OF THE SOCIAL CONTEXT ANALYSIS
Despite the advantages that a consideration of workplace culture
brings to hostile environment law, the First, Fourth, and Sixth Circuits
have rejected this approach, believing that it is contrary to the pur-
poses of Title VII and the developing common law.375 Specifically, it
can be argued that a special consideration of the workplace culture is
unwarranted because: (1) there is no textual support for this ap-
proach; (2) it does not lead to greater predictability and uniformity in
decisions; and (3) to the extent that it does, it is at the expense of
regulating invidious harassment. These and other criticisms, along
with responses to them, are considered below.
375 O'Rourke v. City of Providence, 235 F.3d 713, 735 (1st Cir. 2001); Conner v.
Schrader-Bridgeport Int'l, Inc., 227 F.3d 179, 194 (4th Cir. 2000);Jackson v. Quanex
Corp., 191 F.3d 647, 662 (6th Cir. 1999); Williams v. Gen. Motors Corp., 187 F.3d 553,
564 (6th Cir. 1999); see also Adkins v. Kelly-Springfield Tire Co., No. 97-C-50381, 2001
WL 219636, at *7 n.7 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 6, 2001) (holding that the fact that all employees
were exposed to harassment militates in favor of Title VII liability and does not help
the employer's defense). As mentioned above, the Seventh Circuit has equivocated
on the issue. The Seventh Circuit appeared to have adopted differential standards in
Reed v. Shepard, 939 F.2d 484, 492 (7th Cir. 1991), and reaffirmed the reasoning be-
hind them in Shepherd v. Slater Steels Corp., 168 F.3d 998, 1010-11 (7th Cir. 1999)
("Whether the sexual content of the harassment is indicative of sex discrimination
must therefore be examined with attention to the context in which the harassment
occurs."), and Johnson v. Hondo, Inc., 125 F.3d 408, 412 (7th Cir. 1997) (noting that in
assessing whether certain words and conduct are motivated by sex, courts must take
into consideration that vulgarity is common in certain contexts, and thus is not be-
cause of sex). But another panel, notably not an en banc panel, later disavowed such
standards. See Smith v. Sheahan, 189 F.3d 529, 534-35 (7th Cir. 1999).
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A. Lack of Textual Support
Critics of using workplace culture in the hostile environment
analysis believe that the text of Title VII does not support this practice.
The text of a statute is the starting point for assessing a statute and the
causes of action that are based on its prohibitions.376 Admittedly, the
text of Tide VII provides no explicit command that courts look to
social context in assessing hostile environment cases. Tide VII states
that it is unlawful for an employer to discriminate with respect to the
terms and conditions of employment because of the individual's
sex.377 There is no mention of the relevant factors for harassment
cases, much less a suggestion that workplace culture is relevant to the
analysis. There is no explicit assumption of risk defense 378-to which
a consideration of social context might be analogized-nor a rule that
an employee's forbearance from complaining about harassment pre-
cludes liability.3 79 Indeed, while Title VII regulates discrimination on
376 See Greyhound Corp. v. Mt. Hood Stages, Inc., 437 U.S. 322, 330 (1978)
("[T]he starting point for every case involving construction of a statute is the lan-
guage of the statute itself."); Butler v. Ysleta Indep. Sch. Dist., 161 F.3d 263, 268 (5th
Cir. 1998) (stating that the touchstone for interpreting Title VII is the words of the
statute).
377 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1994).
378 Smith, 189 F.3d at 535 ("There is no assumption-of-risk defense to charges of
workplace discrimination."); Williams, 187 F.3d at 564 ("[J]udgments by the court as
to a woman's assumption of risk upon entering a hostile environment are im-
proper."); Moteles v. Univ. of Pa., 730 F.2d 913, 922 n.2 (3d Cir. 1984) (Becker, J.,
dissenting from the denial of rehearing) ("There is no 'assumption of risk' defense
recognized in Title VII."). See generally Kelly Ann Cahill, Hooters: Should There Be an
Assumption of Risk Defense to Some Hostile Work Environment Sexual Harassment Claims?, 48
VAND. L. REV. 1107 (1995).
379 There are three important qualifications to the rule (which is literally true)
that temporary forbearance alone will not preclude liability. First, under Faragher and
Ellerth, a plaintiff who fails to promptly report harassment might be barred from re-
covering if her employer can establish the plaintiffs forbearance was unreasonable
and that it took prompt action to prevent or correct the harassment. See Faragher v.
City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 806-07 (1998) (holding that the plaintiff's decision
not to complain of hostile environment harassment, where the employer took reason-
able efforts to prevent or correct harassment, can preclude liability under Title VII);
Parkins v. Civil Constructors of II1., 163 F.3d 1027, 1038 (7th Cir. 1998) ("'[T]he law
against sexual harassment is not self enforcing' and an employer cannot be expected
to correct harassment unless the employee makes a concerted effort to inform the
employer that a problem exists."). Second, an employee must file a charge of discrim-
ination with the EEOC within 180 days (or 300 days if filed with a state administrative
agency) of the incidents of harassment about which he complains. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
5(e). Finally, a failure to complain is evidence that the alleged conduct was welcome
or not severe (or never occurred at all) and thus could be quite devastating to a
plaintiff's case. See Mosher v. Dollar Tree Stores, Inc., 240 F.3d 662, 667 (7th Cir.
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such diverse bases as race, color, sex, religion, and national origin, the
statute applies the same prohibition to all these types of discrimina-
tion, °80 regardless of the particular culture of a workplace, suggesting
that plaintiffs of all workplaces should all be treated equally.
Where a statute fails to suggest a contrary intent, as here, uni-
formity in application is the presumed course of action. 38 ' This
means that similar cases are to be treated similarly, and that the same
level of scrutiny should be applied across the board regardless of
whether the workplace is populated with common ruffians or cultured
royalty. From the White House to the warehouse, Tide VII was in-
tended to impose the same standards on employers and their employ-
ees. The text of the statute reveals nothing to the contrary, and even
the Supreme Court has suggested that there should be one general
standard for different types of hostile environment harassment-
whether based on race, sex, religion, or age-to the extent feasible.
3 82
This lack of textual support has led the Fourth Circuit to comment:
"We are unable to discern an 'inhospitable environment' exception to
Tide VII's mandate that employers may not discriminate based on em-
ployee's [sic] gender as to the 'terms, conditions, or privileges of em-
ployment."' 3 83 In that case, the district court had concluded that
2001) ("Although an employee facing a discriminatory or harassing work environ-
ment is not required to file suit before resigning, failure to object to egregious condi-
tions or to seek some form of redress is compelling evidence that the employee, or
any reasonable worker, would not find the conditions intolerable.").
380 See42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1).
381 Furthermore, "remedial statutes... are to be construed liberally." Collinsgru
v. Palmyra Bd. of Educ., 161 F.3d 225, 232 (3d Cir. 1998) (holding that a remedial
provision should be liberally construed to give a remedy in all cases intended to be
covered) (citing Miller v. Robertson, 266 U.S. 243, 248 (1924)). For a sound criticism
of this rule, see Stomper v. Amalgamated Transit Union Local 241, 27 F.3d 316, 320
(7th Cir. 1994). There, the court stated:
Plaintiffs stress that the LMRDA is a remedial measure and seek a liberal
construction. This maxim is useless in deciding concrete cases. Every statute
is remedial in the sense that it alters the law or favors one group over an-
other.... But after we determine that a law favors some group, the question
becomes: How much does it favor them? Knowing that a law is remedial does
not tell a court how far to go. Every statute has a stopping point, beyond
which, Congress concluded, the costs of doing more are excessive-or be-
yond which the interest groups opposed to the law were able to block fur-
ther progress. A court must determine not only the direction in which a law
points but also how far to go in that direction.
Id.
382 See Faraglwr, 524 U.S. at 787 n.1 ("[W]e think there is good sense in seeking
generally to harmonize the standards of what amounts to actionable harassment.").
383 Conner v. Schrader-Bridgeport Int'l, Inc., 227 F.3d 179, 194 (4th Cir. 2000).
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some of the comments at issue "were simply insufficient to constitute
harassment, in light of the 'rugged environment' of physically de-
manding work ... 38 4 The Fourth Circuit rejected the view that the
text of Title VII permits an exception for harassment that takes place
in the context of strenuous work, or that social context should even
enter the analysis.
It is important, however, to keep in mind that although Title VII
does not explicitly endorse an examination of social context, the stat-
ute also does not explicitly mention "hostile environment" nor even
the term "harassment. s38 5 Not only are these terms not mentioned in
the statute, they are left undefined. Although Congress significantly
amended the statute in 1991, nothing was done to remedy these "over-
sights." The normal assumption in such situations is that this failure
to legislate was intentional, possibly because Congress could not reach
a consensus on the issue38 6 or because Congress intended courts to
use their own judgment in defining these essential terms.3s7 This is,
of course, a basic function of courts in the common-law system.
"Broadly worded constitutional and statutory provisions necessarily
have been given concrete meaning and application by a process of
case-by-case judicial decisions in the common-law tradition."388 Be-
cause Title VII "does not use the term [sexual harassment] or other-
wise refer specifically to the conduct described by it, the metes and
bounds of the wrong have been left for definition by the
courts .... ,,389 If that is so, the lack of textual support for a close
examination of workplace culture is not a fatal, or even a particularly
sound, criticism.
384 Id.
385 Ford v. West, 222 F.3d 767, 775 (10th Cir. 2000) ("[T]itle VII does not explic-
itly mention hostile work environment."); Mendoza v. Borden, 195 F.3d 1238, 1244
(11th Cir. 1999) ("Title VII does not mention sexual harassment."); Fitzgerald v. Ford
Marrin Esposito Witmeyer & Gleser, L.L.P., 153 F. Supp. 2d 219, 228 (S.D.N.Y. 2001)
("The statute does not literally deal with sexual harassment.").
386 See POSNER, supra note 356, at 251 ("One way to achieve compromise is to use
general language, in effect shoving off on the courts the task of completing the legis-
lation."); Mary Ann Glendon, Foundations of Human Rights: The Unfinished Business, 44
AM.J.JuRus. 1, 10 (1999) ("[P]ractical agreements... are achieved only at the price of
a certain ambiguity.").
387 See POSNER, supra note 347, at 590 ("The costs of legislative enactment imply
that statutes will often be ambiguous. After all, one way to reduce the cost of agree-
ment is to agree on less-to leave difficult issues for future resolution by the courts.").
388 N.W. Airlines, Inc. v. Transp. Workers Union, AFL-CIO, 451 U.S. 77, 95
(1981).
389 Guess v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 913 F.2d 463, 464 (7th Cir. 1990).
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Although the decision by courts to consider workplace culture
involves more of an evidentiary issue than a substantive issue, even if it
is assumed that this approach effects a substantive change in the law,
the Supreme Court in Oncale was free to make such an alteration of
hostile environment law. If courts are free to fill the gaps in statutes
left by Congress,390 they are also free to create the standards and bur-
dens of, as well as defenses to, hostile environment claims. Once this
is done, courts certainly may consider evidence relevant to these vari-
ous facets of a harassment claim, including evidence of workplace cul-
ture. The Supreme Court has so understood its creative role in
hostile environment law. Along these lines, although there is no real
textual support for an application of the avoidable consequences doc-
trine to Title VII, in Faragher and Ellerth the Supreme Court applied a
modified (and more defendant-friendly)3 91 version of this doctrine to
supervisory harassment cases.392 Faragher and Ellerth's adoption of the
avoidable consequences doctrine is simply one manifestation of this
practice. Discrimination is a statutory employment tort;3 93 therefore
the courts have frequently looked to common-law tort doctrines to
create the common law of Title VII. They have liberally adopted many
tort principles in crafting the statutory torts of Title VII and similar
390 This gap filling role is a significant part of a court's duties, especially with re-
spect to labor and employment laws. See San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon,
359 U.S. 236, 240 (1959) ("This Court was called upon to apply a new and compli-
cated legislative scheme, the aims and social policy of which were drawn with broad
strokes while the details had to be filled in, to not small extent, by the judicial pro-
cess.") (referencing the NLRA). When the text of a statute does not specifically speak
to an issue, "courts are left with no choice but to construct a rule that makes the best
sense, while adhering as closely as possible to what we can discern Congress would
have wanted." Rizzo v. Children's World Learning Ctrs., 213 F.3d 209, 220-21 (5th
Cir. 2000) (en banc) (Jones & Smith,JJ., dissenting), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 958 (2000).
391 See Savino v. C.P. Hall Co., 199 F.3d 925, 934-35 (7th Cir. 1999) (noting.that
the avoidable consequences doctrine of tort law only reduces a defendant's level of
liability, and does not completely preclude liability; but under Faragher and Ellerth's
incorporation of the doctrine, it can result in complete absolution from liability).
392 See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807 (1998) (holding that
failure to complain of harassment where employer took reasonable steps to prevent it
precludes liability); Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 764 (1998) (limit-
ing employer liability could encourage employees to report harassing conduct before
it becomes severe or pervasive and would serve Title VII's deterrent purpose).
393 Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 264 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concur-
ring) (stating that Title VII created a "statutory employment 'tort'");Jansen v. Packag-
ing Corp. of Am., 123 F.3d 490, 506 (7th Cir. 1997) (Posner, C.J,, concurring in part
and dissenting in part) ("Title VII creates a statutory tort of employment discrimina-
tion.... ."); Fenton v. Hisan, Inc., 174 F.3d 827, 829 (6th Cir. 1989) (hostile environ-
ment harassment is a statutory tort); Miller v. Bank of Am., 600 F.2d 211, 213 (9th Cir.
1979) ("Title VII and § 1981 define wrongs that are a type of tort .. ").
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statutes, some of which inure solely to the benefit of defendants.
These tort principles include the doctrine of avoidable consequences
mentioned above,3 94 respondeat superior liability,395 the discovery
rule,3 96 shifting burdens of proof,397 the fellow servant rule,398 princi-
ples of causation, 399 the eggshell skull rule,400 and others.40 1 It stands
to reason, then, that courts may take the less-drastic step of focusing
on workplace culture as one factor applicable to the analysis of the
hostile environment tort, especially considering that social context is
highly relevant to unwelcomeness, severity, and causation. Some crit-
ics have argued that the courts which consider workplace culture have
created a special defense for blue-collar employers or have even cre-
ated a more lenient standard of conduct for blue-collar workplaces.
Although these charges are largely unfounded, it is worth noting that
Congress has apparently given courts the authority to create a quasi-
defense based on workplace culture, or even a less-strict blue-collar
394 See Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 764 ("Title VII borrows from tort law the avoidable con-
sequences doctrine."); Ford Motor Co. v. EEOC, 458 U.S. 219, 231 n.15 (1982).
395 See Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 764; Sauers v. Salt Lake County, 1 F.3d 1122, 1125 (10th
Cir. 1993); Miller, 600 F.2d at 213.
396 See Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385, 393 (1982) (discovery
rule).
397 See Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 264 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("[T]he com-
mon law of torts has long shifted the burden of proof to multiple defendants. .. ").
398 See Guess v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 913 F.2d 463, 465 (Title VII uses a "negli-
gence standard that closely resembles the 'fellow servant' rule" in assessing co-worker
hostile environment cases.).
399 See Buenrostro v. Collazo, 973 F.2d 39, 45 (1st Cir. 1992) ("[P]irinciples of cau-
sation borrowed from tort law are relevant to civil rights actions brought under
§ 1983.").
400 See Avitia v. Metro. Club of Chi., Inc., 49 F.3d 1219, 1228 (7th Cir. 1995)
(FLSA) ("In a statutory tort case as in a common law tort case, the 'eggshell skull' rule
prevails, so it is no defense to an award of full damages that the plaintiff's injury was
amplified by a preexisting condition for which the defendant was not responsible.");
see alsoJenson v. Eveleth Taconite Co., 130 F.3d 1287, 1294 (8th Cir. 1997) (Title VII);
Doty v. Sewall, 908 F.2d 1053, 1059 (1st Cir. 1990) (NLRA). It is worth noting that
proponents of women-specific standards could look to the eggshell skull principle for
support of their position, as the "eggshell plaintiff" rule requires the defendant to
take his victim as he finds her, arguably delicate sensibilities and all. See Pierce v. S.
Pac. Transp. Co., 823 F.2d 1366, 1372 n.2 (9th Cir. 1987) (FELA) ("When an emo-
tional injury causes physical manifestations of distress we can see no principled reason
why the eggshell plaintiff rule should not apply.").
401 See Kolstad v. Am. Dental Ass'n, 527 U.S. 526, 540 (1999) (limiting principal's
liability for punitive damages); Baskerville v. Culligan Int'l Co., 50 F.3d 428, 432 (7th
Cir. 1995) ("What is reasonable depends on the gravity of the harassment. Just as in
conventional tort law a potential injurer is required to take more care, other things
being equal, to prevent catastrophic accidents than to prevent minor ones.").
[VOL- 77:2
2002] SOCIAL CONTEXT IN HOSTILE ENVIRONMENT LITIGATION 521
standard for hostile harassment cases, even though the text of Title
VII does not explicitly ordain this course of action. The courts' power
to fill gaps in statutes entails the ability to redress judge-made defects
in the judge-made hostile environment standard as those problems
become apparent. Courts could do this by reforming or defining in
greater detail those aspects of the hostile environment standard that
have proven problematic for courts and litigants alike. Accordingly,
the argument that an examination of workplace culture is not sup-
ported by the text of Title VII is not particularly cogent.
B. Flawed Motivation Analysis
As discussed above, some courts find support for their examina-
tion of culture in the "because of sex" language of Title VII. 402 They
reason that, when a work environment is already saturated with sexual
innuendo, foul language, and childish behavior even before the arri-
val of the plaintiff, its continuation probably had nothing to do with
the plaintiffs sex. Rather, it is reasonable to assume that the foul lan-
guage and unpleasant behavior are typical of the particular culture of
the workplace. The problem with this reasoning, it is argued; is its
inaccuracy. The plaintiff might well have been harassed because of
her sex even though others in the same environment were subjected
to similar conduct for other reasons. It is possible that the motivation
for the sexual banter changed with the advent of the plaintiff.
Because it is hard to tell what a harasser's true motivations are,
and indeed the harasser might have multiple motivations,40 3 critics
argue that it is best to leave this question to the jury and that a consid-
eration of social context cannot give foolproof results in the causation
analysis. Consider for example, Pirolli v. World F/avors,4 0 4 where a re-
tarded man was subject to ridicule and violence, he claimed, because
of his sex and disability.40 5 In its milder forms, the conduct at issue
included making fun of the way the plaintiff walked, ate, drank, and
sat.40 6 The more severe manifestations included punching him, stuff-
ing him in a garbage can, and throwing objects at him.40 7 It was un-
disputed that horseplay and juvenile behavior was a regular part of the
462 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (a) (1) (1994) ("It shall be an unlawful employment prac-
tice for an employer-.., to discriminate ... because of such individual's race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin... .") (emphasis added).
403 See, e.g., Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 258-61 (1989) (mixed-
motives case).
404 No. 98-3596, 1999 WL 1065214 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 23, 1999).
405 Id. at *3.
406 See id. at *1.
407 See id. at *1, *4.
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work environment, and that employees other than the plaintiff were
also subject to taunts and roughhousing.
4b8
On summary judgment, the district court held that, because wo-
men were subjected to similar treatment, there was little to suggest
that the plaintiff's treatment was due to his sex. 409 The court used a
similar rationale when holding that Pirolli failed to create an issue for
trial on his disability harassment claim: other non-retarded individuals
were also subject to similar horseplay, suggesting that Pirolli's treat-
ment was not based on his disability.410 Of course, considering the
social context that existed, it may have been that Pirolli's colleagues
were simply fun-loving fellows who wanted Pirolli to feel like one of
the regular guys. But it is also possible that some of their treatment
was due to his disability. Although Pirolli's male and female col-
leagues were indisputably subjected to similar conduct, the district
court's opinion makes no mention of their being ridiculed for their
deficient mental abilities or for the way they talked. Importantly, to
withstand summary judgment, Pirolli only had to create a genuine is-
sue for trial. And to prevail on this issue, Pirolli only had to show that
a reasonable jury could believe that his sex or disability was a motivat-
ing factor of the conduct.411
To be a motivating factor,
the forbidden criterion must be a significant reason for the em-
ployer's action. It must make such a difference in the outcome of
events that it can fairly be characterized as the catalyst which
prompted the employer to take the adverse employment action,
and a factor without which the employer would not have acted.412
A prohibited motivating factor need not be the sole factor moti-
vating the harassment.413 Thus, a hostile environment plaintiff does
not have the burden of showing that the prohibited reason was the
only cause of the harassment; This, more than anything else, demon-
strates a possible flaw in the district court's reasoning. Even if. the
harassment of other non-disabled employees definitively demon-
strates that the plaintiff was not harassed solely because of his disability,
408 See id. at *5.
409 See id. at *6.
410 See id. at *7.
411 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (1994) ("Except as otherwise provided in this sub-
chapter, an unlawful employment practice is established when the complaining party
demonstrates that race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating factor
for any employment practice, even though other factors also motivated the practice.") (em-
phasis added).
412 Foster v. Arthur Andersen, L.L.P., 168 F.3d 1029, 1033-34 (7th Cir. 1998).
413 See id.
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this is not the test for liability. It is possible that the harasser also
mistreated the plaintiff for reasons that are not unlawful. Even then,
the defendant will be liable for the harassment if the prohibited crite-
rion was a motivating factor of the ill treatment.
Furthermore, suppose that Pirolli and his non-retarded col-
leagues had been subjected to similar mistreatment in the sense that
all of them were ridiculed and assaulted. But also suppose that the
plaintiff's mistreatment was more severe and frequent than that which
his colleagues endured. In such a case, it is at least plausible that
these additional dimensions of mistreatment were due to Pirolli's disa-
bility. Focusing on the childish workplace culture, however, might cut
short further analysis of the claim. Courts adopting this practice
might reason that Pirolli's treatment was not due to his disability be-
cause other non-retarded co-workers were treated similarly. But ac-
cording to the hypothetical facts, because of its frequency and severity,
the dissimilarity between Pirolli's treatment and that of his colleagues
is greater than any similarity they may share.414 Thus, emphasizing
the workplace culture presents the danger of a false negative.
One problem with this criticism, however, is its presumption that
courts will not grasp the nuances of a case and that they cannot differ-
entiate between background culture of a workplace and disparate
treatment of a plaintiff. The Eighth Circuit, however, has shown that
most courts are quite capable of making the necessary distinctions.
Facing a case similar to Pirolli, the Eighth Circuit correctly decided
that harsher harassment directed at one group-true disparate treat-
ment-sufficiently demonstrates the harasser's motivation. In Kopp v.
Samaritan Health System, Inc., the hospital defended a hostile environ-
ment suit by showing that the harasser mistreated both men and wo-
men.415 The Eighth Circuit agreed that both groups of hospital
employees were subjected to inhospitable treatment. Nevertheless, it
held that there was sufficient evidence that the harassment of the fe-
male plaintiff was "because of sex" in light of the more serious harass-
414 In attempting to make out a prima facie case of discrimination where the
plaintiff was punished for an infraction, he usually must show that other individuals
who also committed misconduct were treated better than him (i.e., he must show a
difference in treatment). In demonstrating this similarity, courts require the plaintiff
to show that his infraction was similar in kind and degree to that committed by the
better-treated co-employee. See Radue v. Kimberly Clark Corp., 219 F.3d 612, 617
(7th Cir. 2000). It seems reasonable, then, that employers claiming the benefit of a
blue-collar standard should likewise be compelled to show that mistreatment of an
employee was similar to the mistreatment endured by other employees not in the
plaintiff's class.
415 13 F.3d 264, 269 (8th Cir. 1993).
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ment suffered by women.416 Presumably other courts will also be able
to see this distinction, and, thus, they do not need to turn a blind eye
to workplace culture simply to avoid false negatives. True, a consider-
ation of workplace culture is not error-proof, but it is relevant to the
analysis of the harasser's motivation. And, the magnitude of its utility
is far greater than the danger that it might distort the analysis.
The main criticism of the Pirolli court's use of social context can
be traced to the fact that there were no other disabled individuals in
Pirolli's workplace. The workplace culture analysis is most effective
when the workplace contains more than one member of the plaintiff's
protected class. This allows the court to see with greater certainty
what motivated the behavior at issue, because if there are two mem-
bers of a class in the workplace-say, a female plaintiff and a female
co-worker-and only one is harassed, it is likely that the harassment
was not due to the common trait. Similarly, if one is harassed along
with men, it is also likely that the harassment was not due to the plain-
tiff's sex. If both females are harassed, along with men, it is also un-
likely that the conduct is due to the plaintiff's sex. If, however, both
women are mistreated, and men are not, it is more likely that the har-
assment was due to their sex. Still, the inference behind a considera-
tion of workplace culture in the causation analysis-that offensive
conduct which existed prior to the plaintiff's arrival, or which is also
borne by men, or which is traditionally part of such workplaces, is not
substantially motivated by the plaintiffs sex-remains reasonable
even if there is only one member of a protected class in the particular
workplace. It simply commands less certainty than its employment in
a situation where other workers subjected to the same treatment share
the protected trait.
Thus, because Pirolli was the only disabled individual at that
workplace, there is less certainty that the horseplay existed regardless
of the plaintiffs disability. But that conclusion is still reasonable, es-
pecially because conduct similar to that at issue in the case existed in
the workplace prior to Pirolli's arrival there, and non-disabled people
were subjected to the same treatment. Notably, absolute certainty is
not required for summary judgment, just the failure of the plaintiff to
create a genuine issue for trial, which Pirolli failed to do. The district
court's analysis of social context undoubtedly assisted the court in re-
416 Id. ("[T] he incidents involving female employees are of a more serious nature
than those involving male employees. For example, several of Albaghdadi's alleged
abuses of women involve actual physical contact and harm; all of the incidents involv-
ing male employees consist only of a raised voice or a verbal insult.").
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alizing the plaintiffs failure, thus demonstrating its value in such
cases.
C. Workplace Culture and Unwelcomeness
Those courts that emphasize workplace culture in their analysis
of welcomeness are also accused of utilizing flawed logic. According
to critics, these courts assume that any plaintiff who would consent to
work in an environment filled with vulgarities must not find such be-
havior objectionable. 417 This charge is unfounded. It is true that
some employees will tolerate vulgarity and abuse, not because they
welcome it, but because they think they have no other choice, whether
economically or legally. Not surprisingly, then, most courts have held
that an initial failure to object to abusive conduct is not necessarily
fatal to a harassment claim. Among them is the Supreme Court,
which in Meritor Savings Bank, F.S.B. v. Vinson held that even though
the plaintiff consented to some of the harassment from her supervi-
sor, this did not in itself prove that all of the harassment was welcome
and certainly did not preclude a hostile environment claim.
418
But the Vinson Court never held that the plaintiff's behavior was
never relevant to unwelcomeness or that a court could never grant
summary judgment on the unwelcomeness element when taking into
account the plaintiff's participation in the harassment. Rather, the
Court observed that the plaintiffs reluctance to complain about cer-
tain conduct is certainly relevant to the question of unwelcomeness,
and thus in some egregious cases, it might preclude recovery.419 Ac-
cordingly, this criticism of courts that remain sensitive to workplace
culture-including aspects of the plaintiffs behavior that are consis-
tent with that culture-fails to take into account the degree to which
the plaintiff's behavior may enter the analysis of unwelcomeness. Cer-
417 See, e.g., Reed v. Shepard, 939 F.2d 484, 487 (7th Cir. 1991). But remember, it
is reasonable to assume that a plaintiff who fails to complain about working condi-
tions either did not find them unwelcome or did not perceive them as severe. See
Mosher v. Dollar Tree Stores, Inc., 240 F.3d 662, 667 (7th Cir. 2001) ("Although an
employee facing a discriminatory or harassing work environment is not required to
file suit before resigning, failure to object to egregious conditions or to seek some
form of redress is compelling evidence that the employee, or any reasonable worker,
would not find the conditions intolerable."). True, the plaintiff's reticence might be
attributable to something else-say, fear-but that does not obviate the reasonable-
ness of a presumption that a failure to complain indicates that the plaintiff was not
seriously offended.
418 See Meritor Say. Bank, F.S.B. v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 68, 69 (1986) (stating that
voluntariness in the sense of consent is not a defense to a hostile environment claim,
although it is relevant to the question of welcomeness).
419 See id.
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tainly not every harassment claim that arises in an inhospitable envi-
ronment is ascribable to that culture, and some employees may
continue working there, without complaining, even though they find
the background culture objectionable. But where a plaintiff in such
an environment revels in this culture, and invites sexual attention, it is
not unreasonable to factor this into the hostile environment analysis.
Again, courts must exercise sound judgment in analyzing work-
place culture and its relevance to unwelcomeness. Obviously a plain-
tiff who execrates co-workers may not be immune to similar abuse
directed at him; but a court may reasonably presume that a plaintiff
who frequently tells dirty jokes is not offended-and offensiveness is
closely related to unwelcomeness-by similar vulgarity spouted by
other employees. Additionally, a plaintiff whose tongue is no stranger
to all sorts of invectives cannot credibly complain that hearing similar
epithets greatly offends his sensibilities, for if he is that sensitive to
vulgarity, he would not use such language himself. Not surprisingly,
then, the courts that pay attention to workplace culture frequently do
so only when the plaintiff has participated in sexually-based conversa-
tions and conduct similar to that which he complains about in his suit,
and only when the plaintiff's participation cannot be described as an
incidental occurrence. Where courts show this sensitivity, there is lit-
tle danger that they will mistake a legitimate harassment claim for a
simple manifestation of workplace culture. They are not, as some
courts have charged, creating a defense of unclean hands, or unclean
tongues, or assumption of risk.420 Rather, they are properly assessing
the claims according to the totality of the circumstances, which in-
cludes the social context in which the harassment occurred.
D. Turning Title VII on Its Head-Creating Perverse Incentives
Some critics also charge that focusing on workplace culture al-
lows employers to use past and pervasive harassment to shield them-
selves from liability. An employer, so the criticism goes, thus has a
perverse incentive to make his workplace more blue-collar by permit-
ting vulgarity and boorish behavior, as this will lead reviewing courts
to perceive any actual harassment as part of the social context of the
workplace. Thus, the severity and pervasiveness of harassment, which
should be grounds for liability, are actually used to protect the em-
420 See, e.g., Williams v. Gen. Motors Corp., 187 F.3d 553, 564 (6th Cir. 1999)
("JUludgments by the court as to a woman's assumption of risk upon entering a hos-
tile environment are improper."); Moteles v. Univ. of Pa., 730 F.2d 913, 922 n.2 (3d
Cir. 1984) (BeckerJ., dissenting from the denial of rehearing) ("There is no 'assump-
tion of risk' defense recognized in Title VII.").
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ployer. Smart employers, it is argued, will tolerate, and even ensure,
that their workplaces are sufficiently offensive as to be considered
blue-collar.42 1 The more a workplace mirrors the lax mores of society,
the greater the chance the employer has of prevailing in a Title VII
Suit.
422
In Jackson v. Quanex Corp., the Sixth Circuit used these arguments
to criticize the practice of focusing on workplace culture. 42 3 In Jack-
son, the EEOC required Quanex Corp. to hire more black workers;
among these was plaintiff Linda Jackson, who worked as a saw and
furnace operator in a factory.424 Apparently some of these newly-
hired employees bumped white workers from their positions, and so
they became unpopular with some of the whites. The plaintiff over-
heard anti-black comments and jokes, including references to black
employees as "niggers," employees talking about "nigger-rigging"
equipment and their desire not to work for a "nigger," and that "no
nigger was going to bump a white woman. '42 5 The district court
granted judgment as a matter of law for the defendant, in part be-
cause most of the alleged harassment was not directed at the plaintiff,
many of the alleged incidents were outside the statute of limitations,
and because racial slurs and the telling of racial jokes seemed to be
"conventional conditions on the factory floor," and thus not because
of the plaintiff's race.4 26 In reversing, the Sixth Circuit criticized the
district court's reasoning because it "renders less actionable racial in-
cidents in the workplace so common as to constitute, in his mind,
'conventional conditions on the factory floor' . ."427 This, the court
421 SeeJackson v. Quanex Corp., 191 F.3d 647, 662 (6th Cir. 1999).
422 As the Second Circuit submits: Title VII "might require standards higher than
those of the street." Gallagher v. Delaney, 139 F.3d 338, 342 (2d Cir. 1998). But in
fact, Title VII only requires parity, or rough equality of treatment. Of course, an
employer who permits some of its employees to mistreat both men and women
equally, while not subject to liability under Title VII, could face a lawsuit under state
tort law. For example, an employer might be held liable for intentional infliction of
emotional distress or battery. The advantage to such a claim, from a fairness and
deterrence standpoint, is that the offending employee will also be subject to liability,
an advantage that Title VII plaintiffs (and defendants) do not enjoy. Personal liability
would give employees a strong incentive to police their own conduct, and since they
are the party in the best position to do so, it seems sensible.
423 Jackson, 191 F.3d at 662.
424 Id. at 650.
425 Id. at 651.
426 See id. at 656, 659.
427 Id. at 660 (citation omitted).
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of appeals thought, condones "racially harassing conduct the more
prevalent that conduct becomes."428 It held:
[T] he district court was wrong to condone continuing racial slurs
and graffiti on the grounds that they occurred in a blue collar envi-
ronment. We have deemed such reasoning illogical in the context
of sexual harassment, "because it means that the more hostile the
environment, and the more prevalent the sexism, the more difficult
it is for a Title VII plaintiff to prove that sex-based conduct is suffi-
ciently severe or pervasive to constitute a hostile work
environment."
4 29
In a sex harassment case, a divided panel of the Seventh Circuit
expressed similar views:
It is true that the severity of alleged harassment must be assessed in
light of the social mores of American workers and workplace cul-
ture.., but nothing in Oncale even hints at the idea that prevailing
culture can excuse discriminatory actions. Employers who tolerate
workplaces marred by exclusionary practices and bigoted attitudes
cannot use their discriminatory pasts to shield them from the pre-
sent-day mandate of Title VII.
430
These courts have recognized that "American popular culture
can, on occasion, be highly sexist and offensive. What is, is not always
what is right, and reasonable people can take justifiable offense at
comments that the vulgar among us, even if they are a majority, would
consider acceptable." 43 1 Accordingly, these courts would not place
428 Id.
429 Id. at 662 (quoting Williams v. Gen. Motors Corp., 187 F.3d 553, 564 (6th Cir.
1999)). The Federal Circuit has expresses similar sentiments:
[N]o principled argument supports the view that sex-based offensive behav-
ior in the workplace is immune from remedy simply because it may be cul-
turally tolerated outside of the workplace. The purpose of Title VII is not to
import into the workplace the prejudices of the community, but through law
to liberate the workplace from the demeaning influence of discrimination,
and thereby to implement the goals of human dignity and economic equal-
ity in employment.
King v. Hillen, 21 F.3d 1572, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
430 Smith v. Sheahan, 189 F.3d 529, 535 (7th Cir. 1999). The Smith court failed to
realize that the "present-day mandate of Tide VII" is that there be no discrimination
"because of" sex and that harassment because of sex is only prohibited when it is
severe and unwelcome. Title VII does not mandate that all workplaces receive the
Miss Manners seal of approval. They can be "marred by exclusionary practices and
bigoted attitudes" and a host of other undesirables, so long as there is no severely
offensive and unwelcome harassment that is motivated by the victim's sex, race, color,
religion, or national origin.
431 Torres v. Pisano, 116 F.3d 625, 633 n.7 (2d Cir. 1997). Of course, the problem
with the Torres court's analysis is that conduct which the majority finds inoffensive,
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any particular emphasis on analyzing claims in the context of the
background culture, since it is that culture that generates harassment.
They believe, moreover, that considering harassment in light of the
general unpleasantness of the workplace culture would create a per-
verse incentive for employers to make their worksites offensive, as the
more offensive the workplace the easier it is to camouflage severe sex-
based harassment.
It should be recognized, however, that the perverse incentives
this criticism envisions are a little far fetched. What employer, after
all, is going to encourage conduct that might constitute harassment,
out of a hope that if he is ever sued for harassment his workplace will
be judged to be sufficiently injurious that the plaintiff cannot claim
severity, unwelcomeness, or discriminatory motivation? First of all, at
some point the increased unpleasantness of a workplace will nega-
tively affect productivity and employer's ability to retain employees
with firm-specific skills. As these factors are related to the employer's
ability to generate profits, and generating profits is presumably the
goal of the firm, no employer in his right mind would jeopardize prof-
its by intentionally creating an unpleasant environment simply to in-
crease his chances convincing a court that any harassment was simply
a manifestation of background culture.
Second, because of the uncertainty of the reasonable person stan-
dard, even when courts properly consider workplace culture, such an
employer is taking a great risk that he will encourage too much bad
conduct and that he will face general liability along with punitive dam-
ages. Furthermore, he will also preclude himself from being able to
assert the Faragher/Ellerth affirmative defense. It would be much easier
for an employer simply to over-regulate his workplace and prohibit all
off-color remarks andjoking. Although these efforts may never prove
completely successful, and could be costly, they (1) might be sufficient
to prevent actionable harassment from ever occurring, (2) might con-
stitute sufficient care so as to preclude liability under the negligence
standard of co-worker harassment, and (3) may constitute sufficient
efforts to prevent or correct harassment as to satisfy the employer's
prong of the Faragher/Ellerth affirmative defense. In short, employers
have strong incentives to create hospitable workplaces.
Finally, even if an employer were foolish enough to tolerate har-
assment with the hope that he can later escape liability by pointing to
the social context of the workplace, courts will be able to see through
this and will adjust their analysis accordingly. Sensitivity to workplace
assuming they are reasonable people, cannot as a matter of law be actionable under
Title VII because reasonable pe 6 ple do not find it severely offensive.
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culture exists because courts realize that the workplace culture often
exists regardless of and despite the employer. Workers, as products of
their particular cultures, cannot help but bring some of that culture
into the workplace, and an employer should not be penalized for
those aspects of culture that he cannot change. In contrast, where an
employer negatively alters the nature of the work environment, or
should know that employees are suffering discriminatory harassment,
courts are smart enough not to permit such an employer to hide be-
hind workplace culture.
CONCLUSION
Lately there has been a noticeable coarsening of American cul-
ture, including workplace culture. 43 2 Because of limits placed on the
government by the Supreme Court's First Amendmentjurisprudence,
it is generally believed that the government is largely powerless to
stem the tide of vulgarity that passes for entertainment in modern
America. This is unfortunate, because what society is culturing is its
future citizens, and America has already seen some of the ill effects of
lyrics that glorify violence against women and the weak.433 This may
simply be a foretaste of what is to come.434
One aspect of this modem culture is a fascination with all things
sexual.43 5 Not surprisingly, this and other aspects of general culture
have made their way into the workplaces of America and are now a
regular staple of some work environments. Title VII, which prohibits
hostile environment harassment, has been invoked against workplace
vulgarity and childishness. However, Title VII is violated only when
harassment is severely offensive, unwelcome, and based on the plain-
tiff's sex or other protected attribute. Realizing that courts often have
difficulty in making these assessments, the Supreme Court offered
some advice: look to the social context of the workplace, as it can be
432 See generally ROBERT H. BORK, SLOUCHING TOWARDS GOMORRAH: MODERN LIBER-
ALISM AND AMERICAN DECLINE (1996).
433 "Where can you get the idea that sexual violence against women is fun? From
a music store, through Walkman earphones, from boom boxes blaring forth the rap
lyrics of 2 Live Crew." GEORGE F. WILL, America's Slide into the Sewer, in THE LEVELING
WIND 13, 13 (1994) (discussing the Central Park "wilding" incident).
434 "[T] he most important determinant of crime is probably the culture of a given
society." Gerard V. Bradley, Retribution and the Secondary Aims.of Punishment, 44 Am. J.
JuRIs. 105, 110 (1999).
435 "The social air is heavily scented with sex. It saturates commerce and amuse-
ment-advertising, entertainment, recreation." WILL, Sex Amidst Semicolons, in THE
LEVELING WIND, supra note 433, at 31, 31 (1994).
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helpful in making these essential determinations. 436 Although the
Court's command is susceptible of several constructions, interpreting
"social context" to mean "workplace culture" makes good sense be-
cause workplace culture is highly relevant to three essential elements
of a hostile environment case: unwelcomeness, severe offensiveness,
and motivation.
That is, some of the vulgarity that is labeled "harassment" is not
caused by the plaintiff's womanhood, but on the culture's distorted
sense of manhood. Similarly, because this juvenile behavior is omni-
present, its severity is greatly attenuated for all but the most reclusive
plaintiffs. By reminding courts that they must consider the "social
context" in which purported harassment occurs, the Oncale Court was
restating its admonition from Harris that a hostile environment must
be judged within the totality of the circumstances, 437 and the culture
of the workplace is perhaps the most important part of this "totality."
The Fifth, Seventh, Eighth, Tenth, and District of Columbia Circuits
have appreciated this fact and accordingly have judged harassment
claims with a sensitivity to the culture in which the incidents occurred.
By doing so, these courts have helped to ensure that Title VII does not
become more of a workplace civility code than it already has. These
courts have also given slightly greater definition to the hostile environ-
ment standard and thereby increased the certainty and predictability
of the standard.
Not surprisingly, even some of the courts that disparage the em-
phasis placed on workplace culture agree that this culture must be
taken into account.438 They agree that this is one facet of the "social
context" analysis mandated by Oncale.439 These courts are correct
that, taken too far, the social context analysis can result in erroneous
rulings. But this is hardly a good reason for abandoning such a useful
tool, and indeed critics have failed to identify a case where a court
gave social context inordinate weight in assessing a hostile environ-
ment claim. Still other courts have suggested that workplace culture
or the inhospitable work environment should not enter into the evalu-
ation of motivation, severity, or unwelcomeness. As demonstrated
above, these courts object on a whole host of grounds, none of which
436 Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 82 (1998).
437 Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 23 (1993).
438 Smith v. Sheahan, 189 F.3d 529, 534-35 (7th Cir. 1999) ("[T]he severity of
alleged harassment must be assessed in light of the social mores of American workers
and workplace culture."); Williams v. Gen. Motors Corp., 187 F.3d 553, 571 (6th Cir.
1999) ("[T]he customary 'culture,' or lack of it, in a particular workplace is part of
the totality of the circumstances to be taken into account.").
439 Smith, 189 F.3d at 534-35 (citing Oncale, 523 U.S. at 75).
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have much merit. They have not demonstrated that the background
culture of a workplace is contrary to Title VII or is irrelevant to the
hostile environment analysis. These courts have simply demonstrated
that problems can arise when workplace culture is over-emphasized, a
danger inherent in any analytic tool.
The Supreme Court acknowledged in Harris that the test for hos-
tile environment harassment "is not, and by its nature cannot be, a
mathematically precise test."440 At the same time, the analysis need
not be completely unprincipled. Despite the fact that hostile environ-
ment suits have been around for thirty years, the courts still have a
long way to go in defining the conduct that constitutes actionable har-
assment. Examining purported harassment in light of workplace cul-
ture adds another dimension to the analysis, hopefully making sexual
harassment law more predictable and uniform. Factoring workplace
culture into the hostile environment analysis is simply one small step
in the right direction.
440 Harris, 510 U.S. at 23.
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